Concept
Reason to Know at Contracting
UCC buyer's consequential damages
Reason to Know at Contracting
Section 2-715(2)(a) makes the seller answer for the buyer's consequential loss only if the loss results from “general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.”1 The clause asks what notice the seller had, when it made the deal, of what the buyer meant to do with the goods. Notice matters because a consequential loss does not arise within the immediate buyer-seller transaction. It stems from the buyer's dealings, often with third parties, and it is recoverable only if the breaching party could reasonably have foreseen it at the time of contracting.2
The condition also guards a boundary. The Code's remedies are liberally administered to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as full performance would have, but, as Michigan's enactment puts it, “neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law.”3 Section 2-715(2) is where the Code specifically provides for the buyer's consequential damages, so its conditions mark the edge of that recovery.
Consequential damages are one buyer remedy among several. Section 2-711 indexes the remedies of a buyer that has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance, and section 2-714 those of a buyer that has finally accepted them.4 A buyer that has paid some or all of the price of identified goods may, in certain circumstances, recover the goods themselves.5 The Code seeks to balance buyer and seller remedies evenhandedly, so that in theory neither side holds an advantage as the non-breaching party.6 The reason-to-know condition fits that design: the seller answers for the buyer's derivative losses only when it could have seen them coming.
The condition descends from Hadley v. Baxendale. A loss that the parties could not fairly and reasonably have contemplated when they made the contract, the court explained, would neither flow naturally from the breach in the great multitude of such cases nor be the product of special circumstances communicated to or known by the defendants.7
The Code keeps the time of contracting but frames the question objectively. Official Comment 3 makes the seller liable for consequential damages in all cases where it had reason to know of the buyer's general or particular requirements at the time of contracting. The buyer need not show that the seller consciously accepted an insurer's liability, and the seller's obligation is not limited to cases in which it failed to use due effort in good faith.8 A seller “had reason to know” what a reasonable person would have known, and the test of necessity also covers what the seller actually knows.9
Reason to know is the first of two conditions in the statute. The second, that the loss could not reasonably have been prevented by cover or otherwise, is developed in the next major section.10 The subsections below take up the first condition in four steps: how the Code replaced the tacit-agreement test, which needs the seller is charged with knowing, when that knowledge must exist, and what the seller must have foreseen.
Tacit Agreement Rejected
The statute asks what the seller “had reason to know” at contracting.11 It does not ask whether the seller promised anything, and that omission marks the break with a stricter reading of the older rule, the tacit-agreement test.
Under that test, a plaintiff could recover consequential damages arising from special circumstances only if “the defendant fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, [such liability] when the contract was made.”12 In effect, the plaintiff had to prove that the parties specifically contemplated consequential damages and that the defendant actually assumed the risk of them.13 Other cases, and certainly the recent trend of authority, have rejected the test.14
The test is hard to meet in ordinary commerce. Sellers do not announce, in a routine sale, that they will answer for the buyer's idle plant or lost resales, and buyers rarely think to ask. A rule that demands proof of a conversation nobody had would excuse nearly every silent seller, including one that knew exactly how the buyer meant to use the goods.
R.I. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Products Corp. shows what replaced it. Lampus knew all of its buyer Neville's requirements and needs: the structural and aesthetic standards the cement blocks had to meet, the use Neville made of them, and that Neville formed them into planks for structural floor and ceiling systems.15 The “had reason to know” test, the court explained, does not require a showing that the seller contemplated or tacitly agreed to certain consequential damages. A seller that knows of the buyer's general or particular requirements and needs is liable for the resulting consequential damages whether or not it contemplated or agreed to them.16 Actual knowledge is therefore the easy end of the test. A seller that knows cannot defeat recovery by saying it never thought of itself as an insurer, and the reasonable-person standard reaches the further needs that the seller should have recognized.
Courts applying the Code have also set aside pre-Code authority that rests on the old requirement. In Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., the court answered an argument built on a line of non-Code cases by observing that they relied on a rule the Official Commentary to § 2-715 expressly rejects.17 The same Commentary tells the seller where its protection lies: “Any seller who does not wish to take the risk of consequential damages has available the section on contractual limitation of remedy.”18
Because the standard is objective, a buyer that never warned the seller may still recover. In Hendricks & Associates v. Daewoo Corp., the seller argued that the buyer never told it a breach might cost the buyer a business client. The court rejected the argument: actual knowledge is not a requisite of foreseeability, and the proper inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent seller would have contemplated the loss when the contract was made.19 Daewoo had twice before made garments for the same client at the buyer's request and had seen that client react strongly to relatively minor departures from design specifications, which should have alerted it that the client expected precise specifications.20 Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co. states the principle in general terms. The Code imposes an objective rather than a subjective standard, actual knowledge by the seller of the buyer's requirements is not required, and the only requirement is that the seller reasonably should have been expected to know of the buyer's exposure to loss.21
Two other limits keep the objective standard from becoming open-ended. The buyer cannot recover consequential loss that it could have prevented by cover or otherwise, and a clause excluding consequential damages bars recovery.22
The standard widens liability only to what the seller should have known, so it defeats a claim as readily as it supports one. In Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., the buyer sought the cost of renting cars for its own customers. The court observed that it could hardly be said that the dealer, either when it sold the car or at any time afterward, had “reason to know” that the buyer would accommodate its customers by renting them cars and ultimately assuming the rental cost.23 Lampus and Schneidt rest on the same objective test. They differ in what the circumstances told the seller at contracting: the block maker knew the structural use and standards its blocks had to meet, while nothing in the car sale suggested a rental program. In each case the question was what a seller in that position had reason to know, and the answers differed because the facts visible at the time of sale differed.
General and Particular Needs
Section 2-715(2)(a) names two kinds of needs, “general or particular,”25 and the cases show that they reach the seller by different routes. A general need follows from the buyer's evident line of business: a seller that knows how the goods will be used knows what a breach will cost, without being told. A particular need belongs to one buyer's circumstances and ordinarily reaches the seller only through what the buyer discloses or what the parties' dealings reveal.
Resale is the first general need. A seller that knows the buyer intends to resell has reason to know that nondelivery will cost the buyer its profit on those sales, because the breach prevents a profitable resale.26 The inference needs no more than knowledge of the buyer's line of work, and the objective standard supplies the rest: actual knowledge of the buyer's exposure is not required.27 A buyer that has already lined up its own customer remains a buyer. In Allied Canners & Packers, Inc. v. Victor Packing Co., the court concluded that Allied was a buyer in its contract with Victor and that it had a “forward contract” to sell the raisins to Shoei, so the Code's buyer remedies applied to it.28 See also Bende and Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc. (boots bought for resale); Simeone v. First Bank National Ass'n (vehicle parts bought for trade or resale).
Production is the second general need. In Lewis, the seller knew that its oil would run the buyer's sawmill and that defective oil would make the equipment operate improperly, and curtailed production and lost profits followed naturally from the equipment's failure.29 A seller that knows how its goods will be used need not be told what their failure will cost. See also Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co. (compressor train in an ammonia plant). Resale and production rest on the same inference but cost the buyer different things: a defect in goods bought for resale costs the margin on sales the buyer cannot make, while a defect in a production input costs the output of a line that cannot run.
A particular need becomes chargeable to the seller when the buyer makes it known. In Jetpac Group, Ltd. v. Bostek, Inc., the buyer told the seller, Bostek, that a shipment of 100 computers was only the first in a prospective sale of 3,000 units to a buyer in Russia.30 Bostek thus had reason to know that a defective shipment could jeopardize that opportunity and cost the buyer the profits it could reasonably have earned had all 3,000 units shipped.31 The disclosure supplied the notice, and no promise by the seller to bear the risk was involved.
Decisions denying recovery show what missing notice looks like. Schneidt and Landmark, discussed elsewhere in this unit, turn on the absence of facts that would have alerted the seller. See also Egerer v. CSR West, LLC (lost rents on commercial space); McCoolidge v. Oyvetsky (loss of access to accessibility equipment).
Time of Contracting
The statute fixes the date for testing notice in its own words: the buyer's loss must result from needs “of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know.”33 Formation therefore controls. What a reasonable seller in that position understood when the deal was made decides the question, and facts that surface between contracting and breach do not enter it. The general definition of consequential damages says the same, asking whether the breaching party could reasonably have foreseen the loss at the time of contracting.34 See also Beard Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc. (construing “at the time of contracting” in Virginia's version of § 2-715(2)(a)).
Fixing the date at formation ties the test to the information the parties had when they bargained. A seller decides whether to sell, what to charge, and whether to propose a limit on its liability from the exposure it can see when it signs. If later facts could enlarge that exposure, the buyer, which alone controls its own downstream commitments, could add to the seller's risk without paying for it. Testing at breach would also screen out almost nothing, because once a loss has happened nearly any loss looks foreseeable in hindsight.
Landmark Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp. shows thin notice at formation. Landmark bought a Wash Pac Unit from Chrysler at an auction and later sought, among other damages, the cost of hiring someone to wash cars by hand. When it bought, Landmark was already leasing a Wash Pac Unit from another company, and it had no contact with Chrysler before or at the auction.35 The court held that the trial court could reasonably conclude that the hand-washing cost was not a loss resulting from needs that Chrysler had reason to know of when it sold the unit.36 Landmark bore the burden on the point, had not met it, and could not recover those damages.37
The decisions that find reason to know rest on facts the seller held when it contracted. Daewoo had made garments twice before for the same client at the buyer's request,38 and Bostek had been told that its shipment was only the first of 3,000 units.39 Chrysler had nothing comparable.
Because the inquiry turns on what a reasonable seller in that position knew when the deal was made, it is ordinarily a question of fact. Unless it can be ruled on as a matter of law, the trier of fact decides it, and a finding supported by the evidence cannot be overturned on appeal.40 Dakota Grain Co. v. Ehrmantrout illustrates how much rides on that finding. The trial court there awarded an elevator consequential damages of $11,332.51, representing 51 percent of the damages the elevator incurred in settling with four farmers.41 It had deducted the other 49 percent because the elevator failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate, noting that none of the wheat delivered on May 9 had been tested; the next major section takes up that limit.42 On the reason-to-know question, however, the appellate court found the trial court's statements inconsistent about whether the seller, Ehrmantrout, knew or should have known when he entered the contract that his wheat was intended to be resold by the elevator for seed. Calling that question the key element in deciding whether consequential damages were appropriate, it remanded for clarification of the findings.43
Because the Code asks only what the seller had reason to know, and not what it agreed to bear, notice is easier to prove than an assumption of risk. The buyer must still show that cover or other reasonable steps could not have prevented the loss.44 A separate question, taken up next, is how much of the loss the seller must have anticipated.
Type Versus Amount
Section 2-715(2)(a) speaks of the buyer's “general or particular requirements and needs,”46 and its words leave open what the seller must have had reason to anticipate. On one reading, the seller must have had reason to know the type of loss the buyer would suffer, such as lost resale profit. On another, it must have had reason to know how large that loss would be. The text requires neither as such; it asks only whether the buyer's requirements and needs were foreseeable, though courts often treat the rule as identical to the traditional foreseeability rule.47
Most courts choose the first reading. Reason to anticipate the type of loss generally makes the damage foreseeable, and the cases requiring reason to know the amount are less common.48 A seller that knows its buyer intends to resell has reason to know that breach would prevent a profitable resale.49 That notice is all the seller needs to appraise the risk: every undelivered unit is a sale the buyer cannot make. How large the profit proves to be depends on the buyer's bargain with its own customer and on later markets, and the seller controls neither.
A minority of courts require reason to know of the amount as well. A seller that knew the buyer intended to resell might expect the resale price to include a modest profit. If the buyer instead negotiated an unusually high price, the fact that such large profits did not seem probable at formation limits recovery: the buyer recovers the profit the seller had reason to expect, but not the excess.50
Whichever reading a court adopts, the buyer must still prove how much it lost, a question the later section on certainty takes up. The notice condition does not relieve the buyer of that burden.
The line between foreseeable profits and market value can shift in the buyer's favor. A plaintiff that cannot show how much profit it would have earned had an asset been delivered on time can recover the asset's fair market value. That value reflects the ordinary profits anyone could make from the asset, but not unusual profits that only the plaintiff might have made. Because fair market value is assessed as of the date of delivery, it includes profits likely at that time even if they were unforeseeable when the contract was formed, so damages may shift from consequential losses to market losses.51
The reason-to-know condition also stops at the boundary of consequential damages, and courts police that boundary. In a train-derailment case, the court held that survey expenses were incidental damages rather than the “consequential, special [or] indirect damages” that the parties' contract limited, because survey expenses are inspection expenses that flow directly from the ordinary course of events following a derailment with serious cargo loss.52 They are substantially equivalent to cover costs, being incurred to mitigate damages, and they do not result “other than in the ordinary course of events.”53 Cover is likewise a separate measure: a buyer that can cover only in part is entitled to the net cost of cover, the difference between the cover price and the contract price plus expenses, together with any consequential damages as defined in § 2-715, less expenses saved.54 The condition sits in the definition of the consequential component and not in the cover measure.