Concept
Limits on Consequential Damages
Expectation interest (including direct, incidental, and consequential damages)
Limits on Consequential Damages
Consequential loss is the part of the expectation formula that carries a claim beyond the value of what was promised. The formula reaches “any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach,”1 and the typical consequential item is a profit the injured party expected to earn from the transaction. A buyer of commercial property, for example, loses the rental income it expected to collect.2 Recovery for such losses is subject to controls that do not apply to ordinary damages.3
General damages escape most of those controls because they measure the thing promised. They are always recoverable, since they represent the value of the very performance the defendant agreed to give. Special or consequential damages may or may not be, depending on whether the risks of those damages were part of the basis of the parties' bargain.4 A supplier of cattle feed probably means to guarantee a price but not to insure the herd, so the rancher's cattle losses when the feed supply is interrupted would not be recoverable.5 Expectation damages can be measured by either general or special measures, and the special measures are subject to several limiting rules.6
The controls also protect the willingness to contract. Take a seller who agrees to sell Alice a piano. The seller would hesitate to sign if liability could reach damages Alice could not prove with sufficient certainty. Alice, for her part, must disclose any profit-making plan for the piano, because without disclosure she cannot recover the lost profits if the seller breaches.7
Four limits stand between a consequential claim and payment. Causation requires proof that the breach in fact produced the loss claimed; the issue seldom arises with general damages, but it can defeat a consequential claim.8 Reasonable certainty and foreseeability are the two rules that define this area. Consequential damages must be proved with reasonable certainty, and they must be of the general kind the parties contemplated when they contracted; a loss outside that contemplation, or never communicated so as to put the breaching party on notice at contracting, is not recoverable even when clearly proved.9 The parties' own contract supplies the fourth limit, because disclaimers and limitations of liability for consequential damages are common, and UCC §§ 2-316 and 2-719 govern them in sales of goods.10 This section takes foreseeability first, because it fixes which kinds of loss the breaching party can be charged with, and reasonable certainty second, because it tests whether a loss of a permitted kind has been proved.
Foreseeability
Hadley v. Baxendale supplies the foreseeability limit, and its facts show how the limit works. The plaintiffs ran an extensive milling business, and their mill stopped when its crank shaft broke. The broken shaft had to go to Greenwich, where the engineers would use it as a pattern for a new one, and the plaintiffs hired a carrier to take it there.11 The carrier's neglect delayed delivery, the new shaft arrived days later than it otherwise would have, and the mill lost the profits it would have earned in the meantime. The plaintiffs sued for those profits.12
The court reasoned that those profits fell outside the bargain. The only circumstances the plaintiffs had communicated were that the article was the broken shaft of a mill and that they were the millers. Those facts fit just as well with a mill that held a spare shaft and wanted only to return the broken one to its maker, in which case delay would not have touched the mill's profits.13 The special circumstances that would have made idleness likely were never communicated to the carrier,14 so the loss of profits could not reasonably be considered a consequence the parties contemplated when they made the contract.15 The court ordered a new trial and took the occasion to state the rule the next jury should apply.
Recoverable damages are those that may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things, from the breach itself, or reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, when they made the contract, as the probable result of its breach.16 When special circumstances were communicated to the defendant and so known to both parties, the damages they would reasonably contemplate are the injury that ordinarily follows from breach under those circumstances.17
Modern statements of the rule keep both branches. A loss is foreseeable if it would arise in the ordinary course, or if the breacher had reason to know of special circumstances that could give rise to it.18 The two branches divide the work between loss that any promisor can anticipate and loss that depends on facts peculiar to the promisee. A roofer who promises an urgent repair to a roof with a hole in it must realize that delay lets rain in, so water damage inside the building follows in the ordinary course. Costly equipment sitting under the hole is a different matter. Unless the roofer was told of it, or otherwise had reason to know of it when the contract was made, damage to the equipment and the interruption of the owner's business fall outside what the roofer could foresee.
Courts gauge foreseeability when the contract is made, not when it is broken.19 The reason lies in what a promisor can do with information. A promisor who learns before committing that a breach could cost the promisee a large and unusual loss can reject the deal, raise the price, write a clause limiting or excluding the loss, buy insurance, or take extra precautions.20 Each of those responses is available only before the promise is made, so information that reaches the promisor after signing cannot enlarge liability, however long before the breach it arrives. The rule also gives the promisee a reason to speak up during negotiations, because a promisee who does not disclose a profit-making use cannot recover the profit lost.21
What the promisor must have is reason to know, not actual knowledge. A particularly dense promisor remains liable for the losses it should have foreseen.22 Nor must the promisor know the exact transaction that depends on its performance. A seller of fabric to a clothing factory need only have known, or had reason to know, that the buyer would make clothing and sell it in the ordinary course to its customers.23 The question most often arises when nonperformance under one contract costs the claimant profits under a second contract with a third party. The claimant must then show that the breacher should have contemplated that its failure would cause the loss under the second contract.24
The loss must also have been foreseeable as a probable result of breach, and a mere possibility does not qualify.25 The requirement keeps the rule workable. A promisor need not bargain over every remote contingency, but it should either bargain over a probable loss or pay for it. Hadley drew the line there: a mill might stand idle for want of a shaft, yet in the great multitude of cases in which millers send broken shafts by carrier under ordinary circumstances, idleness would not in all probability follow.26
The rule asks what losses would follow if the contract were broken, and the breach itself need not have been foreseeable. A promisor who fully meant to perform when it signed cannot escape liability by pointing out that it had no reason then to expect a default. The court asks, hypothetically, what losses the promisor should have considered had it thought about the effects of a breach like the one that occurred.27
Reason to anticipate the type of loss generally suffices to make damage foreseeable, although some cases also require reason to know the amount. A court that follows the second reading lets the plaintiff recover the profit the defendant had reason to expect, but not the excess.28 The two readings diverge when the plaintiff's loss is unusually large.
Foreseeability can be satisfied and the claim still fail, because courts sometimes use the word as shorthand for the scope of the bargain. Hadley's loss failed because the special circumstances were never communicated to the carrier.29 Kenford Co. v. County of Erie is the harder case, because the promisor knew the facts. Kenford agreed to donate land for a county stadium, and the county later abandoned the project. Kenford sought, among other damages, the lost appreciation of its nearby land. Everyone expected the stadium to raise nearby land values, and the county knew Kenford owned land there, yet the court struck the award. Kenford had knowingly taken on the risk that its hopes for the surrounding land would go unrealized if the stadium were never built, and nothing showed that the county had agreed to carry that risk. A promise to build a stadium guaranteed the stadium, not the value of the land around it.30
Article 2 states its own version of the rule for buyers. Consequential damages include any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.31 The comment adds that the seller is liable whenever it had reason to know of the buyer's general or particular requirements at the time of contracting. It requires neither a conscious acceptance of an insurer's liability nor a failure to use due effort in good faith.32 The discussion of buyer's consequential damages below takes up the details.
Reasonable Certainty
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 states the limit: the injured party cannot recover damages beyond the amount the evidence establishes with reasonable certainty, and the rule seeks to prevent extravagant or speculative awards.34 The rule rests on the breach victim's ordinary burden of proof. A party that seeks to enforce a contract must prove its loss, and the evidence must persuade the factfinder that the loss more likely occurred than not and give it enough to calculate a money award.35 Some authorities say the rule goes further and raises the standard of proof, requiring more than a preponderance of the evidence for some damages.36
In practice the rule lets a judge act before and after the jury. A judge may reject an element of damages by partial summary judgment, so that the jury never hears evidence on it, or may remit a verdict that exceeds what was reasonably certain.37
Consequential damages feel the rule most. Problems of proof can affect damages of every kind, but consequential damages usually present the greatest difficulties.38 The rule, by contrast, seldom if ever has any application to market damages, because a market price supplies a figure that can be checked.39 An old opinion states the danger. A profit computed from a series of future events collapses if any one event fails, and leaving the figure to the unbridled discretion of a jury could ruin a defaulting party for a loss that no one contemplated. The court added that parties who want such enlarged responsibility can provide for it expressly when they contract.40
Direct damages are not immune, because the breach victim bears the burden of proving both the fact and the extent of its loss.41 Suppose a firm contracts to build a one-of-a-kind waste-disposal system and loses the job when the buyer reneges. Its direct damages are its expected profit, the price less its expected costs. A firm with no reliable evidence of what the novel system would have cost cannot show that it expected a profit at all, while a firm that planned carefully before quoting its price may prove the loss through accurate cost projections.
Reasonable certainty asks two questions in order. First, did the breach victim prove that it suffered a loss at all? Second, does the evidence give the factfinder a reasonable basis for fixing the amount? Once the existence of loss is established, doubts are generally resolved in favor of the breach victim. The determination of damages is then an approximation, not an exercise in mathematical precision. Comment a to § 352 takes that view, and UCC § 1-305, Official Comment 1, expresses a similar sentiment.42 A restaurant owner whose chef partner abandons the venture shows the sequence. She proves the fact of lost profits with her own restaurant's history and with evidence about other restaurants, and the law then permits her to recover the future profits for the remaining two years of the contract even though the amount requires some estimation.43
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp. shows both outcomes inside one lawsuit. The court of appeals allowed lost profits for the defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff's record. Even after the promotional efforts ended and the record left the marketplace, it kept selling on its own momentum, adding about 10,000 sales and climbing from roughly number 80 to number 61 on a Billboard soul singles chart. That made it certain that the plaintiff had suffered some damage, even though the amount was unclear.44 The same court ruled that the claimed damages for lost tours were too speculative to recover.45 The difference lies in the evidence of existence. For the lost sales, the record's own performance after promotion stopped showed that the breach had cost something, while the tour claim had no comparable anchor.
Once existence is established, courts rarely demand exactness about the amount. In Benchmark Health Care Center, Inc. v. Cain, a health care center wrongfully ended a one-year contract for rehabilitation therapy. The therapy provider proved its lost profit for the rest of the term with an accountant's projection built on its profit in the months before termination, and the appellate court upheld the jury's award. Every estimate of the future involves some speculation, but this one was documented and realistic. United States Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc. shows a second route. The hardcover publisher could not prove what its September hardcover sales would have been without the breach, because any such evidence would necessarily have been hypothetical. The court nonetheless accepted the trial court's calculations, observing that it is not error to lay the normal uncertainty in such hypotheses at the door of the wrongdoer who altered the proper course of events, instead of at the door of the injured party.46 The two decisions differ in where the proof came from. In Benchmark the plaintiff built its estimate from its own records. In Naval the breach itself had made the proof hypothetical, so the doubt fell on the wrongdoer. That second move is the wrongdoer rule, an exception to the certainty rule that gives jurors some room to estimate the loss where the lack of certainty results from the wrongdoer's own conduct.47
Courts differ on how much certainty the amount itself requires. Some state the rule more strictly, demanding that both the existence and the amount of damage be proved with reasonable certainty. A court stating the rule that way might strike a lost-profits claim even though the plaintiff showed with reasonable certainty that profits were at least $100, if nothing established how much more.48 Courts also weigh how confident they are in the estimate, how clear it is that some damage occurred, how blameworthy the defendant was, whether the plaintiff produced the best available evidence, how much is at stake, and whether another way exists to compensate the injured party.49
Article 2 takes the lenient view openly. Comment 4 to § 2-715 puts the burden of proving the extent of consequential loss on the buyer but rejects any doctrine of certainty that requires almost mathematical precision, so loss may be determined in any manner that is reasonable under the circumstances.50 Leniency about amount does not excuse speculation about existence, and concrete proof satisfies the rule most easily. A reseller such as Wiley, which earns $100 profit on each retail sale of a regular anvil, can price a lost sale unit by unit.51 The Lewis case shows both sides of the line. The defendant supplied the wrong oil for the plaintiff's hydraulic sawmill system, and the mill did not work properly for two and one-half years. Because the plaintiff had an established business, the court allowed lost profits for that period to be computed from past profits. It denied damages for the two and one-half years after the problem was corrected, however, when the plaintiff argued that the strain on its capital had kept it from operating at full capacity.52
The new business rule applies the existence question to the plaintiff most likely to fail it. New businesses suffer most under the certainty requirement, because many never earn a profit. For a venture with no history of profitable operation, the breach may have spared the plaintiff future losses rather than caused them, and a plaintiff that cannot show profits were reasonably certain cannot recover lost profits at all. An established business with a history of profitable operation may satisfy the requirement.53 Courts traditionally denied lost profits to new ventures as too speculative, contingent, and remote, and some treated the idea as close to a per se rule.54
Modern courts have pared the rule back to a question of proof. A growing trend rejects automatic denial and lets a new business try to meet the reasonable certainty standard, though it carries a heavier burden than an established firm does.55 The new business can try two routes: its own profit record before and after the breach, or the profits of comparable businesses. The restaurant owner described above used both, combining her own restaurant's history with evidence about other restaurants.56 The decision in Gerwin v. Southeastern California Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists shows the failure. A buyer of used bar equipment for a planned hotel restaurant and cocktail lounge could not establish future profits, because the business was new, the buyer was new to the business, and the buyer offered no evidence of comparable businesses in the area.57
When the evidence fails at the first stage, the breach does not disappear. The claim survives, and where there are no actual damages or none that can be proved, the court awards nominal damages, a small sum fixed without regard to the amount of loss. One dollar, ten, or even a hundred may qualify, but one thousand was too much in one Texas decision.58 A plaintiff who cannot prove expectation damages to a reasonable degree of certainty may also be limited to reliance damages, so a lost-profits claim denied as speculative may give way to a claim for what the plaintiff spent preparing to perform.59 Two overstatements recur on this topic: that the rule demands mathematical precision about amount even after loss is shown, and that a new business is barred outright from recovering lost profits.