Concept
Strict Liability and Excuse
Impossibility
Impossibility of Performance
Strict Liability and Excuse
A promise to perform is a promise to deliver a result, and contract law holds the promisor to that result even when events beyond the promisor's control make it impossible. Excuse is the exception. A duty is discharged only when the contract was made on the basic assumption that the intervening event would not occur, and a promisor gets no relief for an event the promisor caused or whose risk the promisor assumed.1
The Restatement packages that test into three specific rules, each phrased the same way. The death or incapacity of a person necessary to performance, the destruction of a specific thing necessary to performance, and a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order that makes performance impracticable are each an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made.2 The Uniform Commercial Code adds a counterpart for sales of goods. It addresses goods identified when the contract is made that suffer casualty without fault of either party before the risk of loss passes to the buyer.3
Those rules depart from a baseline, and they make sense only against it. The first subsection states the baseline and the seventeenth-century case that applied it without mercy. The second shows how the burning of a music hall produced the exception that the Restatement now states in general form.
Strict Contractual Liability
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts opens its chapter on excuse with a warning: contract liability is strict liability. Contracts are to be kept (pacta sunt servanda), so a promisor who fails to perform owes damages even if the promisor was without fault and even if circumstances made the contract more burdensome or less desirable than the promisor anticipated.4 The word “strict” describes the trigger. Liability attaches because the promised result was not delivered, and a willful, a negligent, and an innocent failure alike give the promisee a cause of action.5 A court applying the default rule therefore begins with two questions: did the defendant promise, and was the promise kept? The reasons for the failure matter only through the excuse doctrines this chapter develops.
Paradine v. Jane (1647) shows the rule at its harshest. A tenant whose leased land had been taken from him by an army during the English civil war was sued for the unpaid rent, and the court refused to treat the dispossession as a defense. A party who by his own contract creates a duty on himself, the court reasoned, “is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident or inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.”6
The court's reason is the reason for the whole rule, and a later statement of the principle draws the line exactly. Where the law imposes a duty, inevitable accident may excuse nonperformance, because the law will not require what a party, without fault, has become unable to do. Where a party voluntarily assumes a duty by agreement, accident or inevitable necessity will not excuse it, “for if he desired any such exception, he should have provided for it in his contract.”7 A tenant who promises rent without qualification has assumed the duty. The lease could have addressed dispossession and did not, so the loss stays with the tenant.
Literal impossibility does not end the inquiry, though students often assume it does. Whether a court can order the promised performance and whether the promisor owes money for failing to deliver it are separate questions. If performance is impossible, specific performance is unavailable, but the court can still award damages for the lost value of the defendant's expected performance.8 Impossibility alone therefore removes one remedy and leaves liability in place until an excuse doctrine applies.
The point is sharper when the promisor caused the impossibility. A construction company agrees to sell a specific new house to Buyer #1 but inadvertently sells the house and conveys title to Buyer #2. Performance of the first contract is now impossible. Because the company's own fault produced the impossibility, the company is not excused, and Buyer #1 can recover whatever money damages Buyer #1 can prove.9
The next case shows what it takes to move off this baseline. A music hall rented for a series of concerts burned down without anyone's fault, and the court released the owner from liability.10 It did so because the parties had contracted on the basis of the hall's continued existence. Every excuse doctrine that follows rests on a finding of that kind.
The Taylor v. Caldwell Exception
The first break in the rule of strict liability came in Taylor v. Caldwell (1863). The plaintiff, a roving impresario, planned to stage musical events and other entertainments at the defendant's Surrey Gardens music hall and spent a substantial sum on promotion, advertising, and preparation. Before any entertainment could be offered, the Gardens burned to the ground. The fire was no one's fault. The plaintiff sued to recover his wasted outlays, and the defendant answered that performance had become impossible and that he should be excused as a matter of law.12
The court framed the question as one of loss allocation. The hall had been destroyed without fault of either party and so completely that the concerts could not be given as intended, and the issue was whether the plaintiffs' loss should fall on the defendants.13 The contract did not help, because the parties “evidently had not present to their minds the possibility of such a disaster” and made no stipulation about it. The answer therefore had to come from the general rules of law applicable to such a contract.14
Those rules, the court held, bind a promisor only when the contract is positive and absolute, not subject to any condition, express or implied. Some contracts cannot be fulfilled unless a particular specified thing continues to exist, and in them the parties must have contemplated that continuing existence as the foundation of what was to be done. In the absence of any express or implied warranty that the thing will exist, such a contract is not read as positive. It is read as subject to an implied condition that the parties are excused if, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without the contractor's default.15
The hall fit that description. The court absolved the owner because the hall itself was essential to performance and the parties had contracted on the basis of its continued existence.16 The promoter's wasted promotion costs, the loss he had sued to recover, went uncompensated.
The exception has a built-in limit. A fire without fault does not discharge anyone by itself, because the implied condition arises only where the contract carries no express or implied warranty that the thing will exist.17 The Restatement's general rule on supervening impracticability builds in the same limit by discharging the duty unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.18
The implied-condition explanation has an obvious weakness, and the court supplied the evidence for it. The parties had not thought of the disaster, so a term covering it is a poor description of what they intended.19 The hall's indispensability also fails to settle who should bear the loss. The owner could not rebuild the Gardens in time, and no one supposes the contract demanded that. But the owner could still write a check to cover the promoter's losses, a performance far less impossible than rebuilding, and the real question is whether the parties intended him to.20 Later opinions, such as Scott & Sons v. Del Sel (1922), pressed the same doubt about implied terms that nobody wrote.
Modern law keeps the result and drops the fiction. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 discharges a party's duty when, after the contract is made, the party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.21 The parties need not have been conscious of the alternatives for an assumption to be basic. The death of an artist hired to paint a picture qualifies even though neither side ever thought about it.22 The assumption must still be patent enough from the circumstances and the contract's apparent purpose that the parties can reasonably be taken to have shared it.23
That test produces the Surrey Gardens result without a fictional term. The hall's survival was a basic assumption of a contract to use it on particular dates, nothing in the language or circumstances shifted the risk of its destruction to the owner, and the owner was not at fault, so the owner's duty was discharged. How courts decide whether an assumption was basic, and whether the party seeking excuse took on the risk, is the subject of the elements discussed next in this chapter.
Impossibility itself can be defined by the situations in which it recurs. A circumstance excuses performance as impossible when one of four things happens:
- the subject or means of performance has deteriorated, been destroyed, or become unavailable;
- the method of delivery or payment has failed;
- a law now prevents performance; or
- death or illness prevents performance.24
The burned music hall is the first kind. The Restatement states three of the four in separate sections: death or incapacity in § 262, destruction or deterioration of a specific thing in § 263, and governmental regulation in § 264.25 Those sections speak the language of impracticability even when the facts amount to impossibility. This chapter treats them as the classic impossibility cases and reserves cost-based impracticability for its discussion of neighboring doctrines. Increased or unexpected difficulty and expense do not usually count as impossibility, which keeps the category as narrow as the exception that produced it.26