Concept
Burden and Bargaining Context
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Burden and Bargaining Context
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) both limit stipulated damages to an amount that is reasonable in light of the loss and the difficulty of proving it, and both treat an unreasonably large sum as a penalty that will not be enforced.1 Neither says who must prove that a particular sum is reasonable or unreasonable. Courts have filled that gap in two steps. First, the party attacking the clause ordinarily carries the burden, so every contest begins with a presumption that the sum is valid. Second, the circumstances of the bargain affect how far a court trusts the figure the parties chose, since a sum negotiated by sophisticated parties earns more deference than one a stronger party dictated.
Who Bears the Burden
Most courts make the party attacking a stipulated damages clause prove that it is a penalty. In Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, the New Jersey Supreme Court quoted § 356(1) and then, consistent with the trend toward enforcing stipulated damages clauses, treated such clauses as presumptively reasonable and put the burden of proving unreasonableness on the challenger. Most courts today, it added, allocate the burden the same way.2 The rule has two parts that work together: a presumption that the clause is valid and a burden on the party who wants it set aside. A defendant who calls the sum a penalty must come forward with evidence, and a court that hears none enforces the clause.
Other courts reach the same allocation. A Nevada decision cited in Wasserman's, Haromy v. Sawyer, observed that liquidated damage provisions are generally prima facie valid and required the challenger to establish that applying the clause amounts to a penalty. Wassenaar demanded proof that the stipulated amount was grossly disproportionate to the actual harm and thus unreasonable.3 Texas places the burden of pleading and proof on the party asserting that a clause is a penalty,4 and Wahlcometroflex, Inc. v. Westar Energy, Inc. reflects the same allocation. A treatise states the rule in the same terms: the burden of proving that the agreed sum is disproportionate to the foreseeable or actual harm rests on the defendant.5
What the challenger must establish is that the clause punishes. When a party attacks a liquidated damages provision, the court asks whether it was a genuine attempt by the parties to settle damages in advance. If it was not, the court treats it as a penalty, meaning a provision whose purpose or effect is to punish or deter breach by imposing liability beyond reasonably anticipated loss, and refuses to enforce it.6
The burden allocates the work of proof, and the characterization of the clause stays a question of law for the court.7 Law and fact meet at the challenger's evidence. In Phillips v. Phillips, the Texas Supreme Court explained that a party can show a clause is unreasonable by proving that the actual damages were much less than the amount contracted for, and that showing requires the party to prove what the actual damages were.8 At the extreme, the Restatement comment says, if it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum is unenforceable. In its illustration, a builder's clause of $1,000 per day of delay fails because the owner lost nothing, having been delayed a month in getting permission to operate, and the loss was easy to prove.9 The challenger gathers the facts about the loss, and the court turns them into a legal conclusion.
Two ideas support putting the burden on the challenger. A clause the parties wrote down is, until shown otherwise, an attempt to settle damages in advance, which is the very question the penalty rule asks.10 And as Wasserman's observed in quoting Goetz and Scott, absent bargaining unfairness a stipulated damages clause reflects equivalent value, so the party who says it does not should show why.11 The same opinion adds that sophisticated parties negotiate these clauses to avoid the cost and uncertainty of litigation. Requiring the enforcing party to prove the figure reasonable at the outset would bring back some of that litigation.12
Winning the burden also changes what the nonbreaching party must prove afterward. In Barrie School v. Patch, the court held that a nonbreaching party has no duty to mitigate damages where the parties agreed to a valid liquidated sum in the event of breach.13 A clause that survives challenge therefore stands as the measure of recovery, and one that falls sends the parties back to proof of actual damages.
The second result in that scene reflects a minority position. Wasserman's noted Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. DiDonato, an earlier Appellate Division decision holding that the party advocating enforcement of a stipulated damages clause bears the burden of proof and persuasion.14 That allocation inverts the majority's logic. The party who wants the benefit of the stipulated sum must first justify it. An answer should therefore start from the majority rule and say that the court, not a factfinder, makes the final characterization. It should flag the minority allocation when the facts do not identify the jurisdiction.
Commercial and Consumer Parties
The reasonableness limit is the same for every signer, but courts adjust the scrutiny they give the figure. In Wasserman's, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that sophisticated parties acting with counsel often negotiate stipulated damages clauses to avoid the cost and uncertainty of litigation, and that they can be better placed than a court to provide a fair and efficient remedy. Absent concerns about unconscionability, it said, a court frequently need ask no more than whether the clause is reasonable.16
A negotiated figure earns that deference because the party who accepts it takes on a risk and can charge for carrying it. California highway contracts show the mechanism: high liquidated damages make contractors jittery, and the fear of costly delay pushes bid prices up.17 A promisor who traded a lower price or better terms for that risk has received value, and absent bargaining unfairness a stipulated damages clause reflects equivalent value.18
The inference weakens when one side dictates the term. The penalty rule began as a check on overreaching: equity refused to enforce penalties the parties had agreed on, and courts of law later adopted the rule to prevent over-reaching and to relieve unconscionable bargains.19 The modern line between penalty and liquidated damages grew out of equity's practice of relieving defaulting obligors from forfeiture of the penalty due under penal bonds.20 A stronger party that fixes an excessive sum recreates the problem the rule was built to solve.
The size of the sum does not decide the case in either direction. Some courts have upheld very large dollar amounts as reasonable liquidated damages when professionals such as doctors and lawyers freely negotiated their contracts.21 A large figure freely negotiated is not suspect for its size alone, and a small figure imposed by a dominant party is not safe for its smallness. The penalty rule also guards only against sums that are too large. A clause that sets damages disproportionately lower than the foreseeable or actual harm is not a penalty, although it may be struck down as unconscionable.22
Consumer contracts are harder. Wasserman's declined to decide how liquidated damages clauses fare in consumer contracts, while remaining sensitive to the possibility that such clauses may be unconscionable and unjust.23 Statutes sometimes supply the answer. California makes a liquidated damages provision valid unless the party seeking to invalidate it establishes that it was unreasonable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made, but the statute does not apply against a consumer or in certain other situations.24 Where no statute speaks, the parties' circumstances enter the reasonableness inquiry. Courts consider whether the parties were sophisticated, represented by counsel, and negotiating at arm's length, as in L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-Destin, Inc. Barrie Schooll v. Patch shows such a clause reaching ordinary families. The Patches enrolled their daughter for the 2004-2005 school year under a re-enrollment agreement with a cancellation deadline, and the agreement made them pay tuition for the entire year as liquidated damages if they withdrew her after that date.25 They argued that the form was a contract of adhesion and should not be enforced. The court disagreed. A contract of adhesion is not void per se, and a court refuses to enforce one only if it is unconscionable, which requires extreme unfairness shown by the lack of meaningful choice and by terms that unreasonably favor the other party.26
Bargaining unfairness can also defeat a clause that is not a penalty. In Commercial Real Estate Investment, L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., the court noted that to be enforceable a liquidated damages provision must not be the product of unfairness resulting from disparate bargaining positions, a lack of access to pertinent information, or anomalies in the bargaining process, such as monopolies, duress, or contracts of adhesion.27 Those defenses ask how the parties reached their agreement, while the penalty rule asks what the sum is. The two inquiries are independent, so a clause can survive one and fall to the other, and a form agreement raises the question of unfairness without answering it.
The penalty rule rests on public policy, so even a counseled signature cannot rescue a sum that punishes.29 The bargaining setting changes how much the court trusts the figure and which side is likely to carry the proof. The test itself stays in place.