Concept
Knowledge of Purpose Versus Detail
Causation and foreseeability
Knowledge of Purpose Versus Detail
A breaching party answers for loss outside the ordinary course only when it had reason to know of the special circumstances that produced the loss.1 The Restatement does not say how much knowledge counts. A breacher may know only that the plaintiff is in business, or what the plaintiff will do with the promised performance, or the terms of one particular deal that the performance is meant to feed. These are three different amounts of information, and the cases sort claimed losses by which amount supports each. Knowing the use is enough for the ordinary yield of that use. Knowing only the business is not. A specific deal binds the breacher only if it was disclosed or otherwise known when the contract was made.
Section 351(1) sets the moment of measurement: the breacher is not liable for loss it did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made.2 The earlier discussion of kind of loss showed that the exact amount need not have been foreseen. This section asks which details of the plaintiff's plans a breacher must have known. The line falls where it does because of what a breacher can price at formation. A breacher who knows the use can estimate, in general terms, what failure will cost the plaintiff: the profit that use would have earned. It can then raise its price, insure, or limit its liability. Knowing only that the plaintiff is in business says little about what the performance is for, and an undisclosed deal gives the breacher nothing to price against.
Knowing the General Use
In Basic Capital Management, Inc. v. Dynex Commercial, Inc., the lender, Dynex, breached a loan commitment and argued that the consequences were not foreseeable because it did not know the specific venture in which the borrower intended to engage. The court found no authority for that position. A lender need not know the venture. It is enough that it knew the nature of the borrower's intended use of the money.3 General knowledge of the borrower's business was a different matter: standing alone, it gave the lender no reason to foresee the probable results of refusing the loan.4 The venture is detail downstream of a use the lender knew, while knowledge of the business alone does not reveal what the money is for.
Sales contracts raise the same question. A buyer's consequential damages may include lost profits, but the buyer must establish causation, foreseeability, reasonable certainty as to amount, and that mitigation doctrines do not bar recovery.5 A seller that knows its buyer resells holds the same information the lender held: it knows what the goods are for, though not who will buy them. Basic Capital's reasoning therefore points toward charging the seller with the profit a resale would ordinarily yield, without any need to name the buyer's customers. Which UCC provision indexes the buyer's remedies depends on acceptance. Section 2-711 applies when the buyer has not accepted the goods or has justifiably revoked acceptance, and § 2-714 applies once the buyer has finally accepted.6 The sales parallels, including § 2-715, appear later in this chapter.
The role the buyer plays shapes what its loss looks like. If the seller knew the buyer was a middleman, the net profit the buyer would have realized on resale is a proper measure of the buyer's expectation interest and the seller's liability.7 An end-user presents a harder case. Suppose the buyer claims that the missing equipment shut down a major manufacturing division and cost six months of operating income. That loss is plainly a consequence of the breach, but its scope depends on the buyer's own operations, and the seller may not have known of them, or been able to foresee them, when the contract was made.8 Whether the loss is chargeable then turns on § 351(2)(b): did the seller have reason to know the special circumstances behind it?
Specific Deals and Future Contracts
Marcus & Co. v. K.L.G. Baking Co. shows where that rule stops. The court restated that a seller answers for losses that would probably result in the ordinary course of things from breach under the special circumstances known to the parties when the contract was made, losses the law ordinarily treats as within both parties' contemplation.10 From that formulation it followed that a seller who knows only that the buyer intends to resell is not liable for the buyer's lost profit on a particular subcontract whose existence was not made known at the time of the sale. That special injury was not within the seller's contemplation as the probable result of breach.11 Marcus does not make knowledge of resale irrelevant. It addresses one claim, profit on a specific subcontract. The two lines fit together once each claim is sorted by what it depends on. A claim for the profit the known use would ordinarily yield rests on information the seller had. A claim resting on the price, terms, or penalties of one particular deal rests on information only the buyer had.
Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America applies the same line to an even thinner showing. A company paid to transmit a business cable in cipher failed to send it. It understood that the cable related to business but did not understand the particular message, and Judge Cardozo's opinion held, under the principle in Hadley, that it was not liable for the sender's lost profits.12 Knowing that a message concerns business tells the company only that the sender is in business. Basic Capital makes the same point about a borrower's business: general knowledge of it gave no reason to foresee the probable results of refusing the loan.13
A different gap appears in Coppola v. Kraushaar. The defendant's failure to deliver two gowns ordered for a bride delayed the wedding. The bride then broke off the engagement, and the suitor sued for the five hundred dollars he had spent on the wedding. The court held the damages too remote: without specific warning, it was hardly to be contemplated that she would forever refuse to wed if the gowns were not ready by the day set.14 The loss depended on her own decision, and no specific warning had pointed to that decision.
Specific knowledge can also widen what a breacher answers for. A seller who knows the buyer is purchasing to resell is generally charged with the lost resale profit, but profit on future contracts is a separate question. In Hendricks & Associates v. Daewoo Corp., an import agent bought garments from a Korean manufacturer that knew the garments were needed for resale to Champion, a wholesaler with which the importer had a continuing relationship. The garments were so defective that they were too risky to market, and Champion ended the relationship. The First Circuit held that a rational jury could find that the manufacturer could have foreseen that so severe and pervasive a nonconforming tender would probably cost the importer future Champion contracts in the ordinary course of events. What separates Hendricks from Marcus is what each seller was told. The Marcus seller knew only of an intention to resell. The Daewoo manufacturer knew the customer and the continuing relationship, so the lost future business sat inside the use it had been told about.
The first step does most of the work, because a single claim for lost profit often mixes the ordinary yield of a known use with the extras of one deal. Notice given after the contract was made cannot move an item from the second group into the first.15
Knowing the purpose opens the door to recovery without guaranteeing it. In a 1993 decision, a court held that a shipowner could not rely on a classification certificate as a guarantee that its vessel was soundly constructed. The gap between the $85,000 fee and the $264,000,000 in damages sought was, the court said, strong evidence that the parties did not intend that liability. Citing § 351, it concluded that so small a fee could not have been meant to cover such a risk.17 The later section on disproportionate compensation develops that limit.