Concept
Effects of Discharge
Impossibility
Effects of Discharge
A discharging event leaves three questions open: must the other side still perform, who keeps what changed hands before the event, and what follows when the event blocks only part of the performance or blocks it only for a time. The Uniform Commercial Code's casualty rule previews all three answers. When identified goods are destroyed without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer, a total loss avoids the contract.1 A partial loss, or deterioration that leaves the goods nonconforming, lets the buyer inspect and then either treat the contract as avoided or accept the goods with an allowance from the price, without further right against the seller.2
The common law starts from the same place. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts treats the death or incapacity of a person necessary to performance, the destruction or deterioration of a thing necessary to performance, and a governmental regulation or order that makes performance impracticable as events whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.3 Earlier parts of this chapter asked when an event qualifies. This section asks what follows once it does.
Discharge answers one claim and leaves others open. It answers the claim that the promisor broke the contract, because a justified failure to perform carries no liability in damages. It does not say whether value that changed hands before the event must be returned. A party who paid in advance for a performance that will never come has given money for nothing, and a party who finished most of a job has conferred a benefit that no one has paid for. If discharge merely ended the duties and left every loss where it fell, the recipient would keep the payment or the work with nothing owed in return. Three rules therefore govern the consequences: how one party's excuse affects the other party's duties, what recovery is available for performance rendered before the event, and how the law treats an event that reaches only part of a performance or only for a time.
Mutual Discharge
A party excused by impossibility is not in breach and owes no damages. Strict liability was the baseline at the start of this chapter, and under that baseline even a blameless failure to perform produced damages; excuse removes that liability. The other side's natural response to a missed performance is a suit for the value of the bargain, and that suit needs a breach to stand on.4
The release runs in both directions. Each side's performance is the price of the other's, so when the law excuses one performance the exchange has failed, and holding the other side to its promise would make it pay for something it will never receive. The Code states the result as avoidance of the contract when the loss of identified goods is total.5 The common-law sources say the same thing: release of the excused party's obligation also discharges the other party's contractual duties, so the effect of impracticability is to terminate the contract.6 In the music hall case, the owner's duty to license the hall was discharged, and the owner could not then claim the promoters' payment by arguing that its own failure to perform was excused.7
The release depends on an established excuse and, for goods, on where the risk of loss sits. If the risk of loss had already passed to the buyer before identified goods were destroyed, the contract is not discharged and the buyer remains liable for the price.8 A partial casualty to identified goods produces a graduated result in place of an automatic ending: the buyer may inspect what is left and then avoid the contract or accept the remainder with an allowance from the price.9 Discharge also looks forward. It ends the duties still to be performed, and what becomes of money already paid or work already done is a separate question, taken up in the next subsection.
Impossibility can also strike a condition instead of a duty, and then the other party is not simply released. A promise to pay is often conditioned on some other event, and if that event becomes impossible, the question is whether the paying party's duty ever arises. An incidental condition is excused and the paying party must still perform, while a material condition is not excused and the paying party's duty never arises.10
Consider an owner who promises to pay $375,000 for a house, provided the builder obtains a certificate from a named architect. The builder completes the house to specifications, but the architect dies before issuing the certificate. The certificate is an express condition, yet it is incidental to the performance the parties bargained for, so impossibility excuses it, the owner's duty to pay becomes due, and the builder recovers on the contract.11 A builder who has fully performed should not forfeit the price over a step the parties cared little about.
A wedding singer comes out the other way. A singer who agrees to perform at a wedding for $500 and then falls seriously ill is excused from singing, but the singing is a material part of what the host is paying for. The condition to the host's duty to pay is therefore not excused, and the duty never arises.12 The host owes nothing, as under mutual discharge, but by a different route: the duty was never triggered, not discharged after arising. The same reasoning explains why the music hall owner's claim failed. The owner's performance was a material part of the agreed exchange, and excusing it would have forced the promoters to pay for something they never received.13
Students often assume that every impossibility simply ends the contract. The sorting question is what became impossible. If it is a promise, the promise is discharged and the return promise goes with it. If it is a condition on the other party's duty, ask whether the condition is a material part of the agreed exchange: an incidental one is excused and payment falls due, and a material one is not excused and payment never becomes due.
Restitution for Part Performance
Discharge ends the claim for breach, but it does not settle who keeps what the parties handed over before the event. When impracticability excuses a contract, the benefit of any performance already rendered must be restored under principles of unjust enrichment: one party should not keep a benefit at the other's expense without paying for it.15 A buyer who made a down payment before the event, for example, can have its value restored.
Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City shows the remedy at work. The owners granted the city easements and received in return, in place of money, the city's promise to maintain dune height. The city was excused from performing its part of that bargain, but it had been unjustly enriched by keeping the easements without paying anything for them. The court therefore gave the owners restitution measured by what the city would have had to pay for the easements had the contracts provided for money compensation instead of dune maintenance.16
The case keeps two questions apart. Excuse answers the claim for damages, so the owners could not recover what the dune promise would have been worth to them. Restitution answers the enrichment, and its measure follows from its question: what did the city receive? The claim survives the excuse because the two rest on different premises. A court discharges a duty because the event defeated a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and that reasoning gives no support to letting the party who received the other's performance keep it free. If the city could invoke the discharge and also retain the easements, an event neither party caused would hand the city the owners' side of the bargain and leave the owners with the whole loss. The logic runs both ways, since a party who paid in advance for a performance that will never come is likewise entitled to have the payment restored.17
English law once refused restitution. Under the rule associated with Chandler v. Webster, the parties were placed in the position they occupied when the frustrating event occurred, so a sum already paid stayed with its recipient however little the recipient had done to earn it.18 Disputes over hirings for the coronation processions show how the question arose. In Krell, the owner sued for the £50 balance of a £75 price for a flat from which to watch them.19 Under that rule the outcome depended on how the contract happened to schedule its payments, and the question of who was enriched dropped out: a party who had paid early lost money that a party who had not yet paid never had to surrender, although the bargain and the event were identical. England later abandoned the rule. At the suggestion of the Law Lords in the later Fibrosa case, Parliament authorized recovery of the value of benefits received whenever a court considers it just, having regard to all the circumstances.20
American courts have generally taken the opposite view. When impracticability or frustration discharges a contract, the parties must make restitution for the benefits conferred on them, so the older English rule is not the American default.21 Some courts stretch the idea of benefit to cover expenses incurred in preparing to perform, and there is growing recognition that restitution in this setting adjusts the gains and losses each side sustained, in addition to curing unjust enrichment. The Restatement (Second) lets a court grant relief on such terms “as justice requires including protection of the parties’ reliance interests.”22 The widening has a reason. A benefit-only measure leaves a performer with nothing whenever spending produced no benefit for the other side, so an event neither party caused would load the whole loss on whichever party had spent first. Equitable adjustment costs predictability, because an approach that asks how the parties would have dealt with the unanticipated event leaves much to the court's discretion and makes results hard to predict.23
Divisibility offers a second route to payment for part performance. If the excused party rendered part performance before the impracticability arose, recovery for that part may be available under the doctrine of divisibility.24 A contract is divisible when each part of one side's performance is the agreed equivalent of a corresponding part of the other's. In Gill v. Johnstown Lumber, the log driver's pay was set per thousand feet of logs delivered, so the contract divided into segments and he was paid at the contract rate for each segment completed before performance became impossible.25 A building contract can be entire even when it provides progress payments, because a provision for progress payments is not payment for the equivalent work. A contractor whose job is discharged midway therefore cannot claim a proportion of the price on a divisibility theory.26 Even then, a court may sever the contract in the interests of justice, as the Restatement suggests, though the normal divisibility tests are not met, or may fall back on restitution.27
Steps three and four sort the contract rate from the value measure, and step five is where jurisdictions differ. A good answer names restitution of benefits conferred as the default and flags equitable adjustment as the broader approach some courts take.
Partial and Temporary Impossibility
Impossibility or impracticability sometimes reaches only part of what was promised, or interferes only for a time, and the law then tailors relief to the extent of the impediment. The Code shows the middle course for goods: when identified goods are partly lost or have deteriorated until they no longer conform, the buyer may inspect them and then either treat the contract as avoided or accept what remains with an allowance from the price.29 The general law reaches comparable results through Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 269 and 270, which recognize relief short of complete excuse where impracticability is temporary or partial. It also reaches them through the equitable discretion that Comments 6 and 7 to UCC § 2-615 give a court to excuse performance in part when the event does not fundamentally affect the entire performance.30
Both rules rest on one idea: discharge extends only as far as the impossibility does. When an event removes one piece of a performance, every other piece remains as feasible as it was before. A court that treated the loss of a part as the loss of the whole would let a promisor use a narrow obstacle as an exit from the entire contract, and the promisee would forfeit performances that were still available and still bargained for. The affected part is therefore discharged, the unaffected part remains due, and the other side's counterperformance is reduced where fairness calls for it, which adjusts the contract's terms while leaving the contract in force.31
The goods rule differs from the general approach in who makes the choice. A buyer may have no use for a depleted lot, so the Code hands the buyer the election, while the general rule works through the court's discretion to fit relief to what the event actually took away.32
Temporary impossibility raises a different question, because the event removes the performance only while it lasts. A strike by county workers that prevents the recording of a cabin's transfer on the date fixed by the contract supplies the answer. The strike may not excuse the seller's performance in its entirety, but it can excuse the failure to transfer title on the date appointed.33 The duty is suspended while the impediment lasts, so the seller is not in breach for the missed date, and when recording becomes possible again the seller must convey.34 Ending the contract would give the strike more effect than it earned, because the strike took away a date and left the cabin, the price, and both parties' wish to complete the sale intact.
Revival has a limit. The Restatement's treatment of temporary impracticability offers relief short of complete excuse and does not promise that every suspended duty returns on the original terms. Where the delay would make later performance materially more burdensome than the performance originally promised, suspension can ripen into discharge.35
A delay that only makes the promisor wait, or that adds ordinary expense to a familiar job, leaves the duty to spring back, as the cabin seller's does. Only a change in the burden itself defeats revival. Students therefore err in both directions with temporary events, either by treating a delayed performance as permanently discharged or by assuming that every suspended duty revives on the original terms.