Concept
Discharge by Agreement
Substituted contract and substituted performance
Substituted Contract and Performance
Discharge by Agreement
An obligee, the party to whom a duty is owed, can give up the right to performance, and the obligor, the party who owes the duty, is then relieved of it. That relief is a discharge, the extinguishing of a contractual duty. But an obligee cannot discharge a duty merely by saying so. Except as §§ 274–77 provide, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts denies effect to an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge unless it satisfies one of three tests.1
- The assent is made for consideration, that is, in exchange for something the obligee bargained for.2
- The assent is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration.3
- The assent has induced action or forbearance of a kind that would make a promise enforceable, as when the obligor changes position because of it.4
Each test is borrowed from the law of promises. The Restatement treats an obligee's assent to a discharge like a promise to give something up, and the assent binds only where a promise would. An obligee who tells the obligor to forget the debt, with no exchange, no independent ground for enforcing a promise, and no reliance, has discharged nothing.
The piano sale shows the rule defeating an obligee's own agreement. A seller delivers a piano under a $400 contract. The buyer, Alice, refuses to pay, and the seller gets a judgment against her. Alice then offers $375 'in full settlement,' and the seller accepts. Contract law is adamant that the seller can still collect the last $25. Alice gave nothing beyond part of what the judgment already required, so the seller's agreement to take less has no consideration behind it, and the preexisting duty rule stands in the way. That the partial payment comes sooner and spares the seller the work of enforcing the judgment does not change the result.5
The piano sale is no oddity. Attempts to release all or part of an obligation without any bargained exchange have troubled the common law at least since Foakes v. Beer was decided in 1884, and some states have responded by statute.6
When the obligee does receive something in return, the thing offered may itself be only a promise. The question is then the one the mutuality cases ask: is the promise real or illusory? In De Los Santos v. Great Western Sugar Company, for example, a trucking company 'agreed' to haul 'such tonnage of beets as may be loaded' by the other party, and the dispute turned on whether that was a real commitment.7
The sections that follow take up the arrangements by which parties actually replace one duty with another: the substituted contract, the substituted performance, and the executory accord. For each, the question is what the obligee agreed to accept, whether it was a new promise, a different performance, or a performance still to come, and whether that agreement carries the bargained-for footing described above.