Concept
Temporary and Partial Impracticability
Impracticability
Temporary and Partial Impracticability
The discharge rule taught so far can look like an all-or-nothing choice: the duty survives untouched, or it disappears. Two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supply the middle positions. Section 269 provides that impracticability that is only temporary suspends the obligor's duty while the obstacle lasts, but does not discharge the duty or prevent it from arising, unless performance after the obstacle ends would be materially more burdensome than it would have been had the obstacle never occurred.1 Section 270 covers an event that reaches only part of the performance. The duty to render the remainder stays in force if substantial performance is still practicable, or if the obligee, within a reasonable time, agrees to render any remaining performance in full and lets the obligor keep what it has already received.2
These middle positions follow from what discharge is for. A court discharges a party because a supervening event the contract did not allocate has upset the bargain.3 The upset reaches only as far as the event does. A port closure that clears within a month disturbs the bargain for that month, and a ban on one product line disturbs that line and leaves the rest of the deal practicable. Ending the whole contract in either case would give the obligor an exit the event does not justify, while compelling performance during the closure, or of the barred line, would demand what has become impracticable. So where the impracticability does not go to the entire basis of the contract, a court may give relief short of full excuse. It may excuse a portion of the performance, with a matching reduction in counterperformance where appropriate, or it may excuse only a delay.4
Both rules sit downstream of the elements taught earlier. A party who invokes either must still show an event that satisfies the basic-assumption, burden, fault, and risk requirements, and the new question is how far the excuse reaches in time and in scope. Temporary impracticability comes first, because its central question, whether the duty revives, concerns time. Partial impracticability follows, and it divides by the route that keeps the remainder alive: either the obligor can still render something substantial, or the obligee elects to take the rest on the original terms.
Temporary Impracticability
Section 269 sets a default and an exception. The default has two parts: the duty is suspended while the obstacle lasts, and it revives when the obstacle ends. The exception converts suspension into discharge when performance after the obstacle would be materially more burdensome than it would have been without the obstacle.5
The default fits an obstacle that passes. A port that closes for a week disturbs the bargain for that week and nothing else. If a brief interruption ended the contract, a party could use it as an exit from a bargain that had not been disrupted, and the obligee would lose a performance the passing of the obstacle left fully available. Suspension is the narrower response: the obligor escapes liability for the period of the obstacle, and the obligee receives what it bargained for, later. The exception rests on the opposite fact. A long enough delay can change the character of the performance, and resuming would then hold the obligor to a different deal from the one it made. Where the obstacle does not go to the entire basis of the contract, a court may excuse only the delay and leave the rest of the duty standing.6
A strike of county workers shows the narrow response at work. If the strike prevents the recording of a cabin's transfer on the date the contract fixes, it may not excuse the seller's performance in its entirety, but it can excuse the failure to transfer title on the appointed date.7 The seller still owes the transfer; only the date yields.
Each party's position follows from that structure. While the obstacle lasts, the obligor may suspend performance. When it ends, the duty revives and the obligor must perform, with the delay excused.8 The other party has a matching right. A prospective inability to perform ordinarily lets the obligee suspend its own performance, and if the inability is so serious that there is a reasonable probability that substantial performance will not be forthcoming, the obligee may cancel the contract.9 Suspension is thus the baseline for both sides, and cancellation requires a showing of seriousness. An obligee who announces termination too hastily is chargeable with repudiating the contract.10
The treatise's illness illustration shows how seriousness is judged. The result there "probably would be different if it were clear on November 23 that A's illness would have lasted only two or three days."11 A short, known interruption leaves substantial performance likely, and suspension is then all the other party may do. An illness of uncertain length may leave that probability in doubt.
The exception for materially more burdensome performance appears in Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc. Gene Autry, a star of cowboy movies, refused to resume his acting contract with his studio after serving in the Army during World War II, and the California court held that the refusal was not a breach.12 His non-performance was excused while he served, and the delay had also made his later performance substantially more burdensome, so he was relieved of all obligations under the contract.13 The outcome is discharge, not extension. After a long enough interruption, resuming would hold the obligor to an undertaking far from the one the parties contemplated. Some authority goes further and treats an obstacle that outlasts the contract period as discharging the duty automatically.14
The burden in that exception is measured against the bargain, not against literal impossibility. In a gravel case, the defendant had removed all the gravel above water level from the plaintiff's land, and removing the rest would have required a different means of extraction at ten to twelve times the cost. The court held that the extreme increase in cost justified nonperformance. Performance was not literally, or even subjectively, impossible, but it was so different from what the parties had contemplated at the time of contracting that it was impracticable.15 The exception asks the same kind of question of performance after the obstacle: how far has it moved from the deal?
Suspension can also protect a party whose deadline passed while the obstacle stood. In Bush v. ProTravel International, Inc., a customer's notice cancelling a honeymoon safari reached the travel company after the date by which cancellation entitled the customer to a refund of the deposit. The customer pointed to the state of emergency in New York City after the September 11 attacks and to disrupted telephone service, and the travel company answered that the customer was simply nervous about traveling. The court refused summary judgment and gave the customer the opportunity to prove a temporary impracticability that suspended the cancellation date. If the customer proves the obstacle, the deadline did not run while it lasted, and the notice would be timely.
A claimant must also show that the obstacle, and not its own choices, produced the delay. In a dispute over the parties' PSA, the developer enXco needed a state certificate (the CSC) before a contractual Long-Stop Date. enXco could have applied as early as January 2009 but waited until October 2010, filing less than six months before the Long-Stop Date, although North Dakota law authorized the commission to take up to six months to act. The PSA's timetable also assumed that the commission's process could be lengthy and not entirely predictable.16 Two of the earlier elements show through that reasoning. A claimant whose own timing put the deadline at risk faces a fault problem, and a schedule that already assumed slow approval has allocated the risk of slippage to the claimant.
Section 269 reaches frustration of purpose as well, so a temporary event that defeats the value of performance without making it infeasible suspends the duty on the same terms.17 Suspension and discharge both give way to a contrary allocation: a party who assumed the risk by agreement or otherwise gets no relief.18
Partial Impracticability: Substantial Remainder
Section 270 governs an event that reaches only part of what the obligor promised. Under § 270(a), the duty to render the remaining part is unaffected if it is still practicable for the obligor to render performance that is substantial, taking account of any reasonable substitute performance the obligor must render.20 Subsection (b), the obligee's election, is a second route and is taken up next. On the first route the obligor receives a partial excuse: the impracticable part drops out of the contract, and whatever is still practicable remains owed.
Each element of the rule has its own reason. The remainder survives because the gap an event opens is only as wide as the event. A court fills that gap with the term reasonable parties would have adopted had they foreseen the event,21 and reasonable parties would not have agreed that the loss of one portion cancels the portion that can still be done. Full discharge would hand the obligor an exit from work within its power and strip the obligee of performance still available. The substantiality requirement answers the opposite danger. If any scrap of practicable performance kept the duty alive, the obligor could be held to a fragment of the bargain, one that has lost its point or costs far more than it was priced to cost. What survives must still carry the main weight of the bargain. The clause on substitute performance widens the measure in one direction, because the question is what the obligor can still provide and also what it owes in place of the lost part. The paradigm case is impracticability that touches a relatively minor part, where a reasonable substitute keeps what is left substantial and both sides must perform the remainder.22
The Restatement's potato crop illustration shows the rule operating on a single promise. A farmer contracts in the spring to raise potatoes on a specific tract and to sell 200 tons of the crop to a buyer at a stated price, and the tract would ordinarily produce 1,000 tons. If blight or the destruction of the growing plants leaves only 100 tons, although the planting and cultivation were properly done, the farmer's duty is modified to a duty to sell that amount.23 The event removed half of what was promised, and the contract still binds as to the half that exists.
Two variations on the same promise show where the partial excuse stops. If the state seizes the tract by eminent domain before a crop can be raised, nothing remains to be sold, and the duty is discharged outright, because there is no remainder to preserve.24 And where the tract habitually produced only 250 tons and unfavorable weather yielded 175, the duty is neither discharged nor modified. The risk was obvious and the possibility of shortage should have been anticipated, and the buyer, who is under no duty to accept the 175 tons, may refuse them and recover damages.25 The drafters' contrast probably rests on foreseeability. A modest crop failure is a foreseeable consequence, and one can infer that the seller undertook that risk by entering the contract, whereas a collapse from 1,000 tons to 100 is a catastrophe the contract can be read not to have allocated.26
Because the excuse covers only the part the event made impracticable, the other side may already have paid for performance it will never receive. The obligor has a partial defense, and the obligee may have a claim in restitution for any part for which it paid.27 Where reliance losses have resulted in a benefit to the other party, restitution is usually allowed. If the contract can be treated as divisible, a court may hold the parties excused as to only part of their performances.28 A court may also adjust the terms to excuse a portion of the performance, with any appropriate reciprocal reduction in counterperformance, since relief short of complete excuse is available whenever the impracticability does not go to the entire basis of the contract.29
A remainder survives only if it can still be done at a tolerable burden. Impracticability of one part may make the rest of the performance substantially more burdensome, and the obligor is then fully discharged under the principles stated in the earlier sections, not merely excused as to the affected part.30 The obligor priced the performance as a package. An event that destroys one component and changes how the others must be done can leave a remainder that costs far more than the whole was expected to cost, and holding the obligor to it would impose an undertaking the parties never made. The test therefore looks twice: at how much is left, and at what it now costs to render.
When what remains practicable is only a fragment and not a substantial performance, § 270(a) does not keep the duty alive, and the obligee's separate route under § 270(b) decides whether the remainder is still owed.31 The Code treats the seller whose capacity is only partly affected differently. Under UCC § 2-615(b), the seller must allocate production and deliveries among its customers in any manner that is fair and reasonable, and that provision is taught later in this chapter.32
Partial Impracticability: Obligee's Election
Section 270(b) lets the obligee keep the remainder of a contract alive even when the obligor can no longer render substantial performance. The obligor's duty to render the remaining part is unaffected if the obligee, within a reasonable time, agrees to render any remaining performance in full and to allow the obligor to retain any performance already rendered.34 The two routes ask different questions. Subsection (a) asks what the obligor can still do, and it works without anything from the obligee.35 Subsection (b) asks what the obligee is willing to do, and the obligee needs it only when (a) fails because what is left, though practicable, falls short of substantial performance. Without an election, the obligor's duty is discharged, and the obligee may have a restitution claim for any part it already paid for.36
The election is a two-part commitment, and each part does its own work. First, the obligee agrees to render its own remaining performance in full, which gives up any claim to a reduced price for the shortfall. In an ordinary sale or services contract, the obligee pays the full agreed price although it will receive less than the contract described. Second, the obligee allows the obligor to retain what it has already received, which gives up the restitution claim that discharge would otherwise have supplied. Both parts are required. An obligee who could take the remainder and also reclaim its earlier payments would have the best of both outcomes, and the obligor, excused from the destroyed part but bound to the rest and liable to repay, would be worse off than if the contract had simply been discharged.
With both commitments in place, the obligor is no worse off than discharge would have left it. It receives the full price for a smaller job, keeps its payments, and bears no restitution liability; it gives up only the freedom to walk away from work the event left practicable. The explanation lies in the obligee's power over the contract. The party to whom performance is owed may waive restrictive terms or substantial non-performance and so reinstate the duty on somewhat different terms.37 Part of the case for excusing an obligor is the unfairness of insisting on strict performance after circumstances have changed radically, and when the obligee itself gives up strict performance by taking less at the full price and abandoning restitution, that unfairness falls on no one. A court acting alone has a broader tool. Where impracticability does not go to the entire basis of the contract, it may adjust the terms to excuse a portion of the performance, with a matching reduction in counterperformance.38 The election offers no such reduction, and that is the price of keeping the contract on the obligee's initiative.
The reasonable-time requirement protects the obligor from suspense. Between the event and the obligee's decision, the obligor cannot tell whether it remains bound to this customer or may redeploy its capacity. An obligee with unlimited time would hold a free option, electing if the remainder came to look valuable and claiming restitution if it did not. The time limit forces the choice while it can still inform the obligor's planning. The rule fixes no period, so what is reasonable depends on the circumstances. The subsection does not let the obligee demand a proportional share of the performance at a proportional price. It lets the obligee keep the contract only on the terms the subsection states: full performance by the obligee and no restitution.
When neither route applies, the duty to render the remainder is discharged. The adjustment of payments already made is taken up under restitution later in this chapter.