Concept
The Substituted Contract
Substituted contract and substituted performance
The Substituted Contract
An obligee who is owed a performance may agree to take something else in its place, and the something else comes in two kinds. It can be a performance still to come, or it can be a new contract. A substituted contract is the second kind: a contract that the obligee itself accepts in satisfaction of the obligor's existing duty.1 Because the obligee has accepted the new contract and is not waiting on a performance, the original duty ends the moment the new contract is made. The substituted contract discharges it, and the obligee's rights now rest on the new agreement.2
Two questions follow. The first is how to tell that the obligee accepted the new contract itself, and not some lesser promise to take a performance later. The second is what the obligee may do when the obligor breaks the new promise. One example, with its facts varied, runs through both: a buyer owes a seller $450 for a piano, and the two agree that the buyer will pay $425 instead.
Recognizing a Substituted Contract
The Restatement's definition turns on one word: itself. What the obligee accepts is the new contract, with the promises it contains. A creditor who agrees to take a delivery next month in place of payment now has accepted a performance. A creditor who agrees to trade the old contract for a new one has accepted the contract. The Restatement pairs the definition with a rule about the fate of the original duty, which the second half of this unit develops.3
The test is intent. If the parties meant the new agreement to replace all the provisions of the earlier one, the new agreement is a substituted contract, and the earlier duty is discharged even though no one has performed.4 Suppose the piano buyer and seller agree on July 1 that the buyer will pay $425 instead of $450, each intending the new promise to replace the old one. The buyer's duty to pay $450 is discharged although the buyer has paid nothing, and the seller can sue only for $425.5
The law does not readily find that intent when the new promise is for less than was owed. A rational creditor would not accept a mere promise to pay part of a debt in place of a promise to pay all of it, so contract law presumes that a settlement of this kind is an executory accord and not a substituted contract.6 An accord arises when the obligee agrees to accept the substituted performance but does not agree to an immediate discharge.7 Take a debtor who owes $7,000 and offers fifty tons of hay in place of the money. The creditor accepts, but nothing shows that the creditor meant to give up the $7,000 before the hay arrives. The parties have made an accord. The $7,000 duty survives until the hay is delivered, and a creditor who never receives the hay may sue on the accord or on the original debt.8
The presumption yields to the circumstances. In the end the question is whether the parties did or did not intend an immediate discharge of the existing obligation, and courts answer it from the whole setting of the deal.9 Two settings point in opposite directions. When the contract is an executory bilateral contract, so that both sides still owe performance, and the new agreement changes the duties on both sides, the likeliest reading is that the parties are replacing one deal with another. When the obligor is having difficulty performing or is already in breach, and the obligee accepts an alternative performance to salvage what it can, the likelier reading is an accord with no immediate discharge.10
A substituted contract is also not a novation as that term is traditionally defined. A novation requires a third person to replace the original obligor, while a substituted contract is made between the parties to the earlier contract.11 The only question in this section, then, is whether the same two parties meant to swap one agreement for another.
When the New Contract Is Breached
When the obligor breaks a substituted contract, the obligee cannot fall back on the old duty. The substituted contract discharged that duty, and the obligor's breach of the new contract gives the obligee no right to enforce it.13 The reasoning runs in order. The old duty ended when the obligee accepted the new agreement. A duty that has ended is not revived by the obligor's later default. And the old claim has merged into the new agreement, so any action after a breach must be brought on the substituted agreement.14
Return to the piano. The buyer and seller agreed on July 1 that $425 would replace the $450 debt, and the buyer now refuses to pay anything. The seller cannot sue for $450. The seller sues on the $425 agreement, and the extra $25 that the old contract would have produced disappeared when the seller accepted the new promise.15
The rule leaves the risk of default with the obligee, who traded a duty for a promise. Only an express agreement to the contrary lets the obligee enforce the original claim after a breach.16 An obligee who wants the old claim as a fallback has to bargain for that result.
Compare the same default under an executory accord. If the parties meant the $425 promise to operate as an accord, the $450 duty is only suspended until the buyer has had time to perform. A breach by the buyer serious enough to discharge the seller's duty to accept the payment then lets the seller enforce either the original duty or the duty under the accord.17 The buyer's conduct is the same in both cases, and only the parties' intent about when the old duty ends separates them. That is why a reduced-payment settlement is presumed to be an accord unless the parties show that they meant an immediate discharge.18 A student who calls such an agreement a substituted contract tells the seller that the $450 claim is gone. A student who calls a clear replacement an accord gives the seller a $450 claim the seller does not have.
The line between the two is untidy, and one leading treatise says so. It explains that the substituted contract was created largely to circumvent the unsatisfactory rules that until recently governed executory accords, and it urges that the distinction not complicate litigation about routine claim settlements.19 The next section takes up the accord on its own terms.