Concept
Doubts Against the Breacher
Certainty of damages
Doubts Against the Breacher
Section 352 caps recovery at the amount the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty,1 yet the breacher's own conduct can make that amount hard to prove. Comment a answers with a counterweight: doubts are generally resolved against the party in breach.2 A party who has forced the injured party to seek compensation in damages should not be allowed to profit from the breach once it is established that a significant loss has occurred.3
Two further features of the comment shape how courts apply the counterweight. Damages need not be calculable with mathematical accuracy and are often at best approximate. A court may also weigh all the circumstances of the breach, including whether it was willful, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of certainty, which leaves the trier of fact greater discretion over the amount.4 In effect, the comment allocates risk: once the claimant has done what § 352 demands, the leftover imprecision falls on the breacher.
The allocation is older than the Restatement. In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., the Court explained that when the wrong itself makes damages hard to measure, they may not rest on mere speculation or guess, but it is enough that the evidence shows their extent as a matter of just and reasonable inference, even if the result is only approximate.5 The wrongdoer may not complain that the loss was not measured with the exactness that would have been possible had the case, which he alone is responsible for making, been otherwise.6
The reason for the rule appears in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, whose reasoning Modic v. Modic reproduced. Any other rule would let the wrongdoer profit by the wrong at the victim's expense, and it would invite wrongdoing so effective and complete that no measure of damages could be found. The more grievous the wrong, the less likely any recovery.7 A lost-profit claim shows the point. The claimant must prove what would have happened had the promise been kept, and the breach is what prevented that world from happening: the sales never made, the customers never served. Because the breacher's own act opened the gap in the proof, the breacher is better placed than the claimant to bear its cost.
United States Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc. shows the principle at work. A licensee breached its contract by releasing a paperback edition early, and the publisher lost hardcover sales as a result. Nobody could prove how many hardcovers would have sold in the rest of September, so the court looked to the publisher's August 1985 sales. The appellate court held that this choice was within the prerogative of the court as finder of fact: any evidence of the unimpeded September volume would necessarily have been hypothetical, and it is not error to lay the normal uncertainty in such hypotheses at the door of the wrongdoer who altered the proper course of events, not at the door of the injured party.8 The court cited comment a for the proposition that "Doubts are generally resolved against the party in breach."9
Two facts kept that allocation from becoming a guess. The loss itself was established, so the only open question was its size. And the court had a record to start from: hardcover sales had declined from March through August 1985, but they continued through the end of the year at roughly 3,000 copies a month.10
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co. reaches the same result from another direction. The plaintiff sued because the defendant had failed to use its best efforts to further the manufacture and sale of the products covered by their agreement, and the plaintiff's president testified to an estimate of the additional profit the company would have earned. The court conceded that some of that testimony was highly speculative, yet held that the defendant could not complain of it, because the defendant itself had insisted that the question be opened. Independent evidence also supported the verdict: the jury could compute damages from the profits previously made by a going business, and the court noted evidence that other business was available to the plaintiff.11 The opinion also quotes a passage observing that where experience shows a substantial pecuniary loss has occurred but its amount cannot be proved, the defendant usually has reason to foresee the difficulty of proof and should not profit from it. In those cases it is reasonable to require a lesser degree of certainty, leaving greater discretion to the jury, subject to the court's usual supervisory power.12
The principle reaches uncertainty about the amount of damages, not uncertainty about whether damages exist. If the claimant cannot prove the existence of lost profits with reasonable certainty, the court denies them whatever the defendant's conduct. If the claimant proves some lost profits, even $1, the court invokes the wrongdoer exception and lets the jury estimate the rest.13 That line preserves the certainty requirement. Without it, any breach that made proof difficult would excuse proof altogether.
The principle also never licenses a guess. Bigelow, as quoted in Modic, holds that even where the defendant's wrong has prevented a more precise computation, the jury may not return a verdict based on speculation or guesswork, though it may make a just and reasonable estimate from relevant data.14 The Stentor court described the task as reconciling two principles: the claimant is entitled to compensation despite some uncertainty about the amount, and the jury must have reasonable guides and may not make an uncontrolled guess.15 Courts reject pure speculation, not reasonable estimates grounded in evidence, and they keep the power to revisit an excessive award after trial.16 Comment a adds that courts have grown more receptive to sophisticated economic and financial data and to expert opinion, which makes the standard easier to meet.17
Willfulness is only one consideration among several. A secondary-source list of the factors that inform the judgment includes the court's confidence that the estimate is accurate, whether the court is certain the injured party suffered at least some damage, the defendant's blameworthiness or moral fault, whether the plaintiff produced the best available evidence of lost profits, the amount at stake, and whether another method of compensating the injured party exists.18 On that list, a claimant who withholds available proof gains little from the defendant's bad conduct, and a claimant who cannot show that any damage occurred gains nothing.
A different line of authority refused to let bad faith change the rule. That court acknowledged that the defendant's bad faith would ordinarily entitle it to little consideration, but held that bad faith cannot reverse a well-settled rule of law that must be general in its application. Individual hardship, it reasoned, is a lesser evil than bending the rule to rebuke a wrong, however grievous.19 Comment a differs in emphasis. It does not displace the certainty rule, but it lets willfulness inform how much certainty a court requires.20