Concept
Elements of Impossibility
Impossibility
Elements of Impossibility
A claim of excuse by impossibility rises or falls on four elements, and they are the same whether the triggering event is a death, a fire, or a new statute. The Restatement's three classic categories all speak in one formula. If a particular person is necessary to performance, that person's death or incapacity is an event the non-occurrence of which was “a basic assumption on which the contract was made.”1 The same is said of the failure to come into existence, destruction, or serious deterioration of a specific thing necessary to performance,2 and of a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order that makes performance impracticable.3 Because the three sections share that formula, the four elements need to be learned only once.
Stated as a checklist, the elements are these.4
- An event occurs after the contract is made and makes performance, or performance in the contemplated fashion, impossible or impracticable, and the affected party cannot overcome it by reasonable effort.
- The impracticability is objective: the thing cannot be done, as opposed to this party being unable to do it.
- The party seeking excuse did not cause the event.
- The event's non-occurrence was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and the party seeking excuse did not bear the risk that it would occur.
Some statements of the test fold the objective requirement into the first element; this chapter separates it because it raises questions of its own.5
Taylor v. Caldwell satisfies all four. The music hall burned down shortly before the first performance, and Taylor sued for breach. The court absolved Caldwell, holding that the hall was “essential” to performance and that the parties had contracted “on the basis of [its] continued existence,” so its accidental destruction excused him.6 The fire came after the contract, took the hall away from everyone, and started by accident, and the court treated the hall's continued existence as the premise of the deal.
The elements do not carry equal weight. Like the pre-formation defense of mistake, the last element is often the most important one, because it decides who was meant to carry the loss.7 A party that reasonably knew at formation that the event could happen, and failed to protect itself, has no excuse.8 The four elements are also interwoven. Facts that bear on one often bear on the others, and every element must be satisfied for the defense to succeed.9
Supervening Event
The first element requires an event that occurs after the contract is made, and the date of the event sorts the claim into the right doctrine. An event that follows formation is a supervening impracticability. A problem that already existed at formation but was unknown to the parties is existing impracticability, and the party who claims it may have a claim of mistake instead.10 Mistake therefore looks back to what the parties believed when they contracted, while excuse looks forward to a disaster that struck after they were bound.
A specific classic automobile shows how the date alone moves the analysis. Suppose the car was destroyed before the seller made the offer, and the buyer accepted without knowing of the loss. The seller can raise the defense of mistake.11 Suppose instead the car was destroyed after the contract was formed by acceptance. The risk-of-loss rules now come into play. If the risk of loss still rested on the seller, impossibility excuses the seller and the buyer is not liable, because the contract is discharged. If the risk had already passed to the buyer, the contract is not discharged and the buyer owes the price.12 The car is the same in both accounts. Only the date of destruction differs, and the date selects the doctrine.
A third window opens between offer and acceptance. An offer terminates by operation of law if, before acceptance, a person or thing essential to performance of the proposed contract dies or is destroyed. A father who offers a photographer the job of covering his daughter's wedding finds the offer ended if the daughter dies before the photographer accepts, and a later attempt to accept has no legal effect.13 Had the daughter died after the photographer accepted, a contract would exist, and the death of a person necessary to performance would be an event within the Restatement's formula, so the analysis would continue to the remaining elements.14
The usual error is to date the event by the day someone learned of it. Discovery does not move the event. What each party knew at formation matters because mistake is built around beliefs at that moment, but the date of the casualty decides whether the facts belong to mistake at all.
Objective Impossibility
The second element asks whether anyone could have performed. The law frames the question with a pair of definitions. Objective impossibility comes from the nature of the performance, and subjective impossibility comes wholly from the inability of the individual promisor.16 Only the first supports excuse. The party must show that the thing cannot be done, or at least cannot be done in the contemplated fashion, and showing that the party lacks the right equipment or cannot do the job efficiently falls short.17 The First Restatement put the line as the difference between “the thing cannot be done” and “I cannot do it.”18
The reason lies in what a promise carries with it. A promise to do an act includes the representation that the promisor has the usual skills and resources to accomplish the task, so the promisor assumes the risk of its own shortcomings.19
The benchmark is the reasonable person in the promisor's position. The event must defeat the ability to deliver the performance “not only by this party but by a reasonable person in the party's position.”20 If a fire merely damaged the music hall, and a reasonable owner could have restored it in time for the performance, this owner's subjective inability or disinclination to do so would not support the defense.21
Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co. supplies the standard illustration of an inability that is only subjective. Dunbar contracted to supply Canadian with blackstrap molasses, expecting to fill the order from National Sugar's output. National Sugar cut back production until Dunbar could acquire only 344,000 gallons, leaving it 1,166,000 gallons short, and Dunbar answered Canadian's suit for damages by arguing that its own duty was proportionate to National Sugar's willingness to supply.22
The defense failed. Had Dunbar made a supply contract with National Sugar when it dealt with Canadian, it would have held a claim that could be pressed against National Sugar for Canadian's benefit, or even assigned to Canadian. Instead it put its faith in the mere chance that the refinery's output would match earlier years, and it had to take the consequences.23 Dunbar really could not get the molasses, yet its inability traced to its own omission and not to anything in the nature of the performance. The Code takes the same line. Section 2–615 can excuse a seller whose contemplated source of supply fails, but the commentary adds that there is no excuse unless the seller has employed all due measures to assure itself that the source will not fail.24
The Second Restatement reaches the same result in different vocabulary. It recognizes that subjective impracticability involves assumption of the risk or contributory fault, and a promisor in either position is denied the defense.25 That overlap is why this element runs into the two that follow.
Run on the molasses facts, step three ends the inquiry. A supplier that had taken due measures would have held a claim against National Sugar to press for Canadian's benefit, so the shortfall was Dunbar's own problem and not a feature of the performance.26
The death of a person whose personal performance the contract requires is the clearest case in which one individual's inability is also everyone's. Where the obligor is to perform personally, death or incapacity makes performance impracticable for anyone, so the impracticability is objective and not merely subjective.27 The decedent was the only one who could have performed, because personal performance cannot be delegated.28
Insolvency is the commonest subjective problem. A promisor who cannot make a scheduled payment remains bound whatever caused the financial difficulty, because the insolvent party is deemed to have assumed the risk of becoming insolvent.29 The party asserting impracticability also carries the burden of proof and must show that the task could not be accomplished.30 A common slip is to treat the promisor's own literal inability, as in Dunbar, as impossibility. The question is whether the obstacle would stop a reasonable promisor in the same position.
Absence of Fault
The third element asks who caused the event. A party who seeks excuse must have been without fault, and misconduct or negligence may be enough to deny the relief.32 The element matters because the first two can be met on facts the claimant itself created. A burned hall is gone for everyone, so the impossibility is objective, and a fire after the contract is a supervening event, yet neither element asks who lit the match. The original doctrine required that the destruction not be “caused by the fault of the party seeking relief,”33 and the fire in Taylor v. Caldwell was accidental.34
Fault reaches beyond the act that starts the disaster. A seller who is to deliver specific goods on February 1 and fails without good cause to do so cannot claim impracticability when the goods are destroyed afterward, because the defense is disallowed for contributory fault.35 A promisor who creates the impracticability by a voluntary act gets no excuse. A promisor who is enjoined from performing loses the defense if its own wrongful conduct was responsible for the injunction, though a consent decree or other negotiated settlement may not be conclusive on fault.36
The Code follows the same logic. A seller whose fault is one link in the causal chain that made performance impracticable cannot claim the protection of § 2–615, as where a seller fails to pick fruit before a hard freeze injures it.37 The Code's provision on casualty to identified goods builds the condition into its text. The goods must suffer casualty “without fault of either party,” so fault on the buyer's side can defeat that excuse as well.38 The later section on casualty to identified goods returns to that provision.
Because the test looks to causation, the fault must be a link in the chain that produced the event.
When the event is a person's disability, fault must be clear before it blocks discharge, because it is often so difficult to foresee the effect of conduct on health.39 The later section on death and incapacity takes up that rule.
Basic Assumption and Risk
The fourth element has two halves. The first asks whether the parties made the contract on the assumption that the event would not occur, and the second asks whether the party seeking excuse bore the risk of its occurrence anyway. Each Restatement category describes its triggering event in the language of the first half. The assumption reflects the principle that the law protects only against unexpected events that affect a material aspect of the bargain,41 and the parties need not have been conscious of alternatives to hold it. An artist who contracts to paint a painting and dies illustrates the point, because the death is an event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption even though the parties never addressed the possibility.42
The second half usually decides the case. Even when the event's non-occurrence was a basic assumption, the claimant may have impliedly assumed the risk of its occurrence.43 If the parties foresaw the likelihood of the event, they probably allocated the risk of its happening, expressly or impliedly, and even if they did not foresee it, commercial practice or other surrounding circumstances may support an implication that the claimant assumed the risk.44 The court first asks whether the parties allocated the risk, expressly or impliedly, and if they never contemplated the event, it fills the gap.45 The three sources of allocation, in that order, are the contract's own terms, the circumstances from which intention can be inferred, and the allocation the court supplies when the contract is silent.
Express terms come first because a contract that speaks to the event leaves nothing to fill. If a hall lease said that the owner would furnish the hall on April 2 but would have no liability if the hall burned down before then, a court should enforce that condition as written.46 Parties often write such terms as force majeure clauses. These clauses excuse promisors in case of natural catastrophes such as fires, earthquakes, or hurricanes, and often in case of war, governmental regulation, or labor strikes, and parties may condition performance on the non-occurrence of any event they choose.47 In a sale of goods, such a clause can enter the agreement by express agreement or through usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance. The excusing contingencies must be stated or identifiable with enough specificity, and their occurrence must have prejudiced the party.48
A list of excusing events cuts both ways. Courts construe force majeure terms narrowly, so a disruption outside the clause's words is unlikely to be added by analogy.49 A court may also find that the party impliedly assumed the risk of anything the list leaves out, under the expressio unius principle.50 A drafter who names some disasters and omits others has therefore invited the inference that the omitted ones stayed with the promisor.
When the contract is silent, the court looks outside the text. The parties' negotiations and purposes, trade custom, and course of dealing help show what they intended.51 Courts prefer to decide by the parties' intentions because the parties, not the court, are supposed to draft the contract. They sometimes speak of intentions even when the evidence is far from clear that the parties thought about the matter at all.52
If the parties never contemplated the event, the court must predict how they would have dealt with the unanticipated circumstance at the agreement stage. That approach leaves much to the court's discretion and makes results hard to predict, although one clue is that the parties likely would have presumed that each would act reasonably and fairly as circumstances developed.53 Taylor v. Caldwell shows the usual outcome when the thing is the foundation of the bargain. The hall was essential to performance, the parties contracted on the basis of its continued existence, and its accidental destruction excused the owner.54
Excuse is not automatic even for a fire after formation. A builder whose house burns shortly before completion can probably show that the fire made timely performance extreme and unreasonable, that the fire's non-occurrence was a basic assumption, and that the builder did not cause it. The builder will probably still lose on risk, because it controlled the construction site and should have taken greater precautions against fire.55 A later section returns to construction contracts for that reason.
Market price shows how the law treats a risk that parties commonly bear. A change in market price does not excuse performance, but market changes that result from events the parties assumed would not occur may provide grounds for discharge.56 Courts also keep a significant tendency to hold parties to their bargains, finding that they assumed the risk of the events that now make performance difficult, so a claimant should expect the court to look hard for an assumption of risk.57
Foreseeability enters the analysis as evidence. Some courts say the event must not have been reasonably foreseeable at formation, while the Restatement uses the more flexible phrase “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”58 Under either formulation, a party that reasonably knew at formation that the event could occur, and failed to protect itself, has no excuse.59 Foreseeability alone does not settle the question, though. Death is a risk anyone can foresee, yet it discharges a duty of personal service unless the contract clearly manifests an intention to perform despite death.60
A new governmental regulation fits the same frame. Suppose a city council, without prior publicity, tightens its public-safety rules after a hall lease is signed, so that the hall can no longer lawfully be let for public performances. The action is an unforeseen contingency that defeats the basic assumption that the hall could be used lawfully for the contract's purpose, although the owner can still hand over the building.61 For sales of goods, the Code frees a seller whose performance a governmental regulation or order makes impracticable without reference to the contingency and basic-assumption language, provided the regulation, and not the seller's fault, causes the impracticability.62
Run on a hall lease that is silent about fire and has no outside evidence of allocation, the sequence reaches step four, and the hall's role as the foundation of the deal supports excuse.