Concept
Making the Accord Effective
Accord and satisfaction
Making the Accord Effective
A discharge is any means by which a contractual duty is extinguished, and parties can bring one about by agreement.1 Section 273 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts decides when the obligee's side of that agreement counts. Except as stated in §§ 274-77, an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge is not effective unless one of the listed circumstances is present.2 A manifestation of assent is whatever words or conduct show that the obligee has agreed to give up the original duty. The prior section defined an accord as the obligee's promise to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of that duty, and § 273 asks when that promise binds. An accord that fails this screen never reaches the questions of discharge and suspension that follow.
The screen exists because an obligee who agrees to take less, or something different, is surrendering an enforceable right. A creditor owed $1,000 under a contract holds a claim the courts will enforce. If any friendly remark about accepting a smaller sum could erase that claim, courtesies, concessions made under pressure, and half-serious negotiating talk would all work as releases. A gratuitous promise to give up part of a claim is, in the ordinary case, a gift the giver may take back before it is carried out. The law therefore asks for a reason it respects before it treats the obligee's assent as deliberate and final.
The Restatement supplies three such reasons, and any one is enough. The first is that the assent is made for consideration, meaning the obligor gave something the law counts as a bargained-for exchange. The second is that the assent is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration.3 The third is that the assent has induced such action or forbearance as would make a promise enforceable, which is reliance doing the work a bargain would otherwise do.4 Because the routes are alternatives, an answer on a modified settlement should ask which of the three, if any, supports the obligee's assent, and should not stop when the first one fails. The subsections below take them in that order.
Consideration for the Accord
The first route is the familiar one: an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge is effective if it is made for consideration.5 Consideration carries its ordinary meaning, a bargained-for exchange, so the question is whether the obligee agreed to give up the original duty in return for something the obligor gave or promised. The price must come from the obligor's side, and that is the difficulty. An obligor who proposes a settlement is often offering to do what is already owed, or only part of it.
Contract law answers with the preexisting legal duty rule. A debtor who pays or promises only what the creditor is already entitled to receive gives the creditor nothing new, so the creditor's promise to take less has no price behind it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 73 states the rule for a legal duty owed to the promisor, one "which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute."6 Those words mark the boundary. The rule applies when the obligation is clear and its amount is not honestly arguable, and it gives way when either condition fails.
Applied to settlements, the rule defeats the simplest kind of accord. When a debt is fixed, due, and undisputed, and the debtor offers part of it while the creditor agrees to take that part as full payment, nothing has been exchanged. The debtor surrenders no right, and the creditor's promise amounts to a promise to give away the difference. The law does not enforce a gift promise merely because the giver made it. The traditional rule that an agreement to settle a liquidated, undisputed claim for less does not bind the creditor traces to the English decision in Foakes v. Beer (1884). That decision extended the preexisting duty rule, which is itself a corollary of the general requirement of consideration.7 The rule has drawn heavy criticism, and modern developments have reduced its importance, but the analysis still begins here. A creditor with a fixed, undisputed claim has no uncertainty to compromise, so the only thing the debtor could hand over is part of what the creditor already has a right to receive.
The rule bites only when the obligor adds nothing, so any real difference in what the obligor supplies repairs the problem. The simplest repair is a different type of performance.
A change in the time, place, or manner of performance works the same way. The original contract fixed when, where, and how the obligor would perform, and the obligee could insist on those terms. An obligor who offers to perform earlier, somewhere else, or in another form is therefore giving something the obligee could not have demanded. Payment to a third person whom the obligee designates is the same kind of change. Each variation costs the obligor the benefit of the original terms and gives the obligee something the contract did not promise, which is all a bargained-for exchange requires.
A second route to consideration removes the clarity on which the preexisting duty rule depends. A claim is liquidated when its amount is fixed and certain and unliquidated when it has not been reduced to a dollar figure, and a dispute is bona fide when the disagreement about what is owed is honest. Before the UCC, the rule was clear: when the amount owed is unliquidated or the subject of a good faith dispute, accepting a payment tendered in full settlement discharges the rest.8 The mechanism is mutual compromise. The creditor gives up the chance of recovering the larger sum she believes is owed, along with the cost of suing for it, and the debtor gives up the chance of paying less or nothing. Each side surrenders something real in return for certainty, and that exchange is the consideration.
A piano sale shows the pattern. A buyer has a genuine argument that he owes only $400 of the $450 the seller claims, and he sends a $425 check marked as full settlement. The seller cashes it. The buyer has paid $25 more than he thinks he owes and the seller has accepted $25 less than she thinks is owed, so the accord is supported by consideration and the buyer is discharged from the extra $25.9 The dispute has to be honest. Section 73 excludes only a duty that is neither doubtful nor honestly disputed, and a debtor cannot manufacture consideration by announcing a disagreement he does not hold.
Courts divide on a variation, where the debtor admits part of a disputed claim and pays only the admitted portion. Most courts treat the claim as unliquidated and find consideration, while a minority hold that the debtor did only what he was already legally obliged to do.10 The majority view favors resolving disputes, and the debtor's early admission of part of the debt does not bind him.
Once some real difference or compromise is present, courts do not ask whether the exchange was fair in value. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 72 treats any bargained-for performance as consideration, subject to the exceptions in §§ 73 and 74, so the inquiry asks whether the obligee sought the performance in exchange and leaves its worth to the parties.11 A creditor who takes a television worth $500 for a $700 debt has decided for herself what the substitute is worth to her, and the accord may be for less than the original claim. Even a slight change in the obligor's performance, such as paying a few days early, can supply the consideration, because the law checks only that an exchange exists.
A liquidated debt paid in part, with nothing else changed, comes out the other way. A seller who delivered a piano and won a judgment for the $400 price may agree to take $375 in full settlement, perhaps because cash in hand beats the trouble of enforcing the judgment. Even so, the seller can collect the last $25. The amount is fixed by the judgment, nothing is disputed, and the debt was already due, so paying now changes no term of what the buyer owed. The seller's convenience benefits her but is not a different performance by him, and her promise to forgive the balance has no consideration behind it.12 The casino owner and the judgment creditor each accepted less than they were owed. The results differ because only the gambler changed something the original duty required.
Promises Enforceable Without Consideration
The second route appears in § 273(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge is effective if it is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration.14 The first route looked to what the obligor gave in exchange. This clause asks nothing about the obligor's performance. It turns to the obligee's assent and asks whether some other part of contract law already treats a promise made in those circumstances as binding without a bargain. If it does, the obligee's promise to give up the claim borrows that status, and the discharge takes effect even though the obligor handed over nothing.
Consideration is one device the law uses to separate promises worth enforcing from casual ones, a rough signal that the promisor spoke deliberately and meant to be bound. Contract law accepts other signals for the same job, and a signed record is the clearest. When one is present, the law already has reason to believe the obligee seriously meant to let go of the claim. Demanding a separate payment for the discharge would add a technical hurdle with little protective value, and it would let an obligee who truly agreed to forgive a debt take the forgiveness back. Section 273(b) therefore writes no special rules for discharges. It lets the accord borrow whichever substitute for consideration applies.
The most concrete borrowed rule is UCC § 1-306. It allows a claim arising out of a breach to be discharged in whole or in part, without consideration, by agreement in an authenticated record, in practice a signed writing or its electronic equivalent.15 The provision is among the modern developments that have reduced the importance of the preexisting duty rule discussed in the last subsection, under which a promise to forgive part of a fixed, undisputed claim would otherwise fail for want of a price. The idea behind it is that a signature on a record is strong evidence that the creditor decided, deliberately, to give up the claim.
The difference between a forgiveness that works and one that fails often comes down to form, and the failing version shows it most clearly.
In both scenes the obligee wanted to forgive and the obligor gave nothing. Only the second contains a signed record, and that one fact carries the result. The record requirement belongs to the borrowed rule, so meeting it is the whole showing under § 273(b), and the obligor need not prove anything about its own performance. The scope of the borrowed rule matters too. The statute speaks of a claim arising out of a breach, so an answer should confirm that the thing being released is such a claim before relying on it.
The signed release is the example students meet most often, and it is one illustration of the clause, not the only one. The same logic reaches any setting in which contract law binds a promise without consideration. The obligee's assent must satisfy that doctrine's own requirements, and the test in every case is whether the underlying rule reaches the obligee's assent.16
That test corrects a common error on settlement problems. When the obligor has given nothing new, a student who stops at § 273(a) concludes that the discharge fails. The better answer asks what the obligee did to manifest assent. A signed release of a breach claim can rescue the discharge even though the obligor's performance adds nothing.
Reliance as a Substitute
The third route asks whether the obligee's assent to a discharge has induced such action or forbearance as would make a promise enforceable.18 Forbearance means holding back from something the person was free to do, such as declining a loan offer or postponing a sale. The first route looked for a bargained-for exchange. This clause looks instead for a change in the obligor's position. The obligor need not have paid anything for the discharge. What counts is that the obligor did something, or refrained from something, because the obligee said the duty was over.
The clause borrows its standard from promissory estoppel, the doctrine that makes a promise binding when the promisor should reasonably expect it to induce action or forbearance and it does induce it. That gives the route two requirements. First, the obligee should reasonably have expected the assent to lead the obligor to act or hold back. Second, the assent must in fact have led the obligor to do so, and the conduct must be a response to the assurance. The reason for the doctrine follows from the position of an obligee who has promised to forgive a debt without receiving anything. Such a promise would ordinarily be revocable, because a gratuitous promise is a gift the giver may take back before it is carried out. But an obligor who has rearranged affairs on the strength of the assurance cannot undo the rearranging. Letting the obligee retract would leave the obligor worse off for having trusted, so the law stops the retraction without requiring any bargain.
Each requirement screens out a different kind of claim. The expectation requirement limits the route to reliance the obligee invited. An obligee who sets a deadline and knows the obligor must raise money has given an assurance that calls for action, while an obligor who makes an extravagant purchase after a passing remark has taken a risk the obligee had no reason to foresee. The actual-inducement requirement is a causal link. It separates an obligor who changed position because of the assent from one who would have done the same thing anyway. An answer should test both, and the causal link is the one most often missed.
The words and the creditor's expectations are the same in both scenes. What differs is whether the obligor's conduct traces to the assent. The first debtor lost money on a sale and gave up a financing option because of what she was told, which is the injury estoppel exists to prevent. The second buyer lost nothing, so letting the supplier retract leaves him exactly where his own plan put him. His payment of part of a fixed, undisputed claim also supplies no consideration under the first route, so nothing else rescues the discharge.
Because the clause measures effectiveness by what would make a promise enforceable, the usual limits on reliance-based enforcement come with it, including the court's freedom to shape the remedy to what fairness to the obligor requires.19 This route also differs from the other two in what must be shown. The first needs a bargained-for exchange, and the second needs the circumstances of some other enforceability doctrine, such as a signed release of a breach claim.20 The third needs no exchange and no formality, only a changed position that the assent invited and produced. When the obligor gave nothing new and no record was signed, the last question on a settlement problem is whether the obligor did or refrained from something because of the assurance.