Concept
Risk Allocation and Contrary Agreement
Frustration of purpose
Risk Allocation and Contrary Agreement
Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts discharges a frustrated party’s remaining duties “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”1 That closing clause carries more weight than its position suggests. The four elements show that an event has upset the bargain; the clause asks who bears the loss from the upset. A claimant who satisfies every element can still lose if the contract, by its words or its setting, put the risk on the claimant.
Contract liability is strict. A promisor who fails to perform is liable even if it made every reasonable effort and was not at fault, and the excuses of impracticability and frustration are exceptions to that rule.2 Two questions govern whether an exception applies: how fundamentally the event upset the expected exchange, and who bears the risk of that upset.3 The elements answer the first. On the second, fundamentally upset expectations justify relief only if the party seeking it does not bear the risk. The allocation may be clear from the contract’s terms, or it may have to be established by interpretation or construction from the circumstances of the transaction.4 The subsections below follow that division: express terms first, then inference from the circumstances when the contract is silent, then Krell v. Henry, where the inference can run in both directions.
Express Allocation
A contract can allocate a risk in so many words, and an express allocation controls. The principle of discharge, like others in its chapter, yields to a contrary agreement by which a party may assume a greater as well as a lesser obligation. A party may, for example, undertake to achieve a result irrespective of supervening events that may make the result impossible, and if it does so, its non-performance is a breach even when such an event causes it.5
Parties commonly protect themselves with a force majeure clause, which says that a party need not perform in the event of fires, floods, acts of God, war, civil unrest, labor strikes, and the like.6 Material adverse event clauses, usual in corporate merger agreements, serve a similar function: they relieve the party invoking the clause of having to prove that its principal purpose was substantially frustrated.7 Such a clause can also place a risk on the party who might otherwise seek relief. In AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts One LLC, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the effect of a material adverse event provision that allocated pandemic risk to the buyer of a hotel.8
A list of excusing events carries its own danger. Under the expressio unius principle, a court may conclude that a party who enumerated the events that excuse it impliedly assumed the risk of anything it left off.9 A party that took the trouble to name the contingencies for which it wanted relief has shown that it was thinking about excuse, so its silence about one more contingency can look like a choice.
When the language speaks to the event, it settles the question at the first step. A clause that names the event in the claimant’s favor ends the inquiry early, and a clause that places the event on the claimant ends it the other way. A court turns to the surrounding circumstances only when the language is silent.
Implied Allocation and Foreseeability
When the contract says nothing about the event, a court infers allocation from the commercial circumstances in which the parties dealt. One court framed the inquiry as a pair of linked questions:11
“The question is, given the commercial circumstances in which the parties dealt: Was the contingency which developed one which the parties could reasonably be thought to have foreseen as a real possibility which could affect performance? Was it one of that variety of risks which the parties were tacitly assigning to the promisor by their failure to provide for it explicitly? If it was, performance will be required. If it could not be so considered, performance is excused.”
Another formulation reaches the same place from the opposite direction. If the event was foreseeable, the contract should have provided for it, and the absence of a provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.12 Foreseeability therefore turns silence into evidence of choice. A party that could see the event coming as a real possibility and signed without a term can fairly be said to have taken the contract on those terms.
A dispute over median barriers shows the questions at work on a record. Paonessa and Chase had contracts that differed in some respect, but the court held that the difference did not compel the conclusion that Paonessa assumed the risk of a reduction in the quantity of the barriers. The record showed that Chase, a supplier of median barriers, knew the barriers were for department projects and was aware of the department’s power to decrease the quantities of contract items.13 What each side knew about the commercial setting thus bore directly on who carried the risk.
A fixed price is one such circumstance. Purchasers enter fixed-price oil contracts precisely to assign the risk of price increases to the supplier, and no company would rely on such a contract if the supplier could escape whenever the market price rose.14 Foreseeability marks the edge of that logic. If the supplier must obtain oil at astronomical prices because of an unforeseeable world crisis, relief seems more palatable, both on grounds of freedom of contract, since the supplier arguably never agreed to perform under such circumstances, and on grounds of fundamental fairness.15
In a dispute between Hemlock and Sachsen, the court rejected Sachsen’s impracticability and frustration-of-purpose defenses. Hemlock distinguished Chang v. Pacificorp on two grounds. In Chang, the parties adopted a price index specifically to allocate risk, and that purpose failed when the index ceased to reflect the true market price for electricity in the relevant geographic area. In the Hemlock agreements, the price was fixed specifically to avoid market fluctuations, the opposite of the pricing mechanism in Chang, and the court agreed that Chang was readily distinguishable.16
A lessee who can still perform, even at a substantial loss, keeps the loss. In the Restatement’s illustration, a lessee of a gasoline station finds that a change in traffic regulations so reduces its business that it can operate only at a substantial loss. Because the lessee can still operate the station, its principal purpose is not substantially frustrated, its duty to pay rent is not discharged, and it is liable for breach. The result is the same if the loss comes from gasoline rationing or from termination of the franchise.17
Some problems leave even the allocation unclear. Where the facts do not reveal who bore the risk of poor sales, the contract’s shared objective must still be determined in light of its allocation of risk. The inquiry then turns to whether the contract specifically allocated the risk to one party and whether any usage points the other way.18
The last step is the question the court put to frustration cases generally: whether the equities of the case, considered in light of sound public policy, require placing the risk of a disruption or complete destruction of the contract equilibrium on defendant or plaintiff.19
Krell and the Ticket Resale
Krell v. Henry shows how hard allocation can be when the contract is silent. The majority, without expressly addressing risk allocation, resolved the case in a way that placed the risk of the coronation’s cancellation on Krell, the owner of the flat, rather than on Henry, the party who had hired it to view the procession.21 The contract made no express reference to the coronation. But the flat had been advertised as offering a good view of the festivities, the price was suitably enhanced, and Henry’s use was restricted to the daytime. Nothing was impossible or impracticable about Henry using the flat and paying for it, yet the performance had become totally useless to him, and the court excused his duties.22
Whether the court placed the loss correctly is a fair question. When the contract does not itself provide for risk allocation, it is not always easy to know who should suffer the loss caused by the frustration, and it is by no means self-evident that the court was right to impose it on the lessor rather than the lessee.23
Foreseeability complicates the answer. The King’s illness was unexpected, but unexpected is not unforeseeable: star performers do get sick, and a modern insurance company could say what the chances were that a person of the King’s age and habits would fall ill. Neither Henry nor Krell was an insurer, but both could weigh so familiar a contingency as illness and mortality.24 An observation of that kind weighs against excusing Henry, who asks to be relieved of a risk the contract left unaddressed.
The ticket-resale variation tests the same allocation. Buck, the seller, stands in Krell’s position, and Fanny stands in Henry’s. Here too it is not clear what the reasonable risk allocation should be. There are arguments both ways, but the better view may be the one Krell implies: like Krell, the flat owner, Buck, the seller, should bear the risk.25
An answer to a silent-contract problem should set the competing inferences side by side. In Krell, they are the foreseeability of illness against the fact that the performance became useless to Henry. The answer should then decide which inference the circumstances support more strongly and commit to it, because reasonable courts can differ.