Concept
UCC Excuse for Sellers
Impracticability
UCC Excuse for Sellers
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code carries the impracticability doctrine into sales of goods. Under § 2-615(a), a seller’s delay or non-delivery, in whole or in part, is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, or by good-faith compliance with an applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order, whether or not the regulation later proves invalid. Only a seller who complies with the allocation and notice paragraphs that follow receives that protection.1 The section fills a gap. A court that finds a contract silent about a contingency is dealing with an omitted term and should supply one that comports with community standards of fairness,2 and for sales of goods the Code does most of that work through §§ 2-615 and 2-616, with §§ 2-613 and 2-614 and general contract law through § 1-103(b) in support.3 Each of these rules allocates a risk the parties did not allocate for themselves.4
The provision is the Code’s counterpart to Restatement § 261, and the Restatement acknowledges the kinship: both state a principle broad enough to reach every type of impracticability, and the Code “deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of contingencies.”5 Two differences matter. The Code’s text speaks only of sellers, so a buyer finds no parallel excuse on the face of the statute, although at least one court has applied the section to a buyer and common-law principles remain available to supplement the Code.6 And the Code’s standard is impracticability, which extends the common-law impossibility doctrine that § 2-613 echoes for the destruction of unique goods.7
An excused seller is not in breach; the contract is avoided. A seller without an excuse stays bound. If goods are destroyed while the seller bears the risk of loss, and neither § 2-613 nor § 2-615 applies, the seller must still tender conforming goods and answers in damages if it does not.8
Three further rules accompany the excuse. Paragraph (b) requires a seller whose capacity is only partly impaired to allocate its supply fairly, and paragraph (c) requires seasonable notice to the buyer; the excuse protects only a seller who does both.9 Section 2-614 offers repairs that save the contract: it requires a commercially reasonable substitute when the agreed means of delivery fails, and it addresses failed means of payment.10 The definition of the excuse comes first, because the other rules depend on what counts as an excusing contingency.
Commercial Impracticability Under § 2-615(a)
Section 2-615(a) offers a seller two independent grounds: a contingency whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and good-faith compliance with a governmental regulation or order.11 A seller who proves governmental compliance need not separately prove a basic assumption. On either ground the seller must be free of fault. The statutory text does not say so, but courts treat the requirement as implicit, and a seller who supplies one link in the causal chain, such as failing to pick fruit before a hard freeze, cannot claim the section.12
The section opens by yielding to the seller’s own undertaking: it applies “[e]xcept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance.”13 The second condition ties the excuse to performance “as agreed.” A seller who can still tender a commercially reasonable substitute for a failed carrier or berth has no impracticability to claim.14
The greater obligation may be written into the contract or found outside it. A seller may agree to limit the grounds for excuse that § 2-615 would otherwise supply,15 and the official comment locates such an agreement “not only in the expressed terms of the contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and the like.”16 The Restatement adds two considerations. One is whether the seller could have inserted a clause shifting the risk, which depends on how standardized the agreement was, who supplied its terms, and how often the trade uses such language. The other is the seller’s position: a middleman with many sources and customers can spread the risk through slight price adjustments, so its failure to protect itself weighs more heavily than a producer’s with a limited source of supply and few outlets.17 Parties may also write their own list of excusing events, as force majeure clauses do. The comment requires that the listed contingencies be stated or identifiable with sufficient specificity and that their occurrence be prejudicial, and it lets the parties agree on the consequences of exemption under paragraphs (b) and (c).18
Foreseeability runs through all of this. Comment 8 withholds the exemption when the contingency is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of contracting to be among the business risks fairly regarded as part of the dickered terms. A soybean shortage after bad summer weather, a Suez closure after an earlier closure, and scarce copper amid continuing unrest in Peru and Chile are the stock examples, and in each the seller should be held to have foreseen the event.19 The Restatement is subtler. If the event was not reasonably foreseeable, the claimant can hardly have provided against it, but foreseeability does not necessarily imply the opposite, since the difficulty of agreeing on every conceivable term may excuse silence about improbable contingencies.20 Courts split on the weight to give foreseeability. Some hold that a commercial party who can foresee an adverse event must contract against it; most hold that relief should not be denied simply because the event may have been foreseeable.21
These steps compress the elements taught earlier in this chapter: the first is assumption of risk, the second absorbs the supervening event and the basic assumption, the third is the burden, and the fourth is fault.
The seller must prove each step. The claimant is asking for an exception to strict contract liability, and it holds the evidence of its own costs, sources, and efforts. Some courts treat impracticability as a question of law suitable for summary judgment, but almost all treat it as a question for the trier of fact.23 The Code’s vocabulary gives little help in predicting outcomes. The cases and comments speak of a “severe” shortage, a “marked” increase, and “basic” assumptions, with no numerical test.24
Two decisions mark the line between success and failure. In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. an aircraft manufacturer delayed deliveries to an airline while giving military production priority at the federal government’s direction, and the court treated the delay as excused.25 That is the governmental-compliance route, which does not depend on proving a basic assumption. In Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc. a seller’s delivery of 11,000 combat boots destined for Ghana was not excused despite their destruction in a train derailment. The court held that the prospect of derailment was foreseeable and that the parties could have expressed in the contract a different allocation of that risk.26 The same wariness shows up under § 2-613, where courts require more than identification by kind and amount before excusing a seller of fungible goods, so that a seller cannot escape a contract for ordinary goods it could replace on the open market.27
Section 2-615 widened the older law. Where a state formerly required that performance be objectively impossible, the Code reaches performance that remains possible but has become impracticable.28 Courts apply the wider standard sparingly: a court will excuse a contract obligation only very occasionally.29 The rationale has two parts. Parties can allocate the risk of changed circumstances at the time of negotiation better than a court can after the risk has materialized, and courts have difficulty verifying that the prerequisites for excuse are met. A rule that regularly denies excuse therefore induces parties to deal with the contingency expressly, in the contract or through trade usage.30
Whether a buyer may invoke § 2-615 is less settled. The text excuses only a “seller,” and Official Comment 1 likewise speaks of excuse for a seller without mentioning buyers. A buyer’s obligation usually consists of paying the price, and inability to perform that duty falls within the adage that a party assumes the risk of its own inability to perform.31 Some courts nonetheless apply the provision to buyers in circumstances that might amount to frustration of purpose,32 and Power Engineering & Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Krug International treated the defense as available to a buyer, though the buyer there did not prove impracticability. Where a court refuses, the buyer is not without a claim, because common-law principles can supplement the Code.33 The common-law doctrine of frustration of purpose does that work, as Krell v. Henry illustrates: Henry rented rooms to watch a coronation, the coronation was postponed, and the court excused him from paying the balance of the rent because the postponement frustrated his purpose in renting.34
Allocation Under § 2-615(b)
Where the causes described in § 2-615(a) affect only part of the seller’s capacity to perform, paragraph (b) requires the seller to allocate production and deliveries among its customers in any manner that is fair and reasonable.36 The duty is a condition of the excuse. Paragraph (a) protects only a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c), so a seller who proves impracticability but fails to allocate has not earned the protection.37 The trigger is partial impairment. When an event destroys all of the seller’s capacity there is nothing to divide, but when part of the supply survives, someone must decide who receives it, and paragraph (b) says how.
The duty exists because a shortage puts the seller in control. The seller holds the scarce goods, and their market price often rises above the prices in its contracts. A seller free to divide the supply as it liked could sell to the highest bidder or keep the goods for itself while its contract customers went without. A fair and reasonable division turns the shortage into a loss shared among customers, and making allocation a condition of the excuse gives the seller its reason to comply: the seller that divides fairly keeps its protection, and the one that does not forfeits it.
Paragraph (b) also says who shares in the supply. The seller must account for its contract customers, and it may, at its option, include regular customers not under contract and its own requirements for further manufacture.38 Customers at different stages of the manufacturing process may be fairly treated by including the seller’s manufacturing requirements, and the seller may also take account of contracts later in date than the one in question.39 The pool has edges. A seller may include itself and its non-contract customers but need not include the latter, and it may not include new buyers who are not its customers.40
“Fair and reasonable” is a standard, and the sources decline to reduce it to a formula. Apart from the “extra care” that changes in the market require, the comment seeks “to leave every reasonable business leeway to the seller.”41 When prices have advanced, good faith calls for real care in making allocations, and in case of doubt the seller should favor its contract customers and prorate supply evenly among them regardless of price.42
The cases fill in the standard with pro rata methods. A seller that divides its supply pro rata among all of its contract customers will typically be held to have acted fairly and reasonably, and the measure of proration is open: historic deliveries, historic contract amounts, current needs, or other grounds, even where the choice favors one group of customers over another.43 In Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products the plaintiff received a considerably smaller proportion of its contract quantity than other customers did, and the allocation was still not unreasonable as a matter of law.44 Receiving less than other buyers does not make a division unreasonable. The question is whether the method behind the division can be defended.
Two limits keep that flexibility from becoming a loophole. A seller may give a larger than pro rata share to a buyer who would suffer particularly great injury without it, and a seller may treat itself as a customer but may not deviate far from the pro rata scheme in order to maximize its profits.45 The first permits extra care for the customer with the most to lose, and the second denies the seller the advantage the duty exists to deny.
Like the rest of the section, the duty is a default. The comment lets parties agree on the consequences of exemption under paragraphs (b) and (c),46 and a contract may provide that if either party is partially excused the contract terminates automatically and “[n]o allocation of performance shall be required or permitted.”47
A seller that allocates unevenly invites the argument that its method was unreasonable, but a seller that refuses to allocate forfeits the excuse. If a legitimate contingency makes performance only partly impracticable and the seller simply delivers no goods to a buyer, the seller loses the benefit of allocation and is liable for the full quantity the contract required.48 The structure explains the result: the excuse covers only what the event made impracticable, the unaffected capacity stays subject to the contract, and a seller that ships nothing breaches as to goods it could still deliver. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm shows the consequence. At the trial court’s direction the jury assessed damages only on the amount of polystyrene the seller should have allocated to the buyer, and on appeal that was error: because the seller had misallocated, it should have been allowed no credit for commercial impracticability.49
Courts leave the seller this much room for two reasons. They are poorly placed to rewrite a seller’s business judgment after the fact, and a seller’s long-term interest in keeping its customers usually induces it to treat them reasonably.50 The price of that room is predictability. No formula identifies the correct allocation, so a problem on this point turns on whether the seller’s method is defensible and stays within the limits above.
Notice Under § 2-615(c)
Paragraph (c) attaches a duty to speak to the seller’s excuse: the seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of the estimated quota made available to that buyer.52 The sentence carries two contents. The news is that goods will be late or will not arrive. The quota is a number the buyer can plan around, owed only when the seller is dividing a short supply. The statute fixes no number of days for “seasonably,” so the word takes its meaning from the duty’s purpose, which is to tell the buyer soon enough to act.
Notice is a condition of the excuse, not a side obligation. Paragraph (a) protects delay or non-delivery only by “a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c).”53 To receive the benefits of subsection (a), the seller must both allocate fairly and give seasonable notification of any delay, non-delivery, or allocation quota.54 A seller can therefore prove a qualifying contingency and a crushing burden and still lose. Silence does not add a second violation to an excused default; it removes the excuse, and the delay or non-delivery is measured against the contract as an ordinary breach. The statute prescribes no form, but a written statement of the delay and the quota is the version a seller can prove later.
The condition reflects who knows what. The seller controls the scarce goods and learns of the shortage first, so the buyer’s only source of timely information is the seller. A buyer told promptly can buy replacement goods elsewhere, rearrange its own commitments, or agree to take a smaller quota. A buyer left in the dark keeps counting on goods that will not arrive, and by the time the truck fails to show up, covering may be impossible or far more expensive. A letter costs the seller almost nothing and the excuse is worth a great deal, which gives the seller its reason to write. The two contents answer different needs: the news starts the buyer’s search, and the quota tells the buyer how large a search to make.
Notice also starts the buyer’s side of the process, which § 2-616 governs and which this unit describes only so that the seller’s duty makes sense. Section 2-616 sets forth the buyer’s options on receipt of notification.55 Most excuse cases involve a delay and no allocation, yet the seller must still give notice, and if the delay is material or indefinite and excused under subsection (a), the buyer still has the option to cancel the contract.56 That option lets a buyer look elsewhere without first litigating whether the seller’s excuse is sound.
Substituted Performance Under § 2-614(1)
Section 2-614(1) handles a failure that disrupts how a sale is carried out without destroying the sale. When, without fault of either party, the agreed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail, an agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable, or the agreed manner of delivery otherwise becomes commercially impracticable, and a commercially reasonable substitute is available, the substitute performance must be tendered and accepted.58 The section does less than §§ 2-613 and 2-615. Those avoid the contract; § 2-614 does not, and it excuses only obligations incidental to the primary duties to tender and pay for the goods.59 A seller who qualifies still delivers and still collects the price, and only the route changes.
The text names three triggers: failed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities, an unavailable type of carrier, and any other agreed manner of delivery that becomes commercially impracticable. Two conditions apply to all three. Neither party may be at fault, which keeps the section a neutral repair for a breakdown neither side caused.60 And the impracticability must be true commercial impracticability, not mere inconvenience. The official comment adds that a reasonable substituted performance excuses strict compliance only with terms that do not go to the essence of the agreement.61
The comment’s illustration shows the mechanism. A sale called for delivery of wheat f.o.b. a named steamer at Seattle. War led the steamship line to cancel its sailing schedule after space had been engaged, so the agreed manner of delivery failed. The buyer may demand substituted delivery at the line’s loading dock warehouse, and the seller is equally entitled to tender in that manner.62 Everything the parties bargained for survives, since the wheat, the price, and the buyer’s right to receive it are unchanged. Only the vessel is gone. The phrase “tendered and accepted” binds both sides: a seller cannot walk away because the ship is gone, and a buyer cannot refuse the dock-warehouse delivery and call the seller a breacher, because a performance that delivers what the contract promised leaves it nothing to complain about.
The Code treats these failures differently from excuse because of what each takes away. Sections 2-613 and 2-615 apply when a basic assumption fails and the expected performance cannot be had, so the exchange itself is gone and ending the contract is the sensible response.63 When only the delivery method fails, the exchange remains available by another route, and avoidance would destroy a workable bargain. The seller would lose a sale and the buyer a source of supply. Requiring substitution keeps the exchange alive at the price of a changed route, and the Code builds the two rules into one sequence by making § 2-615 expressly subject to the section on substituted performance.64
The section also yields to the parties’ own words. In Virginia Power Energy Marketing v. Apache Corp. the buyer argued that § 2-614 required the gas seller to deliver at an alternate delivery location. The court rejected the argument. Section 2-614 could not “vary the terms of the parties’ express agreement,” and the agreement contained a force majeure clause that excused the seller’s performance, so the seller was not required to deliver elsewhere.65 The result follows from what a gap-filler is for. Nothing in the wheat contract said what would happen if the steamer’s sailings were cancelled, so the Code supplied the substitute. The gas parties had already decided what the event did to the seller’s duty, and ordering delivery elsewhere would have rewritten that decision in the buyer’s favor. The difference between the two sales is whether the contract addressed the event that disabled the agreed method of delivery.
Subsection (2), taken up next, applies the same substitution idea to an agreed means of payment that fails because of governmental regulation.66
Failed Means of Payment Under § 2-614(2)
Subsection (2) applies the substitution idea to payment. If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign governmental regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless the buyer provides a means or manner of payment that is commercially a substantial equivalent. If delivery has already been taken, payment by the means or in the manner the regulation provides discharges the buyer’s obligation unless the regulation is discriminatory, oppressive, or predatory.68 The buyer’s ordinary duty is to pay for the goods in accordance with the contract,69 so the subsection matters only when a government has interfered with the channel the contract chose. Like subsection (1), it leaves the sale standing.70
A regulation must cause the failure. The standard illustration is a contract requiring “payment in gold specie” after which the government forbids payment in gold, an example drawn from Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.71 Because the failure must result from the operation of a government regulation, Allied Plywood Corp. v. Western Pulp held § 2-614(2) inapplicable to the failure of payment arrangements between contracting parties that did not unravel because of any government regulation.72 The limit follows from what the subsection repairs. A governmental ban is an event neither side controls and neither side priced, so moving payment to another channel restores the exchange without unfairly burdening either party. A private arrangement that collapses on its own is different, because a party who promised to pay ordinarily carries the risk that its own financing or banking will fail.
Before delivery, the seller still holds the goods, and the first half of the rule gives it the leverage that comes with them. The seller bargained to be paid in a particular form, and a regulation that closes that channel threatens to leave it handing over goods against a payment it never agreed to take. Permission to withhold or stop delivery removes the threat. The qualifier keeps the permission from becoming an exit, because the buyer holds the key: by providing a means or manner of payment that is commercially a substantial equivalent, the buyer ends the seller’s right to withhold and keeps the sale alive. Equivalence is measured commercially, so the inquiry looks to what the seller would actually receive and be able to use, and the mere fact that the form differs from the contract’s does not defeat it.
The second half addresses a buyer that has already taken the goods. The seller’s self-help is gone, since nothing remains to withhold, so the subsection speaks to the buyer’s debt directly: payment by the means or in the manner the regulation provides discharges the obligation. Without that rule, a buyer holding the goods would be caught between violating the regulation and remaining liable on a payment term the regulation forbids, a squeeze produced by a government neither party controls. The exception for a regulation that is discriminatory, oppressive, or predatory guards the seller’s side of the ledger. It keeps the discharge from becoming a way for a regulation aimed at defeating the seller’s expectation to erase what the seller was owed.