Concept
Excluding Consequential Damages
UCC buyer's consequential damages
Excluding Consequential Damages
A buyer can clear every hurdle in section 2-715(2)(a) and still recover nothing for its consequential loss. It may prove that the loss grew out of needs the seller had reason to know of at contracting, and that cover or other reasonable steps could not have prevented it.1 If the contract validly excludes consequential damages, those showings buy it nothing. The statutory conditions say when consequential recovery is available by default; a clause decides whether the default applies at all.
The statutory hurdles come first, and the buyer carries them. Landmark bought a Wash Pac Unit from Chrysler at auction, but it was already leasing a Wash Pac Unit from Brite, O-Matic and had no contact with Chrysler before or at the auction. The court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude that the cost of hiring someone to wash cars by hand was not a loss from needs Chrysler had reason to know of when it sold the unit. Landmark had not met its burden, so it recovered nothing for that cost.2
A seller who wants protection beyond the reason-to-know limit can write it into the contract. The commentary to section 2-715 tells any seller who does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages to use the section on contractual limitation of remedy.3 That section is 2-719, and its subsection (3) lets the parties allocate "unknown or undeterminable risks." A term that limits or excludes consequential damages stays subject to scrutiny for unconscionability, which means a court may decline to enforce it as so oppressive or one-sided. But courts usually uphold these clauses between business persons.4
The Code tolerates the clause because consequential exposure differs in kind from direct exposure. A buyer's direct damages are finite and can be gauged in advance from the contract price or the market price. Consequential losses can exceed the value of the goods many times over, and their size depends on the buyer's own operations and its contracts with third parties, which the seller neither sees nor controls. Facing that open-ended exposure, a seller can only raise its prices or narrow its markets. An exclusion lets it sell at a price that reflects the risks it can measure and leaves the buyer, who alone knows its downstream dealings, to guard against the rest.
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co. shows how firmly a commercial exclusion can hold. The New Jersey Supreme Court said that whether the preclusion of consequential damages is effective depends on the circumstances. It added that the failure of an exclusive repair remedy of its essential purpose, though a discrete question, is not irrelevant to whether enforcing the exclusion would be unconscionable. The court treated the exclusion as an allocation of risk and enforced it.5 The reasoning rested on commercial circumstances: parties of comparable sophistication, a limitation clearly expressed, and a seller that kept trying to fix the problem.
Section 2-719(2) supplies the other half of the picture. An apparently fair clause that, in the circumstances of its application, fails in its purpose or deprives a party of the substantial value of the bargain must give way to the Code's general remedy provisions.6 A seller who promises repair and cannot repair has failed in that way, so the buyer is no longer confined to the promise. Whether the buyer also recovers consequential damages is a separate question, and Kearney answers it through unconscionability. The two clauses guard different interests: the repair promise assures a working product, and its failure is the seller's breach, while the exclusion records who carries losses that depend on the buyer's own operations. A failed repair does not change who agreed to carry those. Unconscionability turns on the facts, and a seller that keeps trying is better placed than one that abandons the effort.
The words of the clause fix what it removes. In Council Bros., Inc. v. Ray Burner Co., Burnham's warranty provided that no claim would be allowed "for cost of removing, returning, or replacing defective parts or for other consequential damages." The court found it difficult to visualize a clearer way to express an exclusive limitation on the measure of damages.7 The same opinion still let Ray Burner be indemnified for the $3,505.72 that Council Brothers paid others for repairs on the boiler. The trial court found those expenses reasonably incurred in an effort to make the boiler function properly, which made them incidental damages, and the quoted clause does not mention incidental damages.8 The classification work from earlier sections therefore sets the reach of a clause. Drafting that names consequential damages removes consequential damages, and a seller who wants more must say more.
The statute's own limit appears at the opposite end of the market. Suppose a driver buys a car for personal use. The steering mechanism fails, the car hits a wall, and the driver is injured. The warranty limits the buyer to repair or replacement of the mechanism and excludes consequential damages. Section 2-719(3) makes a limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods prima facie unconscionable, so a court presumes the exclusion invalid unless the seller shows otherwise. A limitation of damages where the loss is commercial carries no such presumption. The driver therefore in all likelihood recovers consequential damages for the injury under section 2-715(2)(b).9 The contrast with a machine-tool sale follows from what each buyer can do at the bargaining table. A business buyer can trade a lower price for taking on commercial risk, and it can negotiate or insure. A consumer signs a standard form with no real say over its terms and cannot sensibly price the risk of bodily injury.
A commercial setting does not guarantee enforcement either. Moscatiello v. Pittsburgh Contractors Equipment Co. affirmed a verdict for the buyer of a defective concrete paver after the trial court refused to enforce the sales contract's exclusion of incidental and consequential damages. The court applied a test that combines the absence of a meaningful choice with terms unreasonably favorable to the other party, a test aimed at oppression and unfair surprise. Kearney sits at the other end of the range. There the commercial buyer had agreed to a clear limitation that the court saw no reason to disturb. There is also authority that an exclusion of consequential damages need not necessarily be conspicuous to be valid, so a hidden clause is not invalid on that ground alone.10 Concealment still counts as evidence of unconscionability, because it suggests the buyer had neither notice of the term nor a choice about it.
When an exclusion fails, or does not reach the loss, the buyer is sent back to proof. It must still show the consequential loss to a fair degree of certainty, not mathematical certainty. Damages cannot rest on conjecture, but a reasonable prospect of loss, such as a firm contract with a downstream buyer, should not be defeated by conjecture either.11