Concept
What Makes a Cure Effective
Seller's right to cure
What Makes a Cure Effective
A seller who meets the timing, notice, and reasonable-grounds conditions earns the chance to cure, but the chance matters only if the cure works. Section 2-508 states the standard twice. Under subsection (1), a seller whose tender is rejected before the time for performance expires may seasonably notify the buyer of its intention to cure and then “make a conforming delivery” within the contract time.1 Under subsection (2), a seller that had reasonable grounds to believe its tender would be acceptable, with or without a money allowance, may on seasonable notice take a further reasonable time “to substitute a conforming tender.”2 The sections above explain when a seller may try to cure; this one asks what the attempt must accomplish.
The Code does not say what a cure consists of. Cure is undefined, though it undoubtedly refers to repair, adjustment, or replacement of nonconforming goods and arguably to a money allowance as well.3 Courts have read the statutory words closely. One court, contrasting proposed amendments to § 2-508 with the section’s “plain text,” refused any right to cure after revocation of acceptance.4
The measure of a cure comes from the rule the provision softens. Under the perfect tender rule, the buyer may reject if the seller’s performance fails to conform “in any respect,” and the extent of the nonconformity is no condition of rejection. The Code reduces the seller’s exposure to strategic rejection by giving it a second bite at performance.5 A second bite has to be a bite at the same performance, so a cure is tested against what the contract required. Three questions follow. What must a second tender contain to conform? Can a price reduction stand in for conforming goods? And how far may a substitute depart from the goods the parties bargained for? The three subsections below take them in turn.
A Conforming Tender
Section 2-508(2) answers the first question in a phrase: the seller may substitute “a conforming tender.” Arguably that is both the most and the least the seller can and must do, namely make a second tender, and make it conforming.6 Subsection (1) sets the same standard for a cure within the contract time, since the seller there makes “a conforming delivery.”7 The perfect tender rule explains the demand. The buyer may reject if performance fails to conform “in any respect,” so a seller who wants to displace a rejection must deliver what the contract specified.8
The standard is strict about the result and flexible about the method. Courts generally permit repair as well as substitution of an entirely new tender.9 A repaired item that meets the contract gives the buyer what a replacement would, and nothing in the statute turns on which the seller chooses. Nor is cure reserved for small defects. A court of appeals held that an entire substitute shipment could constitute cure, rejected the notion that a seller has no right to cure unless the defects are “minor,” and noted that courts have asked whether the seller’s belief that the goods would be acceptable was reasonable, not whether the seller knew of the defect.10
A cure under subsection (2) is necessarily late. The statute gives the seller “a further reasonable time,” so the substitute arrives after the contract time, and lateness alone cannot make it nonconforming. Everything else the contract required still binds the seller.11
Proposed fixes that leave something wrong fail. In Albrecht v. Fettig, the contract called for 80 percent red and 20 percent black Angus steers, and the seller delivered 55 percent red and 43 percent black. The seller offered to take back as many black steers as needed to restore the contract proportions. The offer was inadequate for an obvious reason: even with the proportions corrected, the seller would still have breached its obligation to deliver 150 steers.12 Reported decisions such as Worldwide RV Sales & Service, Inc. v. Brooks and Moulden & Sons, Inc. v. Osaka Landscaping & Nursery, Inc. apply § 2-508 to sellers’ proposed fixes on the facts of other sales.
The hardest cases arise when no one can say in advance whether a proposed fix will conform.
To decide who is right, a court makes the judgments § 2-508 requires. Was the seller justified in believing the tender conforming or otherwise acceptable? Is delivery on the contract date of the essence, and if not, is a week’s delay reasonable? Will the refinished table conform to the contract? The answers lie in interpreting the contract to find the parties’ reasonable expectations.13 The discount option raises a different question, whether a price reduction can itself cure, and the next subsection takes it up.
A seller who cures properly ends the buyer’s right to reject, but the buyer keeps its claim under § 2-714 for any injury the original tender caused.14
Price Allowances as Cure
Section 2-508(2) mentions a money allowance only in passing. It asks whether the seller had reasonable grounds to believe its tender would be acceptable “with or without money allowance,” and what it gives the seller is further time “to substitute a conforming tender.”16 Read literally, the allowance belongs to the seller’s expectation about what the buyer would take, while the cure is a conforming tender. Comment 4 points the same way, saying that trade usages permitting variations without rejection but with a price allowance “are not covered by this section,” and one treatise observes that subsection (2) does not appear to recognize price adjustment as a form of cure.17
Practice runs the other way. The same treatise calls price adjustments sufficient to recompense the buyer for a deficiency in quantity or quality certainly the most common form of cure among business people. A seller delivers 995 bushels of potatoes on a contract for 1,000, and 995 suffice for the buyer’s purposes. The authors would let the seller cure with a price reduction equal to the value of the five bushels not delivered, even though subsection (2) does not mention it.18 Other commentary treats cure as arguably covering a money allowance, such as conforming goods tendered late with a price allowance for the delay.19 Two policies evident in the Code, letting the parties settle their own disputes and minimizing economic waste, point in the same direction.20
The decisions that accept an allowance rest on facts that make it an agreed method of performance. In Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. White Lumber Sales, Inc., a plywood shipment deviated nine percent from the contract specifications, while trade usage permitted a five percent deviation. The contract required the buyer to “accept the balance of the shipment as invoiced.” The court held that the seller made an effective cure by giving a price allowance: the buyer could not reject and had to accept the reduction. It did not explicitly discuss whether the seller had reasonable grounds to believe the tender would be acceptable.21 One court, by contrast, refused to recognize a price reduction as a cure.22 Others have considered price credits as cure, among them Oral-X Corp. v. Farnam Cos.
The sources yield three positions, and a careful answer says which one it adopts.
- The text-based view treats a money allowance as something the seller may offer alongside cure, so a buyer who declines it can demand a fully conforming substitute.23
- The agreement-based view accepts an allowance as cure where the contract or trade usage provides for it, as in the plywood case.24
- The broader view would make a buyer who complains of an insubstantial nonconformity accept a price reduction that recompenses it, even without any trade usage.25
The broader view carries its own limit. The treatise authors who advance it would reach only the buyer “who complains of some insubstantial nonconformity which can be recompensed by a reduction in the price,” and they concede that it does some “modest violence” to the statutory language.26 Where a defect goes to what the goods are for, money does not recompense it.
The scratched table in the preceding subsection sits in the middle of the debate. Its 10 percent discount cures only if the contract or the trade permits an allowance, or if a court takes the broader view and finds the scratch an insubstantial flaw that the discount fully recompenses. A seller that offers only an allowance bets on one of those two views. If the buyer declines and a court takes the text-based view, the seller must still substitute conforming goods, within the contract time or a further reasonable time.27
Installment contracts show the allowance idea at its most natural. The Code recognizes that parties to an installment contract anticipate an ongoing cooperative relationship and have an interest in preserving it despite minor bumps in the road.28 The commentary on cure cites § 2-612 and its Comment 5 in support of treating a money allowance as cure.29 Reported decisions address price adjustment as cure in that setting, including Superior Derrick Services, Inc. v. Anderson. That the installment provisions contemplate an allowance does not, however, settle the single-delivery question.
Substitutes Outside the Bargain
Section 2-508(2) says what the seller must end up delivering, a conforming tender, but not which routes to that tender are acceptable. The preceding subsections tested cure against the contract. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith applies the same test to a seller that fixed a defect by installing something the buyer never agreed to take, and it holds that such a substitute is no cure.31
The seller had delivered a new car. The next day it sent a wrecker to the buyer’s home, took the car to its repair shop, and after inspection determined that the transmission was defective. It replaced the transmission with one removed from a vehicle on its showroom floor and told the buyer what it had done. The buyer refused delivery of the repaired car and reasserted his cancellation of the sale. The seller sued for the balance of the price, and the buyer counterclaimed for the return of his deposit.32
The court rejected the seller’s reliance on § 2-508. The statute makes no attempt to define what a cure consists of, so each case is controlled by its own facts. The cure the Code intends does not contemplate tendering a new vehicle with a substituted transmission that did not come from the factory and was of unknown lineage from another vehicle in the seller’s possession. The legislature did not intend the right to cure to be limitless or controlled only by the seller’s will, and a cure that substitutes a chattel “not within the agreement or contemplation of the parties” is invalid.33 The court gave judgment for the buyer and awarded him the $124 deposit.34
The court also explained why a substitute part mattered so much in the sale of a new car. For most people the purchase is a major investment, rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from the car’s dependability and safety. Once that faith is shaken, the car loses not only its real value in the buyer’s eyes but becomes an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with apprehension, and the attempted cure was ineffective.35 The seller invoked automobile-trade usage requiring a buyer to accept a new car whose defects are seasonably cured. The court found no evidence of such a usage at trial and suggested that any such practice may reflect the unequal strength of dealers and buyers, which had long covered over injustices to buyers.36
The limit follows from treating cure as a second attempt at the contract’s own obligation. If the seller alone defined cure, a seller who had already delivered a defective product could press a different product on the buyer and call it performance. A car carrying a transmission of unknown history is not the car the parties contracted for, so tendering it does not try again to perform the first promise.
The shaken-faith passage can be read two ways. Read literally, it describes the state of mind of these particular purchasers. One may argue instead that the court applied an objective standard, so that any reasonable purchaser in the buyers’ position would have refused a car with the substituted transmission.37 The objective reading is the better one. A cure measured by the buyer’s private confidence would only move control of cure from the seller’s will to the buyer’s, since any buyer could veto a cure by announcing that nothing would restore its trust. A standard tied to the parties’ reasonable expectations avoids that result, and it is the standard courts already use to decide whether a proposed cure conforms.38
The two scenes differ in where the substitute came from. In Zabriskie the replacement part had no place in the agreement, while the factory-new sedan is the very thing the contract described. The first falls outside the bargain, and the second is the bargain performed.