Concept
Oral Rescission and the Statute
Rescission
Oral Rescission and the Statute
A contract that the Statute of Frauds required to be in writing can still be undone by spoken words. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 148 says so in its first sentence: notwithstanding the Statute, all unperformed duties under an enforceable contract may be discharged by an oral agreement of rescission.1 In its familiar application, the Statute makes a contract for the sale of land unenforceable unless a signed writing evidences it.2 The sisters in Sokaitis v. Bakaysa ended a signed agreement with a few spoken words, and the law let them.
The result looks odd at first. A rescission is itself an agreement, one in which each party agrees to discharge all of the other party's remaining duties of performance under an existing contract,3 and the natural guess is that an agreement ending a writing-required contract needs a writing too. The guess overlooks what a rescission does. It reaches only duties that remain unperformed, and it extinguishes them when the parties agree. The second sentence of § 148 marks the limit of that reasoning: the Statute may apply to a contract to rescind a transfer of property.4
Three questions organize what follows. When is an oral rescission effective? Where does the rule stop for property that has already been transferred? And for sales of goods, what does the Uniform Commercial Code do to a contract clause that demands a signed writing for any rescission?
Oral Rescission Is Effective
The rule in § 148 has three working parts.5 The contract must be enforceable, whether because it needed no writing or because a signed writing satisfies the Statute. The discharge reaches only unperformed duties, the same remaining duties that every agreement of rescission extinguishes. And the agreement of rescission may be oral. The majority rule puts the same point in terms of executory contracts: one that satisfies the Statute may be rescinded orally.6
Two explanations support the rule. The conventional one is classificatory: the Statute applies to contracts for the sale of land but not to contracts that rescind other contracts.7 The second looks to timing. In Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, two sisters had signed a two-year agreement to share gambling winnings, and they later ended it by oral agreement. The court held that the rescission was not subject to the Statute of Frauds because it involved an instantaneous performance: each party's duties under the original contract were immediately discharged.8 The one-year provision asks whether performance could stretch beyond a year, and a discharge complete at the moment of agreement leaves no performance to stretch.
A spoken “we're done” succeeds where a spoken “let's change the price” fails, and exam questions like to test the contrast. The usual statement is that an oral rescission is enforceable, while an oral modification is not and leaves the original contract in force.9 A modification keeps the contract alive and changes a term of it, and for the great majority of real estate sales contracts the modified agreement is itself within the Statute and cannot be enforced without a writing. The parties then stand where the original contract puts them, assuming an adequate writing supported it.10
Courts nonetheless give oral modifications effect through waiver and estoppel. Most oral modifications ease one party's performance or make a condition less onerous, and such a modification works as a waiver; if the party it benefits has relied on it to its detriment, the other party is estopped from enforcing the original terms.11 The waiver can be retracted by reasonable notice that strict performance will be required, unless retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.12 In Imperator Realty v. Tull, the court held that the defendant could have withdrawn consent to the oral modification before the plaintiff changed position but could not do so afterward. It estopped the defendant from relying on the plaintiff's failure to comply with the written agreement and enforced the oral agreement despite the Statute.13 An answer about an oral modification should therefore say that the original contract stays in force unless waiver or estoppel applies.
Parties sometimes try to head off oral changes by providing that the contract may be modified only by a signed writing. At common law such a clause does not stop an oral rescission, because clauses and statutes of this kind have usually been read to reach modification and not rescission.14 The majority rule explains why drafters write the clauses at all: because an executory contract that satisfies the Statute may be rescinded orally, they add terms that purport to forbid oral rescissions.15 For sales of goods, the third subsection below shows the Code giving such clauses real force.
Rescinding Transfers of Property
The second sentence of § 148 qualifies the first: the Statute of Frauds may apply to a contract to rescind a transfer of property.18 Because the first sentence reaches only unperformed duties, the qualification marks what lies outside its reach. A rescission of an executory contract extinguishes obligations still owing. A rescission of a completed transfer cannot work that way, because the duty to convey was performed when the transfer was made and no duty remains to discharge. Undoing the transfer takes a second one.
Spoken before closing, the same words have the opposite effect. Where no deed has passed and both sides still owe performance, the call-off discharges only unperformed duties and moves no title, so the first sentence of § 148 governs and the rescission is effective.19 The usual statement of the rule agrees: an oral rescission is enforceable, because the Statute applies to contracts for the sale of land but not to contracts that rescind them.20 The two scenes differ in one fact, whether anything has already been conveyed.
The general common-law rule states the line in terms of effect. A rescission need be in writing only if the agreement to rescind would produce a transfer of title to land, such as the surrender of a long-term interest in the property.21 The test asks what the rescission would do, not what the parties call it, so an agreement labeled a mutual rescission that requires title to return is judged as a transfer of title. Leases mark the point where contract law hands off to another field: whether a mutual rescission suffices to surrender a leasehold is a question of real property law, and that law must be consulted.22
On an exam, therefore, ask first whether title has moved or would move. If nothing has been conveyed, treat the oral call-off as effective. If something has been conveyed, treat the agreement to give it back as a contract to rescind a transfer, to which the Statute may apply.
No-Oral-Rescission Clauses Under the UCC
At common law, a clause demanding a signed writing does not stop an oral rescission. For sales of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code reverses that result. Section 2-209(2) provides:
A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.25
The subsection names rescission alongside modification, so a spoken call-off of a goods contract meets the clause just as a spoken price change does. An attempted oral rescission of a contract for the sale or lease of goods is therefore ineffective if the written contract contains a “no rescission except in writing” clause; § 2A-208(2) carries similar language for leases of goods.26
The commentary on these clauses justifies them with a picture from a construction project. Changes are requested and perhaps agreed to in part, the work progresses and relationships deteriorate, personnel change, and memories blur about who orally agreed to what. A signed writing protects against false claims and selective memory, and it serves the evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions that justify requiring signed writings.27 A claimed oral call-off invites the same dispute, and the clause settles it by asking what was signed. In effect the parties write their own statute of frauds, and for goods the Code enforces it.28
The two calls are identical, so the clause alone moves the result. Both parties in the first scene were businesses, which brings up the limit the subsection places on its own rule.
When the clause appears on a form supplied by a merchant, the other party must separately sign it, except as between merchants.29 Put the other way, a non-merchant is held to such a clause on a merchant's form only if the non-merchant signed it separately.30 The evident aim is to protect a party who signs a pre-printed form without noticing a paragraph buried in it; a second signature on the clause itself makes that party's assent specific.
Even when a clause defeats an oral rescission as a rescission, the attempt may still have legal effect. Section 2-209(4) provides that although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy subsection (2) or (3), “it can operate as a waiver.”31 A buyer who orally cancels one shipment gives up the right to insist on it. The rule keeps a signed-writing clause from limiting in other respects the legal effect of what the parties actually did afterward.32 The waiver is not final. The waiving party may retract it by reasonable notification that strict performance will be required, but under § 2-209(5) a waiver “affecting an executory portion of the contract” cannot be retracted if retraction would be “unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.”33
If every spoken attempt counted as a waiver, the clause would mean nothing. In Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, the seller tried to escape a contract term requiring written modifications by labeling the buyer's conduct, allegedly agreeing to new dates, a “waiver” rather than a “modification.” Judge Posner resolved the tension between § 2-209(2) and § 2-209(4) by holding that an attempted modification is effective as a waiver only if there is reliance.34 His reasoning rests on credibility. Reliance is a common substitute for consideration because it adds something to the mere say-so of one party. The main purpose of forbidding oral modifications is to keep a promisor from fabricating a modification that lets him escape his obligations, and that danger shrinks when the promisor has actually incurred a cost. Bootstrapping is possible, but it is a risky course that “makes one put one's money where one's mouth is.”35 The subsection names rescission alongside modification, so the same limit governs a spoken call-off of the sale.