Concept
UCC Remedies and the Expectation Interest
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
UCC Remedies and the Expectation Interest
Article 2 pursues the same goal as the common law, and § 1-305(a) states it: the Code’s remedies are to be liberally administered so that the aggrieved party may be “put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.”1 That position is the expectation interest, and every money remedy in the sections ahead protects it.2 The Restatement formula priced the gap between promise and performance in general terms. The Code prices the same gap in the vocabulary of goods, prices, and markets.
The Code sorts its remedies by party. Seller’s remedies for the buyer’s breach fill §§ 2-703 through 2-710, and buyer’s remedies for the seller’s breach fill §§ 2-711 through 2-717. The two sets are largely mirror images: they give buyers and sellers roughly equivalent rights while allowing for the somewhat different remedial needs of each.3
Liberal administration has a concrete payoff. Section 1-305(a) was meant to negate the unduly narrow, technical readings that some earlier remedial statutes received, and Article 2 accordingly rejects the doctrine of election of remedies as a fundamental policy. Its remedies are essentially cumulative, and whether pursuing one bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.4 Consider a buyer who returns defective goods for a refund and also claims the expenses of handling and forwarding them and the profit lost on an intended resale. Pre-Code courts often held that seeking rescission was an election that forfeited the extra claims. The Code rejects that result, in keeping with its aim of putting the aggrieved party in as good a position as performance would have.5
Section 2-712(2) shows the Restatement’s three terms at work in a single sentence. The buyer recovers the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price, which prices the performance the seller failed to deliver. The buyer also recovers incidental or consequential damages, the other-loss term, but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller’s breach, the cost-avoided term.6 Any Article 2 computation can be tested against those three terms.
Because every remedy aims at the same interest, the Code’s price measures should in theory reach the same number, and a little algebra shows why. A seller’s expectation is its profit: the contract price (K) less its cost of performing (C).7 Suppose the buyer wrongfully refuses a conforming tender, and the market price (M) and the resale price (R) have both fallen below the contract price by the same amount, so that M = R. Each of the seller’s measures then returns the profit, K − C:
- Under § 2-709(1), an action for the price gives the seller K itself, so the seller ends with K − C.8
- Under § 2-708(1), the contract-market difference awards K − M. The seller still holds goods worth M, so award and goods together equal K, and the seller again ends with K − C.9
- Under § 2-706(1), the contract-resale difference awards K − R. The resale proceeds equal R, so award and proceeds together equal K, and the seller once more ends with K − C.10
The three agree because each pairs its award with something of known value, and the pair sums to the contract price: the price itself, goods worth M, or resale proceeds worth R. The measures differ only in which observable number stands in for the value of the goods after the buyer’s default.
The buyer’s measures follow the same logic. Suppose a buyer agrees to pay $100,000 for steel, the seller fails to deliver, and comparable steel now costs $110,000. A buyer who purchases substitute steel for $110,000 recovers the $10,000 difference between the cost of cover and the contract price.11 A buyer who purchases nothing recovers the $10,000 difference between the market price and the contract price.12 In either case the $10,000 closes the gap between what the steel costs now and what the buyer agreed to pay.
The equivalence rests on the assumption that M equals R, and when the prices diverge, the awards diverge too. The drafters created cover for this reason. They thought the market measure arbitrary in application, because it sometimes overcompensated a buyer who bought substitute goods below the market price and sometimes undercompensated one who paid more.13 Sellers face a counterpart. A seller whose resale was not conducted reasonably, and so brought too low a price, may fall back on the contract-market difference.14 A related question remains open. Comment 5 to § 2-713 calls the buyer’s market-price remedy “completely alternative to cover,” available only when and to the extent that the buyer has not covered. The Code nowhere imposes a similar restriction on a seller who resells for more than the market price. Whether that gap gives a windfall to the seller but not the buyer, to neither, or to both, the text does not say.15
If the formulas converge in theory, why does the choice among them matter in practice? The plaintiff must meet each measure’s requirements and absorb each measure’s costs, and these differ.16 Cover and resale rest on an actual transaction. A buyer’s substitute purchase must be made in good faith and without unreasonable delay,17 and a seller’s resale must be made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. A seller whose resale fails that test cannot recover resale damages and is relegated to the market measure of § 2-708(1).18 The transaction pays for itself in one respect: a commercially reasonable cover purchase is appropriate evidence of the market price.19 Its costs lie elsewhere, in the effort and expense of arranging the substitute. Charges in connection with effecting cover can return as incidental damages,20 and where a plaintiff is not fully compensated for its costs, its choice of remedy turns on minimizing them.21
The market measures need no substitute transaction, but they require proof of the market price at the time and place the Code fixes. For a buyer, that is the market price when the buyer learned of the breach, determined as of the place for tender or, after rejection on arrival or revocation of acceptance, the place of arrival.22 For a seller, it is the market price at the time and place for tender.23 A plaintiff who cannot present enough evidence risks a factfinder who underestimates the loss, and that risk differs from one measure to the next.24
An Article 2 problem therefore starts with three questions. Did the plaintiff cover or resell? Does the plaintiff hold the goods? What can the plaintiff prove? The answer is then checked against the profit or benefit performance would have produced.
The Code draws two distinctions that recur through every remedy that follows. The first separates money damages from non-monetary relief. The money remedies are different measures of damages, and the others range from specific relief to cancellation of the contract.25 Like the common law, Article 2 treats specific enforcement as a limited and secondary remedy, available only when damages are inappropriate. Section 2-709 shows that caution: the seller may claim the price only when the buyer has accepted the goods or when the goods cannot be resold because they were lost or damaged or are simply not resalable.26 More precisely, the price is available for goods accepted and for conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passed to the buyer.27 It is also available for goods identified to the contract if the seller cannot, after reasonable effort, resell them at a reasonable price, or if the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort would be unavailing.28
The second distinction asks which party holds the goods. The buyer’s remedies in § 2-711 apply when the seller fails to deliver or repudiates, or when the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance. When the seller delivers and the buyer keeps nonconforming goods, § 2-714’s value difference measures the buyer’s damages instead, and the buyer may add incidental and consequential damages under § 2-715 where appropriate.29 A buyer who has accepted goods and given notice recovers the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller’s breach, determined in any reasonable manner.30 The dividing line is acceptance, not possession. A buyer may keep goods it has not accepted, and a buyer’s refusal to take possession may still amount to acceptance.31
The sections ahead follow that division. The buyer’s remedies come first: cover under § 2-712,32 the market-price measure of § 2-713,33 damages for accepted goods under § 2-714,34 and the incidental and consequential damages of § 2-715.35 The seller’s remedies follow: the action for the price under § 2-709,36 the resale and market measures of §§ 2-706 and 2-708, and the incidental damages of § 2-710.37 The mirror has limits. Cover, the buyer’s counterpart to resale, allows consequential damages, and the resale formula for sellers does not.38