Concept
Frustration Under the UCC
Frustration of purpose
Frustration Under the UCC
Article 2 contains no explicit provision on frustration, but the Code intends the common law of frustration to apply.1 What Article 2 supplies instead are two excuse sections that absorb the older doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose: § 2-613, which deals with casualty to identified goods, and § 2-615, which deals with commercial impracticability.2
Section 2-613 applies when the contract requires goods identified at formation and those goods suffer casualty, without either party's fault, before the risk of loss passes to the buyer. A total loss avoids the contract. If the loss is partial, or the goods have deteriorated so that they no longer conform, the buyer may demand inspection and then either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with an allowance from the price, without further right against the seller.3
Section 2-615 reaches further, and it is written around the seller. Unless the seller has assumed a greater obligation, delay in delivery or non-delivery is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made. By its terms the section applies only to sellers, so a buyer whose purpose has been destroyed cannot point to its text.4
That gap has drawn criticism. One writer calls it unjustifiable that courts are more inclined to sustain impracticability than frustration, and a law review discussion adds that “neither sense nor justice would be served by allowing a seller to use a section 2–615 (UCC) defense and simultaneously deny it to the buyer in the same situation.”5 Courts have found two ways to give the buyer a hearing.
The first route reads § 2-615 to reach buyers. Official Comment 9 speaks of an exemption for the buyer, and most courts have applied the section to buyers on that basis.6 The seller-only text still has critics. An Indiana comment to the section faults Official Comment 9 because it discusses exemption for the buyer while the text applies only to sellers, so a buyer in Indiana may be unable to use § 2-615 at all.7 Buyers have also pressed the section directly, as the buyer did in Power Engineering & Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Krug International.
The second route leaves § 2-615 alone. Section 1-103 authorizes courts to apply common-law doctrines to the extent they are consistent with the Code, and that is how the buyer in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co. could plead frustration as an alternative defense to § 2-615.8 Even a court that refuses to extend § 2-615 to buyers may consult pre-UCC law to supplement the Code on a buyer's claim of excuse.9
The choice of route seldom changes the outcome, because the essential elements of frustration and of impracticability are the same. The Northern Indiana court made that point by comparing § 2-615 with Restatement §§ 261 (impracticability) and 265 (frustration), and it doubted that the seller-only text had substantive significance.10 Both rules turn on a basic assumption: the non-occurrence of the event must have been one on which the parties made the contract, which is the criterion § 2-615(a) uses and the Restatement's frustration rule adopts.11 Both also yield to a contrary allocation of risk. Section 2-615 excuses only a seller who has not assumed a greater obligation, and Comment 8 finds such an assumption not only in the express terms but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting and in trade usage.12 The Restatement's frustration rule discharges the remaining duties “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”13 A buyer's claim in a sale of goods therefore asks the same questions that frustration asks everywhere: whether the lost purpose was a principal one, whether the frustration is substantial, whether the event's non-occurrence was a basic assumption, whether the buyer is without fault, and whether the contract put the risk on the buyer.
The plain-banner buyer resembles the buyer of Canadian lamb pelts, whose goods could be shipped anywhere else in the world after an import ban. The court held that the buyer's purpose was not totally frustrated even though the buyer may have suffered a loss.14 The Restatement's gasoline-station lessee is in the same position. A traffic change leaves him operating at a substantial loss, but he can still run the station, so his principal purpose is not substantially frustrated and he still owes the rent.15 Profit is not the purpose that frustration protects. The doctrine looks past the “bottom line” to the parties' mutual objective, measured against the contract's allocation of risk.16 The two banner orders differ in one fact, whether the goods keep a use after the event, and that fact decides the claim under either route.
Courts have reasons to hold the line even when the elements look close. Judicial excuse may significantly reduce the incentive of those best able to avoid a risk to do so, and that is a reason to limit excuse in difficult cases.17 A fixed price adds another reason. The point of a fixed price is to lock in terms against swings in the market, so a swing does not make out impracticability, and excusing the seller would take from the buyer the bargain it struck.18 Each reason follows from the function the excuse sections serve, which is to allocate the risks the parties did not allocate in their agreement.19
The open question in any jurisdiction is whether a buyer is limited to the common law, and the answer matters mainly to the pleading. The elements the buyer must prove are the same whichever source the court uses.