Concept
Reach and Limits of a Release
Release
Reach and Limits of a Release
A release that has cleared the earlier hurdles (present discharge, delivery, and consideration or a substitute for it) is valid, but validity leaves two questions open: whom the writing frees, and which claims it reaches. The definition frames both. A release is a writing providing that a duty owed to its maker is discharged, immediately or on the occurrence of a condition.1
The first question arises because one transaction or accident often leaves several people answerable to the same obligee while the signed paper names only one of them. The common law answered that freeing one freed all, which defeated an obligee who wanted to settle with one party and pursue the rest. The contract not to sue developed to avoid that result. The obligee promises to forbear instead of declaring the duty discharged, and the change in wording changes the effect on the other obligors.
The second question concerns scope. The words that make a release operative also mark its edges. A broad release can bar claims, even claims against persons the maker never had in mind, while a narrow one leaves other claims alive. Language and the intent it expresses control, so a party who wants out of a release must usually find a ground for attacking the paper itself.
Release Versus Contract Not to Sue
Discharge is the operative word in the definition, because discharge extinguishes a duty.2 When one obligor owes the duty, extinction affects only that obligor. When co-obligors, persons who share liability for the same performance, owe it together, extinction reaches them all. The common law therefore held that a release, rescission, or accord and satisfaction that discharged one co-obligor also released the others whose liability rested on the same joint duty. The old saying puts the result bluntly: a release of one is a release of all.3
The logic is simple. Several obligors owed one duty, and once the obligee surrendered it, nothing remained for any of them to owe. Tort law states the same idea as a cause of action. An injured person may have rights against several wrongdoers but has only one cause of action for a single injury, so releasing it released everyone potentially liable for the harm.4 The early rule rested on joint tortfeasors who acted in concert, where the act of one was the act of all. Early American decisions extended it to independent wrongdoers liable for the same damages, whatever had been paid and whether or not the writing reserved rights against anyone else.5 The tort cases serve here as a second illustration of the line contract law draws between a release and a promise not to sue.
That outcome defeats what the supplier wanted, and the contract not to sue exists to avoid it. The obligee promises one co-obligor that no action will be maintained against that co-obligor. The promise has legal effect, but it does not release other persons who might be obligated to perform the same duty.6 The obligee keeps the cause of action and agrees only not to enforce it against one person. If the obligee sues that person anyway, the defendant has a counterclaim for breach of the promise, with damages equal to the obligee's recovery plus the cost of defense.7 Courts treat the device as one that lawyers devised to get around the traditional effect of a release. It works because the duty is never extinguished. The other obligors stay bound, and what changes is only the obligee's freedom to enforce against one of them.
Modern law therefore asks what the parties intended, not what the paper is called. Words that purport to release or discharge one co-obligor while reserving rights against another are read as a contract not to sue, which preserves the other obligors' liability as the obligee intended.8 Many states have reached the same result by statute.9 Tort law takes the same approach. Whether an instrument is a release or a covenant is a question of construction, and the intent drawn from the substance of the document controls over its label.10 A document that is a release in form does not discharge the others if the parties expressly agreed it would not and the payment was not full satisfaction.11
On an exam, read what the paper reserves before concluding that a document headed “release” has freed every co-obligor.
The reduction keeps the arrangement from over-compensating the obligee. An obligee may receive only one satisfaction for a single injury, so the amount paid for a contract not to sue is credited against the liability of the other obligors and is not simply ignored.12 The same logic marks the boundary between the two devices. The price of a covenant is always less than the full claim, since payment of the full amount leaves nothing to preserve, and an instrument that gives full satisfaction is in reality a release and is treated as one.13
Jurisdictions differ in how much protection they give an obligee who failed to use the right words. Some law abandons the reservation requirement altogether: a release does not discharge others liable for the same harm unless the agreement so provides, because insisting on an express reservation is a booby-trap for the unwary. The Restatement (Second) of Torts took that position, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability carries it forward, as do most jurisdictions.14 Elsewhere, decisions and statutes have moved away from the traditional rule in several patterns:15
- A release necessarily discharges the other obligors, but a covenant not to sue does not unless full compensation has been paid.
- A release with an express reservation of rights against the other obligors is treated as a covenant not to sue, whatever its words of release.
- A release without a reservation still does not discharge the others unless it shows an intention to do so or full compensation has been paid.
The Uniform Joint Obligations Act and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act express the same preference for the parties' terms over the old automatic rule.16 One exception survives in many jurisdictions: a release of one tortfeasor automatically releases another whose liability is solely vicarious for the first tortfeasor's conduct.17
Scope and Challenges to Releases
Because the writing does the discharging, its words fix what it discharges. A court reads the language the maker signed as evidence of intent and, when the language is clear, holds the maker to it.19 The rule suits a transaction whose purpose is finality. A releasee who pays for peace is buying the end of a dispute, and a release that could be reopened whenever the maker later claimed to have meant less would deliver little of what was paid for.
Enos v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc. shows the rule at work. A plaintiff signed a general release in a medical malpractice action, running to “doctors . . . and all other persons,” and the release was later held to bar a products liability, fraud, and misrepresentation suit against a pharmaceutical company.20 The Eighth Circuit found that the document “released all entities from all claims of every kind, including, but not limited to claims resulting from negligence and malpractice.”21 The drug company was no doctor, and the new theories sounded in products liability and misrepresentation instead of malpractice, but the words “all other persons” and “all claims of every kind” reached both. The court added that when a release is unambiguous it is bound by the intent the release shows, and extrinsic evidence offered to give the writing a different meaning is inadmissible.22 That exclusion gives a general release its finality. If the maker could testify to a private understanding, every release clear on its face would still invite a hearing.
A release that says nothing about other persons is read differently. In McCullough v. Bethany Medical Center, the Kansas court presumed that parties a written release did not mention were not released, and it allowed evidence from outside the writing to determine what the parties intended.23 The two decisions differ on one point: the paper in Enos had words that answered the question, and the paper in McCullough had none. Where the language is silent it cannot settle intent, so the court needs other evidence, and the presumption protects a claimant who received nothing from the unnamed parties. That is the modern view generally. Absent clear language to the contrary, a subsequent tortfeasor such as a negligent treating physician is not released as a matter of law.24
Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co. shows how clear language changes the result. There the Eighth Circuit read “all other persons” in a general release to satisfy the “if the release so provides” condition of the local Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, so any subsequent tortfeasor was discharged regardless of the compensation actually received. A majority of jurisdictions follows that position.25 Some statutes go further and require a release to say expressly that it discharges later tortfeasors before they may rely on it, and a statute of that kind may also reduce later damages by the amount already received, as in Moller v. North Shore University Hospital.26 The first move on an exam, then, is to read what the paper says about other persons and other claims before deciding who is free.
A release whose language clearly covers a claim can still be attacked, because a release is a contract and the ordinary contract defenses remain available. Two limits are enough for this chapter, and the doctrines behind them belong elsewhere. The first is mutual mistake. A settlement may later be challenged when the injuries turn out to be much more serious, or of a different type, than the parties believed, especially where the release by its terms extended to unknown injuries. Some courts look beyond the terms of the release to see whether one or both parties were mistaken about the nature of the injury and, if so, grant relief, while others will not.27
The split exists because two sound ideas collide. A release that covers unknown injuries exists to allocate that very risk to the maker, so enforcing the words enforces the bargain. A court that grants relief reasons that neither side had the actual injury in mind, so the paper records no real agreement about it. A student who meets this fact pattern should state both views and not assume that broad wording ends the matter.
The second limit concerns how the release was obtained. In Syester v. Banta, a lonely and elderly widow sued a dance studio over the sale of dance instruction by allegedly false and fraudulent representations.28 After the suit began, the studio's manager rehired an instructor the plaintiff trusted to get her to drop it, and the instructor visited her at work and told her she did not need an attorney. The manager then persuaded her, at her home, to discharge her lawyer by telephone and to settle for a refund of $6,090, and she signed a release that was specific as to that payment and general as to all claims.29 The Iowa Supreme Court recognized that such a release bars all of her claims if it was obtained in good faith. It described evidence that the studio was trying to lead her away from her own counsel by efforts so far beyond the limits of propriety that the studio's own lawyer hesitated to participate.30 The wording of that release was as broad as the one in Enos, and the difference lies in how the signature was obtained. A release ends a dispute finally only if it reflects a fair bargain, and a signature produced by the defendant's own steering of the claimant away from counsel reflects the defendant's pressure. Enforcing it would reward the party that exploited the settlement process. Which defense fits such facts, and what must be proved, is taught in other chapters, but the point to hold here is that a valid-looking release is not immune from them.