Concept
Remedies for Accepted Goods
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
Remedies for Accepted Goods
A buyer who accepts nonconforming goods loses the right to reject them and must keep and pay for them, but keeps the right to conventional contract damages.1 UCC § 2-714 supplies those damages in three parts. Subsection (1) gives a buyer who has accepted the goods and notified the seller of the breach the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach, determined in any reasonable manner.2 Subsection (2) adds a default yardstick for breach of warranty: the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.3 Subsection (3) allows incidental and consequential damages under § 2-715 in a proper case.4
Section 2-714 serves only the buyer who has accepted the goods and has neither rightfully rejected them nor effectively revoked acceptance. A buyer who never accepted the goods, or who justifiably revoked acceptance, looks to § 2-711 and to the cover and market-price measures taught above; a buyer who has 'finally accepted' looks to § 2-714. The two sets of remedies are mutually exclusive.5 The line follows what each buyer holds. A cover buyer measures loss by a replacement purchase of reasonable substitutes, made in a commercially reasonable manner.6 In the anvil hypothetical, Wiley bought 500 Premium Anvils from Road Runner at $850 each and, once a court found the purchase reasonable, recovered $50,000 in cover damages.7 The purchase must be real: the Seventh Circuit denied cover damages to a buyer that replaced gasoline from its own inventory instead of buying on the market.8 An accepting buyer made no replacement purchase and still holds what the seller delivered, so § 2-714 prices the shortfall in those goods. Because Article 2 lets a seller claim the price of goods the buyer has accepted,9 the accepting buyer pays the price and sues for the shortfall.
The three subsections run from the general to the specific. Subsection (1) states a broad standard and leaves proof open, subsection (2) fixes a default method for the typical warranty claim, and subsection (3) attaches the add-ons. The sections below follow that order, because the warranty yardstick and its exception refine the broad standard.
Ordinary-Course Loss
Section 2-714(1) states two conditions and a standard. The buyer must have accepted the goods and given notification of the breach under § 2-607(3); the buyer may then recover, for any nonconformity of tender, the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach, determined in any manner that is reasonable.10 The conditions open the door, the words 'any nonconformity of tender' set its width, and the standard sets the amount.
The door is wider than the word 'warranty' suggests. The subsection reaches any nonconformity of tender, so a late delivery, a missing feature, or a defect in finish qualifies whether or not the buyer can plead breach of warranty. Morgan Buildings and Spas, Inc. v. Humane Society of Southeast Texas makes the point. The seller of a steel-frame storage building had validly disclaimed warranties, but the building was not secure, and rodents infested the animal feed kept inside. The Texas court of appeals rejected the argument that an accepting buyer may sue under § 2-714 only for breach of warranty and allowed recovery for the nonconformity in any reasonable manner. The disclaimer ended the warranty claim and left intact the claim for a building that did not match the agreement.
The amount is whatever the breach ordinarily cost the buyer, proved by any reasonable method. Nonconformities vary too much for a single formula: a late delivery, a defective component, and a missing feature each cost a buyer differently, so a repair bill, a rental invoice, or a price comparison may each prove the loss. As with cover, the test is reasonableness, not exactness. The phrase 'ordinary course of events' also marks the line between this measure and the consequential add-on. A loss that follows naturally from this kind of breach needs no showing that the seller knew of the buyer's unusual needs; losses that depend on such needs belong to § 2-715(2)(a), which asks whether the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know of them.11
Notice is the condition the buyer controls, and silence forfeits the claim. A buyer who keeps nonconforming goods must notify the seller within a reasonable time under § 2-607(3)(a) to preserve the right to any remedy.12 A seller that has delivered and been paid has no other way to learn that the goods disappointed. Prompt notice lets the seller inspect while the evidence is fresh, offer a cure, or adjust its own dealings with suppliers.
Subsection (2) is the standard application of subsection (1) to a breach of warranty, and the two usually produce the same figure, because the drop in value that a warranty breach causes is itself the loss that ordinarily results from it.13 With conforming goods worth $90 and the goods accepted worth $70, the buyer recovers $20 under either.14 The measures diverge when the breach causes loss that ordinarily follows from it but lies outside the goods' own value. The value difference prices only the goods, while subsection (1) asks what the breach ordinarily cost the buyer and can reach the rest.15 A contract clause excluding consequential damages is the other place the choice of subsection matters, and the section on add-ons returns to it. On an exam, apply subsection (1) when an accepting buyer's loss comes from lateness or from a nonconformity outside a warranty claim, and treat subsection (2) as the shortcut for the typical warranty case.
Warranty Value Difference
UCC § 2-714(2) sets the standard measure for the claim accepting buyers bring most often. Damages for breach of warranty equal the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.17 The statute takes two figures at one moment, what the buyer's goods are worth and what goods matching the warranty would have been worth, and subtracts the first from the second.
The warranty may come from the contract itself. Its terms on quantity, quality, and function operate as an express warranty that the goods will conform, and goods that fall short breach it even though the buyer keeps them.18 The subtraction therefore prices the shortfall in the promise, which is the expectation interest applied to goods already in the buyer's hands. Hawkins v. McGee, the surgeon case taught earlier in this chapter, reasoned the same way: the court likened the promise of a good hand to a machine warranted to do certain work and applied the rule for such machines, the difference between the value as warranted and the actual value, together with incidental losses the parties knew or ought to have known would probably follow.19 A car delivered with a lower-priced set of tires than the contract named gives the simplest modern illustration. The buyer recovers the difference in value between the two sets, probably measured by market prices.20
The time-and-place language freezes the comparison at the moment the buyer takes the goods, which leaves with the buyer every market movement that follows. A fixed-price contract already allocates that risk: a decline below the contract price is the buyer's loss, because the buyer is bound to the higher price, and a rise above it is the seller's.21 Take a buyer who pays $100 for goods that, as delivered, are worth $70, when conforming goods have fallen in the market to $90. The value as warranted at acceptance is $90, not the $100 contract price, so the buyer recovers $20, not $30. Having prepaid, the buyer ends up paying a net $80 for goods worth $70, and the missing $10 is the market decline the buyer carries by keeping the goods.22 Had the market held at $100, the same defect would have yielded the full $30. The common slip is to subtract the delivered goods' value from the contract price without checking the market, which works only when the market has not moved.
A buyer who rejects the goods or effectively revokes acceptance can cancel the contract and so pass the $10 decline to the seller; acceptance leaves the risk where the contract put it.23 Tomatoes make the asymmetry concrete. A buyer agrees to pay $5,000, and the market falls to $4,000. If the buyer accepts tomatoes whose actual value is $3,000, it recovers only the $1,000 difference between warranted and actual value and still loses $1,000 on the bad bargain. Had it rejected the tomatoes, revoked acceptance, or never received them, it could have covered in the $4,000 market and escaped that loss.24 The risk follows the decision to keep the goods.
The statute never defines value, and § 2-714(2) does not say market value. Courts have settled on four working notions, market or resale price, subjective value, repair cost, and replacement cost, and each sometimes undercompensates the accepting buyer.25 Subjective value draws the strongest objection. It is hard to verify, it varies among buyers in ways only the buyer knows, and it gives a buyer who values the goods unusually highly no reason to say so before contracting. A seller prices on the assumption that its buyer values the goods at the average, so low-value buyers end up subsidizing high-value ones. An objective measure such as market price supplies the missing reason, because a buyer who values the goods above the market must tell the seller or bear the difference. The reasoning parallels the foreseeability limit taught earlier in this chapter.26
Goods in their defective state often have no established market, so the time-and-place comparison can be hard to apply. In many cases courts find a ready measure of damages in the cost of repair the buyer has incurred or will incur.27 Repair cost has its own limit when the defect appears late. A buyer whose automobile engine runs satisfactorily for a year before failing, and who recovers the cost of a new engine, may end up with a car that outlasts even one that matched the warranty. A federal district court faced the same windfall when a buyer sought the cost of replacing a television tower that collapsed in a blizzard, and it subtracted from the replacement cost a reasonable depreciation for the use the buyer had enjoyed.28
The value-difference formula works when the loss lies in the goods themselves and two objective values can be compared. When the loss does not fit that comparison, the proviso for special circumstances adjusts it, and the next section takes it up. Everything else the defect costs the buyer, such as injury to other property or lost profits, belongs to the incidental and consequential damages that § 2-714(3) adds to the value difference.
Special Circumstances and Title
The value-difference rule carries its own exception. After fixing the comparison at the time and place of acceptance, § 2-714(2) adds that special circumstances may 'show proximate damages of a different amount.'30 Anchoring the comparison at acceptance assumes the buyer's loss takes shape the day the goods arrive. That holds when the defect shows at once, but some breaches surface months or years later, and then the acceptance-date figures can stop tracking what the breach cost. The warranty of title is the clearest example, so this section teaches the proviso through title claims and then tests its limit against a case in which a court refused to apply it.
A seller's warranty of title promises the buyer good title, and a buyer whose goods prove stolen or encumbered may lose them to the true owner months or years after the sale.31 Two yardsticks compete for pricing that loss. The acceptance measure applies the default rule as written: damages equal the difference, at the time and place of acceptance, between the goods' value with good title and their value with the impaired title, and that value is typically the contract price or the market price. The dispossession measure values the goods at the time the buyer loses them, and it governs under § 2-714(1), or under § 2-714(2) once special circumstances appear.32 The statutory text favors neither, and the decisions are mixed, though they lean toward dispossession.33
When the true owner reclaims the goods soon after the sale, the yardsticks nearly merge. Impounded goods are worth nothing to the buyer, and the price paid is good evidence of what they would have been worth with good title, so the acceptance measure returns the purchase price, as in McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson.34 The yardsticks separate as time passes, because the gap between them is whatever happened to the goods' value between acceptance and dispossession, and that gap matters most where the goods have appreciated or depreciated.35
Appreciation shows why a court departs from the acceptance date. In Menzel v. List a buyer paid $10,000 for a painting that turned out to be stolen, and when the true owner recovered it years later the painting was worth $100,000. The appreciation was a special circumstance, so damages were measured at dispossession, at $100,000, and not at the $10,000 price.36 Two reasons support the larger figure. A buyer who pays for a painting presumably expects it to be worth at least the price and probably more, so refunding only the price would strip away the benefit of the bargain, which is the thing expectation damages protect. The seller, for its part, warranted good title and priced the sale knowing it would answer financially if the painting proved stolen, so holding the seller to the later value shifts nothing the seller had not accepted.37 The dispossession rule also places the risk of theft on the party best able to prevent it, since the seller who dealt with the thief can guard against stolen goods more cheaply than a later buyer can.38
Long use pushes the measure the other way. In City Car Sales v. McAlpin a buyer paid $5,000 for a used truck, drove it for a year, and lost it when police impounded it as stolen, at which point it was worth $4,200. The year of use and the depreciation that came with it were special circumstances, so damages were the truck's value on the impound date.39 Ricklefs v. Clemens reached the same result for a buyer who had enjoyed nine months of undisturbed possession of an automobile, awarding the car's value when possession was disturbed. Presumably the same result could be reached by awarding damages as of the time of sale, less a setoff for the nine months of use.40 The acceptance measure would otherwise reimburse the buyer for service already consumed, and the buyer would collect more than the value actually lost.
The dispossession measure also nets out whatever the buyer gets back. In Colton v. Decker a trucker bought a repossessed truck from a bank, and officers seized it because parts of it bore faked serial numbers. The truck would have been worth $22,000 with good title, but the officers dismantled it while looking for serial numbers and left the parts unprotected through a harsh Wyoming winter. The court found special circumstances that took the case outside the time-and-place-of-acceptance language and measured the loss as the truck's value at dispossession minus the salvage value when the trucker recovered the parts.41 Buyers in title cases may also add foreseeable consequential items, such as the cost of keeping possession or of defending title, which the next section takes up.42
The proviso does not invite a reopening of every acceptance-date calculation, and Mayberry v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. marks the boundary. The seller had breached express and implied warranties on a car the buyer accepted. The buyer unsuccessfully tried to revoke acceptance, kept driving the car for an extended period, and then resold it for more than its fair market value.43 The seller argued that the continued use and profitable resale were special circumstances and urged comparing the car's actual value with its fair market value on the resale date, a comparison that would have left the buyer with nothing because the resale price exceeded the actual value.44 The court refused to find special circumstances. The buyer was not undoing the deal and recovering the price, which would have shifted back to the seller the decline in value from the buyer's own use. She kept the car and sought only the value it lacked on the day she accepted it, so the resale proceeds were irrelevant, and § 2-714(2) leaves the decline in value from use with the buyer.45
The title cases and Mayberry rest on one principle: special circumstances count only when they show that the acceptance-date comparison misstates the loss the breach proximately caused. A title defect has no measurable effect until the true owner appears, so the buyer holds what looks like good property in the meantime, and appreciation or depreciation during that interval bears directly on what the buyer finally loses. The defect in Mayberry lay in the goods themselves and was felt at acceptance, so the value difference on that day already fixed the loss; what the buyer later did with the car happened after the loss was set and left it unchanged. In both lines the buyer carries the depreciation from the buyer's own use. Two errors recur on exams: treating any event after acceptance as a special circumstance, and applying the acceptance measure mechanically to a title claim without asking what appreciation or use intervened.
Incidental and Consequential Add-Ons
The accepting buyer's recovery has a third piece, and § 2-714(3) states it in one sentence: in a proper case, any incidental and consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered.47 Subsections (1) and (2) price the shortfall in the goods the buyer kept. A value difference compares two prices for the same goods, so it registers neither what the buyer spent dealing with the defect nor what the defect did to the buyer's other plans or property. In Colton v. Decker the buyer's truck was seized because of a title defect, and he spent more than $4,000 to have the damaged vehicle towed back from police custody. The difference in value alone would not have made him whole, so the towing cost was added to it.48
Subsection (3) cross-references § 2-715 and does not define the add-ons. Section 2-715(1) lists incidental damages, among them expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.49 Section 2-715(2) supplies consequential damages, which include loss from requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise,50 and injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.51 The phrase 'in a proper case' means each add-on must still meet the requirements of its own section, which a later section details. The same § 2-715 damages also attach to the cover and market-price measures, so subsection (3) puts the accepting buyer on the same footing as a buyer who rejected the goods or never received them.52
The overlap among the subsections is clearest when a defect damages the buyer's other property. In Holm v. Hansen the buyer ran a purchased herd carrying brucellosis together with the buyer's own herd. The court treated damage to the buyer's own herd as a special circumstance that moved the claim out of the value-difference formula and into subsection (1), where the loss of that herd was a loss resulting in the ordinary course from the breach of warranty.53 The court could have reached the same total through subsection (3), because the loss of the buyer's own herd is also recoverable as consequential damages under § 2-715(2), with the purchased herd valued by the value difference.54 The two routes agree because each recovers the same loss, and the dollars lost do not change with the label. An answer on accepted goods should sort each item of loss once, place it under one route, and avoid counting it again under another.
The routes stop agreeing when the contract excludes consequential damages, and Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp. shows how. The contract in Hill excluded consequential damages, the seller's breach of warranty cost the buyer profits, and the buyer sued under subsection (1). The court found special circumstances, measured the loss under that subsection, and allowed the lost profits as direct damages despite the clause.55 That outcome has drawn sharp criticism. A clause that allocates the risk of consequential loss to the buyer should bind the buyer whether recovery comes through subsection (1), (2), or (3), and a rule that admits lost profits through one door and bars them at another rewards artful labeling and undoes the allocation the parties wrote.56 Holm and Hill differ in the one fact that matters: no exclusion clause stood between the herd owner and recovery in Holm, so the route changed nothing, while the clause in Hill made the route decisive.
A classification point sits beneath that dispute. Direct and consequential damages are separate categories, so a loss that flows in the ordinary course is direct and not consequential, yet § 2-715(2) does not state every condition of consequential damages. A court that read its words as a complete definition could use a clause excluding consequential damages to strip out direct damages as well, because ordinary-course losses may satisfy the incomplete definition and be misclassified as consequential.57 Whether a particular clause is effective belongs to the agreed-remedies material later in the course. What matters here is that an effective clause operates the same way under every subsection of § 2-714.