Concept
Consequences of Discharge
Impracticability
Consequences of Discharge
Proving the elements of impracticability settles whether the doctrine applies. It does not settle what the doctrine does to the contract and to the dealings already under way. A complete discharge has three consequences: the excused party commits no breach, the other party’s duties end along with it, and whatever the parties exchanged before the event must be sorted out. Events that fall short of complete impracticability call for narrower remedies, from suspending a duty to excusing only part of it, and the temporary and partial rules covered earlier in this chapter supply them. The two subsections below take up the complete case. The first treats liability and the fate of the contract; the second treats the payments, deliveries, and work that preceded the event.
Excuse Is Not Breach
A breach is a failure to render a performance the contract requires, so impracticability protects a party by removing the requirement. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, once the elements are met the party’s duty to render the affected performance is discharged, unless the language of the contract or the circumstances indicate the contrary.1 The Code gives sellers the same protection: delay or non-delivery by a seller who has complied with the allocation and notice paragraphs “is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale.”2 The ordinary rule makes an obligor answer for a failure to perform even when no one was at fault, but that rule presupposes a duty that was due. A discharged duty is no longer due, so liability has nothing to attach to, and the excused party owes no damages for what it did not do.
The other party’s duties fall with the excused party’s. In an exchange each side’s duty is conditioned on the other’s performance, so when one party is excused the other need not render any further performance.3 In a sale, holding the buyer to the price would pay the seller for a performance the law has excused. Release of the excused party’s obligation therefore discharges the other party’s duties as well, because the excused party’s performance will not be forthcoming.4 On a complete excuse the seller is not liable for damages, the buyer need not perform, and the contract terminates.5
Complete discharge is the strongest effect, and narrower events produce narrower ones. Impracticability that is only temporary suspends the duty while the obstacle lasts, and it discharges the duty only if performance afterward would be materially more burdensome than it would have been without the obstacle.6 Impracticability that reaches only part of the performance leaves the rest of the duty in force when substantial performance is still practicable, taking account of any reasonable substitute performance, or when the obligee agrees within a reasonable time to render any remaining performance in full and to let the obligor keep what it has already received.7 Where the impracticability is only prospective, the other party keeps the options it would have if the non-performance were a breach, though no cause of action for breach arises.8
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States shows why a party cannot keep the contract’s benefits and claim the benefits of its discharge too. A carrier agreed to carry a cargo for the Government, the Suez Canal closed, and the carrier sailed around the Cape of Good Hope instead. It collected the full contract price and then sued in quantum meruit, a recovery measured by the reasonable value of services rendered, for the added expense of the longer route.9 The court held that the closure did not make performance impracticable. The added cost was about $43,000, less than 15% of a $305,000 price, and an experienced shipper was better placed than the Government to estimate that cost.10 The court then observed that the carrier’s theory of relief contradicted itself. If performance were truly impossible and the contract a nullity, the carrier should have sought recovery for the entire trip, not only the extra expense. Instead it took its profit on the contract and asked the Government to absorb the cost of the additional voyage.11
The court’s point follows from what discharge does. It frees both sides, so a party that invokes it gives up the contract’s price along with its burdens. As the court put it, “There is no interest in casting the entire burden of commercial disaster on one party in order to preserve the other’s profit.”12
The Code’s casualty rule applies the same effect to identified goods. Under § 2-613, when the contract requires for its performance goods identified at formation, and those goods suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, a total loss avoids the contract.13 The seller’s non-delivery is excused and the buyer owes no price. The section reaches only identified goods. For fungible goods, more than identification by kind and amount is necessary, because the extra requirement keeps a seller from using § 2-613 to escape a contract for ordinary goods it could replace on the open market.14 Partial loss gives the buyer a choice, taken up below with the adjustment remedies.
Because excuse removes a duty, a party who believes its duty is gone need not wait to be sued. Impracticability is most often raised as a defense to a claim of breach, but it can also support a suit to eliminate a contract term in anticipation of a threatened suit to enforce it.15 In Dutrac Community Credit Union v. Radiology Group Real Estate, LC, an Iowa decision from 2017, a developer’s restrictive covenants created an architectural control committee, named its two members, and required committee approval of all new construction, with no provision for successors. By the time Dutrac was ready to build, one member had died and the other had retired and refused to act. The court found every element of impracticability satisfied. The committee’s demise was a supervening event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption, it made approval impossible, Dutrac was not at fault, and Dutrac did not bear the risk. The court granted a declaratory judgment excusing the approval term.16 It refused the other lot owners’ request to create a successor committee, because the covenant provided for none and a court does not make up terms the parties never agreed to.17 Excuse removes the term; it does not install a court-drafted replacement.
Excuse answers a claim of breach and nothing more. It does not erase every claim between the parties, and the next subsection turns to the benefits that one side may already have conferred on the other.
Restitution and Equitable Adjustment
Discharge under § 261 looks forward: it releases the duty to render the performance the event made impracticable.20 Contracts do not freeze when the excusing event occurs, however. Deposits have been paid, goods shipped, and work done, and discharging the remaining duties does not unwind what has already changed hands. If either party performed before impracticability was found, the benefit or its value must be returned, measured by the same restitutionary principles that apply to mistake.21 The finding bars damages for breach, yet it does not leave the parties without a remedy.22
The reason is the windfall that discharge would otherwise create. Each payment, delivery, or day of labor was given in exchange for a return performance, and once the law excuses the return performance, the exchange that justified the transfer is gone. A party that keeps a deposit for goods it will never deliver is enriched by a transfer whose justification has failed, and the event that triggered the excuse supplies no reason for either side to profit from the other’s earlier performance. Restitution reverses the enrichment, and as in mistake cases the task is to unwind a contract whose basic assumption failed.
Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City shows both results flowing from a single discharge. A city obtained easements across beachfront owners’ property by promising to maintain the dunes at a stated maximum height, so that the dunes would not block the owners’ view, and it paid no money.23 After the contracts were signed, state regulations required a permit to work on the dunes, and the permit was denied. The court treated the permit requirement and its denial as supervening events meeting the elements of impracticability, so the city was excused from maintaining the dunes at the contracted height and the owners could not sue for breach. The city had nonetheless received the easements for nothing, because the only price it had offered was the performance it was now excused from rendering. The court held that the city had been unjustly enriched and that the owners were entitled to restitution, measured by what the city would have had to pay for the easements had the contracts provided for money in place of dune height.24
The cash measure follows from what the owners bargained for. They gave an easement in return for a promise about dune height, and once that promise was excused no performance from the city remained to be valued. The only way to price the exchange was to ask what the city received. That measure keeps restitution distinct from the expectation damages a breach would have produced: the owners recover for the easements and not for the dune-height promise the city was excused from keeping.
The boat and the garage differ in what the event destroyed. Section 263 treats the destruction of a specific thing necessary for performance as an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and the boat was that thing.25 The garage contract depends on the lot, which survived, and the half-framed work can be rebuilt. Adjustment follows discharge, so an event that leaves performance practicable calls for none. Test the elements first, because the remedies below apply only if they are met.
Restitution here is not confined to enrichment that survives the event. At times the concept of benefit is stretched to include expenses incurred in preparation for performance, and there is increasing recognition that restitution used to unwind a contract that cannot be performed is concerned with equitable adjustment of the gains and losses the parties sustained, not merely with redressing unjust enrichment.26 The no-fault character of the event explains the shift. The event harmed both sides, and leaving the whole loss on whichever party performed first would allocate it by the accident of sequence.
The older English rule left losses where the frustrating event found them. In the coronation cases, the party in Chandler v. Webster who had paid a substantial deposit was refused restitution of it. At the suggestion of the Law Lords in the later Fibrosa case, Parliament enacted legislation permitting recovery of the value of benefits received “if it considers it just to do so, having regard for all the circumstances,” and the court may deduct certain expenses incurred in reliance on the contract.27 The harshness of the earlier rule shows what restitution corrects: a party who paid in advance lost the payment only because the excusing event arrived after it.
Restitution is the baseline, and the law supplies other ways to adjust the parties’ rights. If the contract is divisible, a court may hold the parties excused only as to part of their performances.28 A court may also keep the contract alive on adjusted terms, through allocation, through the rules on temporary and partial impracticability, or by supplying a term that is reasonable in the circumstances. The party to whom performance is owed can likewise reinstate the duty on somewhat different terms by waiving a restrictive clause or substantial non-performance.29 Supplying a term rests on the gap-filling account of omitted terms. The parties did not provide for the contingency, so the court supplies a term that comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyzing a hypothetical model of the bargaining process, although many courts instead ask what the parties would have included had they anticipated the event.30
Article 2 writes one adjustment of this kind into its casualty rule. When identified goods are partly lost, or deteriorate so that they no longer conform, the buyer may demand inspection and then either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with due allowance from the contract price for the deterioration or the deficiency in quantity, without further right against the seller.31 The price falls in step with the loss and the exchange continues for what survives, which mirrors a court’s power to excuse a portion of a performance with a reciprocal reduction in counterperformance.32
When those tools leave a loss unremedied, the question is how far a court may go. If reliance losses produced a benefit for the other party, restitution usually follows, but beyond that point courts have not ventured far.33 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 272 nonetheless authorizes more: where the traditional rules will not avoid injustice, a court may grant relief on “such terms as justice requires including protection of the parties’ reliance interests.”34 In applying these remedies, start with benefit-based restitution and divisibility, and treat reliance-protective relief for a loss that conferred no benefit as the exceptional backstop.
Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc. (Alcoa) shows how far a court once carried the adjustment idea. The court held Alcoa entitled to relief under the doctrine and then had to choose a remedy. It reasoned that rescission would hand Alcoa a windfall in the current aluminum market and strip Essex of the assured supply it had bargained for, and that a remedy merely shifting windfall gains and losses was neither required nor permitted. It turned to the general rules of equitable restitution and extended them from completed transfers to a long-term contract still being performed.35 The judge ordered neither an allocation nor a cancellation. He devised and imposed his own price schedule, a detailed set of terms that amounted to a seven-year contract written without consulting the parties and without their consent.36
The remedy has drawn sustained objection on two grounds. The first concerns competence: nothing in a judge’s training equips the judge to invent new designs for a disrupted enterprise, and a seven-year price schedule is exactly such a design.37 The second concerns authority. A court that applies impracticability releases a party from duties, but dictating terms for a contract still being performed raises the question where the court finds the power to impose a new contract without the free assent of both parties.38 Professor Dawson described the order as the only instance in which an American judge dictated entirely different substantive terms for a contract still being actively performed, and the casebook authors share his reservations.39 Alcoa is best learned as an example of what a court once attempted and of the objections that attempt drew, not as the ordinary consequence of discharge.