Concept
Existing Impracticability
Impracticability
Existing Impracticability
Sometimes the fact that makes performance impracticable is already in place when the parties sign. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 266(1) governs that case: where, when the contract is made, a party's performance is impracticable without that party's fault because of a fact of which the party has no reason to know, and the non-existence of that fact is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the language or circumstances indicate the contrary.1 Section 261 sends these cases here. Its comment states that existing impracticability is governed by § 266 and that § 261 covers the supervening kind.2
Most of what the earlier sections taught still applies. The rules for supervening impracticability generally carry over, so basic assumption, fault, and risk remain the working questions.3 Two differences matter. First, the party seeking excuse must show that it had no reason to know the facts that made performance impracticable. Second, existing impracticability results in a void contract, whereas supervening impracticability discharges a contract that has already arisen.4 Section 266(1) states the effect in the same spirit: no duty to render the performance arises. An obligor who prevails therefore does not breach by withholding a performance it never owed.
Timing and knowledge both point toward mistake. Chronology is the usual way to tell the two doctrines apart: mistake concerns the state of the world when the parties contracted, while impracticability concerns an event that occurs afterward.5 One commentary draws that line sharply and says impracticability and frustration should always concern supervening events. Another observes that existing impracticability is closely related to mistake.6 The two doctrines also ask the same two questions: how material the gap is between the expected exchange and the actual one, and which party should bear the consequences of the failed expectation. Relief is available only when the gap changes the very basis of the bargain, and only to a party who does not bear the risk.7 A problem that dates the troublesome fact before the signing should therefore be tested under both doctrines.
For goods, the Code reaches the same ground through § 2-613. That section applies regardless of when the goods are damaged or destroyed, so goods already destroyed when the parties contracted fall within it as long as neither party knew of the destruction.8 Article 2 has no separate mistake provision, so common-law mistake principles govern a sale of goods that § 2-613 does not reach.9 The beachfront cabin shows where the line falls. If a tidal wave sweeps the cabin into the sea a few hours before the parties sign, both are mistaken that it exists. If the wave hits after signing but before delivery, no one erred about its existence at the time of contracting, and the loss is a supervening event.10
A dispute over an existing condition is usually a dispute over an omitted term. The parties did not foresee the contingency, or they foresaw it and made no provision for it, and the rules of interpretation supply no answer.11 Two cases about the condition of land show how courts fill that silence.
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard is the excusing case. The Howards had agreed to take gravel from Mineral Park's land for use in building a bridge. They took only 50,131 cubic yards, because that was all that was accessible and removable. The rest lay under water, and the court found that dredging and hauling it would have cost the Howards ten to twelve times as much.12 The obstacle was a feature of the land and not an event that followed the signing. The court reasoned that, in agreeing to take the gravel from the plaintiff's land, the parties “contemplated and assumed that the land contained the requisite quantity, available for use.”13 The defendants, it said, “were not binding themselves to take what was not there.”14
Stees v. Leonard sits at the other pole. One commentator reads the court's strict approach to contract obligation as yielding a default rule: when the contract is silent, the risk and responsibility for deciding whether the land suits the planned construction fall on the builder and not on the owner.15 The builder has the technical skill and experience to judge ground conditions and would normally be expected to do so before building. The owner, typically an investor, has neither.16 Read through § 266(1), that default speaks to reason to know. A builder expected to evaluate the ground before building is poorly placed to claim it had no reason to know what the ground held. Both disputes turn on conditions of the land. They come out differently because of what the parties assumed and which party the transaction made responsible for judging the land.
Knowledge removes the rule for a plain reason: a party who knows the fact has contracted with it in view. Knowledge of an existing impracticability creates an assumption of the risk, and a party may assume that risk in other ways as well. One illustration is a case involving technological breakthrough.17 The rule itself yields to a contrary indication in the language or circumstances of the contract.18
If every step is met, no duty to render the performance arises, and the failure to render it is not a breach. The same facts should also be tested under mistake, which asks the parallel question whether the adversely affected party bears the risk.