Concept
The Coronation Cases
Frustration of purpose
Frustration of Purpose
The Coronation Cases
In Krell v. Henry, Krell granted Henry a license to use his apartment for two days to view the coronation procession of King Edward VII, and Henry agreed to pay £75 for the privilege. After the agreement was made, the coronation was cancelled because the King was stricken with perityphlitis, an inflammation of the area around the appendix.1 Nothing had become impossible. Henry could still pay the rent, and Krell could still give him possession of the flat.2 Yet the court held that Henry was discharged from the duty of payment.3
Section 265 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts turns that result into a rule. When a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated, without that party's fault, by an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, the party's remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.4 Section 265 specifically approves the result in Krell, treating it as a case of “supervening frustration.”5 The doctrine is called frustration of purpose: performance remains possible, but unanticipated changed circumstances have substantially frustrated a party's principal purpose, so that party's duties are discharged and the contract is considered terminated.6
The contrast case is Taylor v. Caldwell, in which fire destroyed a leased music hall.7 The court excused the parties by reading an implied condition into the contract. Suppose that the nature of the contract shows the parties must have known it could not be fulfilled unless some particular thing continued to exist, and that they must have contemplated that continued existence as the foundation of what was to be done. Then, absent an express or implied warranty that the thing will exist, the contract is not a positive one. It is “subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without default of the contractor.”8 The court does not hunt for a clause about fire. It asks what the nature of the deal shows the parties took as its foundation. A contract to use a particular hall assumes the hall will be there, and when it perishes without anyone's fault, the law reads the contract as if it carried the matching condition.
Krell asks a parallel question about a purpose rather than a thing. In Taylor the means of performance perished, because the hall could no longer be supplied. In Krell the flat survived, and the occasion that gave it value did not. Although the cancellation made neither party's performance impossible, it so defeated the purpose of the contract that it should excuse Henry's performance.9 The court apparently treated the staging of the coronation on the expected date as a condition on which the parties intended Henry's rental obligation to depend.10 The two excuses also belong to different parties. Had fire destroyed Krell's flat after the contract was formed, Krell would have been the one asserting impossibility. With the flat intact, it is Henry, the party who was to receive the performance and pay for it, who asserts frustration.11 The next section sets the two excuses side by side.
A frustrated purpose cannot be a secret one. A party's private motivation is not relevant to the contract and cannot be the basis of disappointing the other party's reliance, so the purpose must be so patent and obvious to the other party that it can reasonably be regarded as the shared basis of the contract.12 The Krell contract made no express reference to the coronation. But the apartment had been advertised as one providing a good view of the festivities, the price was suitably enhanced, and Henry's use was restricted to the daytime.13 As the court put it, parol evidence is admissible to show that the subject of the contract was rooms to view the coronation procession, and that both parties knew it.14
The traveler does. Advertising, a premium price, and daytime-only hours made the procession Henry's evident purpose, so the owner could see it in the bargain. The traveler has only a private motive, and a private motive cannot defeat the owner's reliance.15
Krell has critics, and their objection concerns risk rather than possibility. The King's illness was unexpected, but unexpected is not the same as unforeseeable: star performers do get sick, and a modern insurer could say how likely it was that a person of the King's age would fall ill in a given year.16 Henry also looks like a speculator. His two-day lease was apparently transferable, and had demand for a vantage point on the parade route soared as coronation day approached, he might have held a very hot ticket. If things had turned out differently, it might have been Krell who suffered the lost opportunity.17 Krell, for his part, was not the sponsor or producer of the event. He was merely the seller of negotiable viewing rights, a marketable commodity like any other.18 Another of the coronation cases reached a contrary decision on related facts.19
The court itself paid little attention to risk allocation, and a concurring opinion asked whether Henry, the lessee, was the more appropriate party to bear the risk of the coronation's postponement.20 When the contract does not allocate the risk itself, it is not always easy to know who should suffer the loss caused by the frustration, and it is by no means self-evident that the court was right to put it on the lessor rather than the lessee.21 The sections on risk allocation below return to that question.