Concept
Causation and Certainty
UCC buyer's consequential damages
Causation and Certainty
Satisfying the two conditions of § 2-715(2)(a), reason to know at contracting and unpreventability by cover or otherwise, clears only part of the buyer’s burden.1 Those conditions sort losses by kind. They ask whether a type of loss is one the seller can fairly be charged with, given what it knew when it set its price and what the buyer could have done afterward.2 Two further requirements apply to every item of loss the buyer claims: the buyer must show that the breach caused the loss, and it must prove the loss and its amount with enough certainty to support a figure.
Consequential losses arise in the buyer’s own dealings, often with third parties, and many forces besides the seller’s breach move those dealings.3 A buyer’s profit can fall because demand slumps, a competitor cuts prices, or its own managers err. Without a causation rule, a buyer holding a late shipment could blame every bad quarter on the seller. Without a proof requirement, a trier of fact would have no way to test the number the buyer proposed. Courts therefore leave the burden on the buyer. Landmark bought a Wash Pac Unit at auction and sought the cost of hiring someone to hand-wash cars. It was already leasing a Wash Pac Unit from another company and had no contact with Chrysler before or at the auction, so the court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude the cost was not a loss from needs Chrysler had reason to know of, and that Landmark “has not met its burden.”4
The two requirements govern the claim for consequential damages, which is only one of the buyer’s remedies. A buyer that has paid some or all of the price of identified goods may also, in certain circumstances, recover the goods themselves.5 Causation comes first below, then reasonable certainty.
Causation
The lead-in to § 2-715(2) limits recovery to “consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach,” and proof of a breach does not by itself satisfy that phrase.6 An opinion in Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories states the consequence plainly: once a buyer has demonstrated a breach of warranty, it “may recover only for damages that are caused by the breach.”7 The breach opens the door to damages, and causation decides how much of the claim passes through it. The buyer must make that showing item by item, because idle-production profits, replacement costs, and refunds to customers each have a separate causal story.
Secondary authority describes consequential damages as losses that were a proximate result of the breach and were reasonably foreseeable when the parties contracted.8 Foreseeability corresponds to the reason-to-know condition already studied, so what remains here is the factual link between the breach and the loss. Berge Helene, Ltd. v. GE Oil & Gas, Inc. shows a buyer losing on that link alone. Berge had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that GE’s alleged breaches were “a substantial cause” of its financial damages. The court assumed without deciding that Texas law, the only law the parties had briefed, applied. It found “many significant contributing causes” of the “innumerable problems” that the M60 compression module experienced, and it was unpersuaded that GE’s conduct was a proximate cause of the damages sought.9 When many causes contribute to a loss, the buyer must tie the seller’s share of the trouble to the dollars it claims. Pointing to the seller among the causes does not carry that burden.
A repair date in the middle of a claim shows where the line falls.
The profits for January through early July are recoverable if the other requirements are met, because the malfunction kept the lift from earning them. The profits for the rest of the year are not, because the arborist’s own decision to sell caused that loss. The question that sorts the two periods is whether the loss would have occurred had the goods conformed to the contract. Before the repair, a conforming lift would have been out cutting trees, so the idle months trace to the breach. After the repair, the lift worked as promised and the arborist still earned nothing from it, so the same loss would have occurred under perfect performance.
This inquiry differs from mitigation. Mitigation asks whether the buyer could have prevented a loss, and a loss the buyer could have prevented by cover or otherwise is not recoverable.10 Causation comes first and asks whether the breach produced the loss at all, which for the months after the repair it did not.
The buyer’s own circumstances can break the chain as well. In Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., the plaintiff’s theory depended on extra production, for which he said a ready market existed, during a period when he was not using the defendant’s Ambrex 810 oil. The court found no case even remotely in point and held the theory without merit: the failure to produce at full capacity in that period “was not due to a breach of warranty but was clearly due to the plaintiff’s capital resources.” The oil company “cannot be held responsible for the capitalization of plaintiff’s business,” and if a market for the extra output really existed, “surely there were conventional sources available to finance this production.”11
A stranger to the contract can interrupt the chain too. In Worthington decision, the court denied Uniroyal’s motion for summary judgment and sent the issue of damages to the trier of fact, to be measured by the Worthington purchase order as modified. It barred consequential damages, however, for losses resulting from the failure of the Anchor Packing replacement expansion joints.12 The ruling fits the causation requirement, because those losses followed from a different supplier’s joints and not from Uniroyal’s breach. A seller answers for the consequences of its own breach, not for another supplier’s later failure.
The same inquiry applies to individual expense items, and labels do not decide it. In Michiana Mack, Inc. v. Allendale Rural Fire Protection, the court emphasized that both incidental and consequential damages must result from the seller’s breach, and it held that the payment of insurance premiums and interest “did not result from Michiana’s breach.”13 A buyer who would pay premiums and interest on conforming goods as well cannot say the breach produced them. Riley v. Ken Wilson Ford, Inc., by contrast, approved awards for liability and collision insurance, a towing charge, and interest.14
Expenses that follow directly from the ordinary course of events after a breach pose no causal difficulty. A court applying Pennsylvania law treated survey expenses after a train derailment with serious cargo loss as incidental damages, because they flow directly from the ordinary course of events and are substantially equivalent to cover costs, expenses incurred in an attempt to mitigate damages.15 Another court held that the time and money a buyer spent analyzing cracked casings and dealing with the resulting delays flowed from “the ordinary course of events,” and so fell outside a clause excluding incidental and consequential damages.16 Classification matters most when a contract excludes consequential damages, a subject for a later section. Whatever the label, the buyer needs evidence that it incurred the expense because of the breach.
Some losses have two causes at once, and the buyer’s own conduct can be one of them. In a wheat dispute, the trial court found the elevator, which was claiming consequential damages, 49 percent responsible for those damages and deducted that percentage from the award. The court said the elevator had “failed to take reasonable measure (sic) to mitigate or reduce to a minimum the losses,” and it noted that “there was no testing of any kind of the wheat delivered on May 9.” The appellate court treated the allocation of fault as a finding of fact that it would not overturn unless convinced the trial court had made a mistake.17 Apportionment avoids an all-or-nothing choice between letting the buyer shift its own carelessness to the seller and denying recovery for a loss the breach helped cause.
Reasonable Certainty
The buyer must prove each consequential loss with reasonable certainty, though not with mathematical precision.19 Courts state the same burden as “a fair degree of certainty,” and they do not require the buyer “to demonstrate its damages with mathematical certainty.”20 Causation asks whether the breach produced each item of loss. This requirement asks how firmly the buyer must prove that the loss occurred and how large it was.
The standard guards against error in two directions. Damages cannot rest on conjecture or surmise, but a reasonable prospect of damages, such as an existing contract shows, should not be defeated by conjecture or surmise either. NKS held a firm contract with a Russian buyer for 3,000 units, and its first shipment from the seller did not conform. The court conceded there was no assurance the full quantity would ultimately be sold. It held, though, that the firm contract made it a reasonable inference that the contract would have been fulfilled had the first shipment conformed.21
Each half of the standard has its reason. Consequential losses arise in dealings that many forces besides the breach affect, and a figure that no rational method can check turns compensation into guesswork. The breach also makes the buyer’s task harder, because the buyer must reconstruct what would have happened with performance, and that reconstruction never yields an exact answer. If an approximate figure defeated the claim, the seller would profit from the uncertainty its own default created. The standard therefore sorts claims by the quality of their foundation. It demands firm evidence that the loss happened and a reasonable basis, though not an exact one, for sizing it.
Traynor v. Walters shows a claim with no foundation. The buyer was to supply florists in New York City during the Christmas season of 1967 and could not perform those contracts. It claimed lost future profits resulting from loss of goodwill, and the court called damages of that nature “entirely too speculative for reasonable calculation” and left them out of the award.22 An existing contract fixes a quantity and a counterparty. Goodwill predicts what many customers will do in later years, and nothing fixes it. See also Harry Rubin & Sons v. Consolidated Pipe Co. Goodwill and future business return in a later section.
Even a loss that plainly occurred can fail at the amount stage when the evidence does not match the claim. In Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co., the buyer’s losses were primarily lost anticipated profits, with no personal injury and no injury to other property. Its expert put the total financial loss at $540,921 or $723,323 for the three-year estimated life of the equipment, depending on the price received per cord of wood. The jury nonetheless awarded $1,000,000, covering not only lost profits from missed production schedules but also “other unspecified damages.”23 The gap between the quantified evidence and the verdict is the kind of gap this requirement exists to police.
Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer shows a second way a claim fails. After lightning struck Tanzer’s home a second time and damaged several components of his “smart home” system, he hired Marquis to repair the programming and also to upgrade the system by adding video distribution. His expert’s testimony commingled the cost of the upgrades with the alleged cost of repairs.24 The appellate court found the proof deficient on whether consequential damages were warranted and, if so, in what amounts. It declined to disturb a finding that rested on the trial court’s observation that it was “difficult, if not impossible” to determine which of Marquis’s costs flowed from nonconforming items.25 The allowance for approximation helps a buyer who has tied its loss to the breach. It gives no help to a buyer whose evidence leaves the court unable to tell recoverable costs from the rest.