Concept
Frustration Versus Impracticability
Frustration of purpose
Frustration Versus Impracticability
Frustration of purpose and impracticability apply one test to two different injuries. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265, a party's remaining duties are discharged when a supervening event, occurring without that party's fault, substantially frustrates its principal purpose, provided the event's non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made and nothing in the language or circumstances indicates the contrary.1 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-615(a) uses the same basic-assumption criterion.2 The party seeking relief must also not have caused the event or borne the risk of it, and those requirements apply to impracticability as well.3 The doctrines part ways only in what the event does. Under impracticability it makes a party's performance unduly burdensome, and under frustration it leaves performance as easy as before and makes it pointless.4
The classic illustration is Krell v. Henry, a contract to rent a room to watch the king's coronation parade. The parade was postponed when the king became ill. The postponement did not touch the renter's performance, since he could still pay, but it destroyed the fundamental purpose of renting the room on the day the parade was scheduled.5 Frustration therefore requires essentially the same four elements as impracticability, and only the first differs: an event after formation must substantially frustrate one party's principal purpose for making the contract.6
That one difference usually decides which party raises which doctrine. A person who is to supply land, goods, or services but cannot perform will attempt impracticability, while a buyer or any other party obliged to pay will ordinarily attempt frustration.7 Suppose A agrees to supply B with barges to carry B's finished product from B's plant. If A cannot obtain the barges, A pleads impracticability. If B has no product to ship, B pleads frustration, because impracticability cannot reach B's promise: paying is still perfectly possible, but B is getting nothing for the money.8 The coronation case sorts the same way. The renter of the flat, the one who was to pay, claimed frustration, and had fire destroyed the flat after formation, it would have been the owner asserting impossibility.9
The sorting follows from what each kind of change does to a contract. Courts have considered two types of changed circumstances. Unforeseen increases in the cost of one party's performance animate what was traditionally called impossibility and is now usually called impracticability. Unforeseen reductions in the value a party attaches to the performance it is to receive animate frustration.10 A payor will rarely find it impracticable or impossible to pay, but if something has made the performance it would be paying for worthless to it, an excuse analogous to impracticability or impossibility may be proper.11 Risk allocation then works the same way in both doctrines. A fundamental upset of expectations justifies relief only if the party seeking it does not bear the risk of the upset, and the contract's terms may settle that allocation or it may have to be worked out by interpretation from the circumstances of the transaction.12
Both parties then run the same remaining elements, and in the mansion the answers come out alike, because the loss was nobody's fault and the contract allocated the fire risk to neither side. An owner who pleaded impossibility would have named the wrong doctrine, since the owner's own promise to pay was never affected.
Frustration is narrower than this symmetry suggests, because a payor often still receives just what it bargained for. A tailor who makes a wedding dress uses the usual skill, labor, and materials. The licensor of the flat in the coronation case, by contrast, charged a very high rate for an extraordinary use, and that use became worthless, although the king would recover and be crowned on another day, when the flat would again command the high rate.13 The contrast shows where frustration fits and where it does not. A licensor who kept a premium for a procession that never passed would be paid extra for nothing, while a tailor who finished the dress at an ordinary price has delivered ordinary value. A bride whose groom dies before the wedding is therefore a poor candidate for the defense, even though the dress is useless to her.
The same limit explains why a payor whose complaint is only that the deal has become less lucrative gains nothing from frustration. Tenants who sought relief from long-term service-station leases after the highway was moved or gas and tire rationing began almost invariably lost, because the purpose of the lease survived and only the profit the tenant expected was gone.14 Courts call this economic or commercial frustration and deny relief.
Because impracticability is no longer confined to objective impossibility, most frustration cases could probably be resolved under it. That lessens the need for a separate doctrine, but courts, and Restatement (Second) § 265, continue to treat the two as separate but allied.15 The overlap has a practical use. The court in Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co. reasoned that, since the two doctrines differ only in the effect of the fortuitous supervening event, impossibility cases guide the issues the doctrines share, and the trial judge's findings on those issues remain pertinent to the frustration defense even if they were developed for an impossibility defense.16 The history adds a caution for older English decisions, because in England the word frustration covers both doctrines, and a case so labeled may involve a performer's burden rather than a payor's loss.17