Concept
Effects of Discharge
Frustration of purpose
Effects of Discharge
Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the effect of frustration in a single phrase: once its requirements are met, the party's “remaining duties to render performance are discharged,” unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 Each phrase narrows the effect. “Remaining” confines the discharge to performance still due when the event occurred, and “duties to render performance” confines it to obligations to perform in the future. Temporary frustration, by contrast, only suspends the duty, and the suspension ripens into discharge only if later performance would be materially more burdensome.2 Payments already made, work already done, and breaches already committed lie outside the discharge. Section 266(2), which governs a frustrating fact that existed when the contract was made, states the same result in the same words.3
Because a contract is an exchange, excusing one party does not settle everything, and three questions remain. What becomes of the other party's counter-duties, each of which was promised in return for the excused party's performance? Who keeps the money paid and the work done before the event? And what happens when the party now claiming relief had already repudiated before the event struck? The Restatement answers the last question in a special rule under which a later frustrating event can cut off damages for the repudiation.4
Mutual Discharge of Duties
The text of § 265 speaks only of the frustrated party, yet the effect of total supervening frustration reaches both sides. The excused party's remaining duties are discharged and, simultaneously, so are the other party's, because the excused party's performance will not be forthcoming.5 The explanation lies in how bilateral promises are built. Each promise is the price of the other, so each duty to perform rests on the expectation of receiving the counter-performance. Once frustration removes one performance from the exchange, the duty that depended on it has nothing left to rest on, and a rule that freed only the frustrated party would force the other to perform for nothing.
The caterer's contract shows the effect on both sides. The client's frustrated purpose ends the client's duty to pay the balance, and the caterer's duty to cook ends in the same stroke, because the fee that was to reward the banquet will never be owed. Neither side can sue the other for the unperformed exchange. Where the frustration is only prospective, the other party has the same options it would have if the expected non-performance were a breach, except that no cause of action for breach arises.6
The caterer's discharge is derivative of the client's excuse. If the client's claim fails at any element, or if the language or circumstances of the contract placed the risk of the fire on the client, nothing is discharged on either side and each party can still enforce the contract against the other.
Discharge also stops short of claims that have already ripened. The comment to § 261, the parallel rule for supervening impracticability, says the rule applies only to discharge a duty to render a performance and does not affect a claim for breach that has already arisen.7 The two questions are distinct. Discharge answers whether a party must still perform, while a claim for breach answers what a party owes for a failure that has already happened. When the frustrating event strikes, the injured party's loss has already vested, and if a later event could erase it, a party in default could escape liability by waiting for misfortune to reach the contract. The same comment leaves the effect of later events on the amount of damages to the rules on remedies, and their effect on a claim for anticipatory repudiation to separate discharge rules, which the last subsection of this unit takes up.8
Timing alone separates the two outcomes. The banquet was still executory when the fire struck, so it fell with the fee. The menu due on May 1 had already been withheld, so the claim for its breach stood outside the discharge. A later event may bear on how much the client recovers, because that question belongs to the rules on remedies, but it does not extinguish the claim. Mutual discharge ends the executory exchange and leaves untouched what had already happened. It says nothing, however, about the April payment or the ingredients, and the next subsection turns to them.
Restitution After Discharge
Since § 265 discharges only remaining duties, the caterer's April payment and ingredient costs are left unresolved, and English law first resolved such questions by leaving each loss where the frustrating event found it. In Chandler v. Webster, a coronation case related to Krell v. Henry, the defendant had made a substantial down payment and had agreed to pay the balance in advance of the coronation. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to restitution and was liable to pay the balance, whereas the defendant in Krell was excused from paying for use of the premises.10 The rule was simply that the parties should be placed in the position they would have been in at the occurrence of the frustrating event. In the words of one judicial statement of it, the contract “remains a perfectly good contract up to that point, and everything previously done in pursuance of it must be treated as rightly done, but the parties are both discharged from further performance of it.”11
That statement concedes that the rule is “to some extent an arbitrary one.” Its defense is practical: once time has passed and each party's position has changed, it is impossible to ascertain the parties' rights with exactitude, so the law treats everything already done as validly done and relieves the parties of further responsibility.12 In other words, the loss lies where it happened to fall when the intervening event occurred.13 The cost of that convenience shows in the two coronation cases. One defendant, who had already paid, lost the money and still owed the balance, while the other was released from paying. Parties set payment dates for reasons of cash flow and security, and those reasons say nothing about who should bear an event that neither foresaw.
English law abandoned the rule by statute. At the suggestion of the Law Lords in the later Fibrosa case, Parliament enacted legislation permitting recovery under a contract discharged by impracticability or frustration for the value of benefits received, “if it considers it just to do so, having regard for all the circumstances.” The court may deduct certain expenses incurred in reliance on the contract.14
American courts reach a similar place without a statute. When impracticability or frustration discharges a contract, they have generally held that the parties must make restitution for the benefits conferred on them, and at times the concept of “benefit” is stretched to include expenses incurred in preparation for performance.15 The stretch matters because a test that asked only what the other side gained would leave a performer's wasted preparation entirely with the performer. Courts increasingly recognize that restitution used to unwind a contract that cannot be performed aims at an equitable adjustment of the gains and losses each party sustained, and that aim reaches beyond redressing unjust enrichment. The Restatement (Second) accordingly says that a court may grant relief on such terms “as justice requires including protection of the parties' reliance interests,” and a court may also supply a term needed to determine the parties' rights and duties.16
When the excused party had already rendered part of the performance, a simpler route may exist. Recovery for the part performance may be available under the doctrine of divisibility, and the Restatement (Second) suggests that a court may sever a contract in the interests of justice even if the normal tests for divisibility are not met.17
When the contract does not divide, restitution carries the load, and the caterer's facts show how the old and new approaches part.
The contract can sometimes be kept alive instead of unwound. It may be reshaped by allocation, by the rules on temporary or partial impracticability, or by supplying a term that is reasonable in the circumstances, and the party to whom performance is owed may waive restrictive clauses or substantial non-performance and so reinstate the duty on somewhat different terms.18 The measurement of each remedy belongs to the law of restitution. The direction of the law is the point to carry from here: it has moved from freezing losses where they fall toward adjusting them. One more situation complicates the adjustment, that of a party who repudiated before the frustrating event.
Repudiation and Later Frustration
Section 254 of the Restatement (Second) relieves a repudiating party of the duty to pay damages in two situations that come to light only after the breach. A repudiation is a total breach, and damages for it compensate the injured party for the performance it would have received. Under § 254(1), the duty to pay those damages is discharged “if it appears after the breach that there would have been a total failure by the injured party to perform his return promise.”20 Under § 254(2), it is discharged if it appears after the breach that the repudiated duty “would have been discharged by impracticability or frustration before any breach by non-performance.”21 The second branch ties this subsection to the rest of the chapter, because it lets a frustrating event that occurs later reach back and cut off damages for the repudiation.
Both branches address what the preceding subsection set aside, the effect of a later event on a claim for anticipatory repudiation.22 Repudiation damages compensate for a performance that has not yet come due, so the injured party is being paid for a future it can no longer count on. If events then show that the future would never have arrived, either because the injured party would have failed to do its own part or because the law would have excused the repudiator, the injured party has lost nothing the contract protected. An award would then leave it better off than performance would have.
The first branch rests on the same structure of bilateral promises that drives mutual discharge. Each promise is the price of the other, so an injured party that would have delivered nothing could not have claimed the repudiator's performance in return. The word total limits the branch, since the text speaks of a total failure, and a lesser shortfall falls outside it as written.
The second branch turns on three dates: the repudiation, the frustrating event, and the date on which the repudiated performance was due. Its key phrase is that the duty would have been discharged before any breach by non-performance, meaning that the event must arrive before the performance date passes with the performance withheld. Until that date the only wrong is the repudiation, whose damages stand in for a performance not yet due. When the event strikes first, the repudiated duty would have fallen away on both sides, and the damages would have replaced performance that was never going to be owed.
Once the performance date has passed with the performance withheld, a second breach exists and a loss has vested, so a later event can no longer undo it. The same fire makes the point from the other side of the date.
A repudiator who invokes § 254(2) must show that the repudiated duty would actually have been discharged, so the elements of frustration govern the hypothetical question. A repudiator that had assumed the risk of the event, by the language or the circumstances of the contract, cannot make that showing, and the cutoff fails.