Concept
Good Faith and Cooperation
Obligations of the parties
Good Faith and Cooperation
Earlier sections asked whether a party did what the contract and the Code's gap fillers required: conforming goods tendered at a reasonable hour, price paid at the place of receipt, inspection made in time. Section 2-301 sums up the duties behind those questions. The seller must transfer and deliver, the buyer must accept and pay, and each does so “in accordance with the contract.”1 This section asks a different question: how a party carries out those duties. A party can perform every listed act and still defeat what the other side bargained for.
Two features of the Code govern the manner of performance. One is a good faith obligation that rides along with every duty and cannot be waived. The other is a set of rules for particulars that a contract leaves to one party's choice. Each has its own subsection below, and the second applies the first to a setting where one side holds the pen.
Good Faith in Performance
Every contract within the UCC imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance, and the parties may not disclaim it. Section 1-201(b)(20) defines good faith, § 1-304 imposes the obligation, and § 1-302(b) denies the parties the power to contract out of it.2 The obligation is therefore no fourth item beside the duties in § 2-301. It accompanies each of them: the transfer, the delivery, the acceptance, and the payment must be carried out in good faith as well as in accordance with the contract. This subsection concerns only the duty's status. It is always present, it cannot be waived, and it leaves the parties room to say what reasonable performance looks like.
The ban on waiver makes sense once you see what each party buys. A party signing a sales contract bargains for the other side's performance of its promise, not merely for the promise.3 If good faith could be disclaimed, the party with more leverage could insert a waiver at little cost and then perform each stated duty in a way that matches the contract's words and defeats what the other side expected. The weaker party would hold a promise with no assurance about the performance it was buying. Because the Code, not the parties, supplies the obligation, no wording in the agreement removes it.
A duty that no one could shape would leave the parties guessing, even in routine cases, what counts as acceptable performance. So the Code lets them set standards by agreement. Tender must be made at a reasonable hour, and § 1-302(b) allows the parties to set standards for the reasonable time of tender, so a contract may state the hours during which tender is due.4 A stated window answers in advance a question that would otherwise go to a court as a matter of reasonableness. The line between what the Code permits and what it forbids is clear. A clause that sets a measurable standard gives the obligation content, while a clause announcing that no one owes good faith tries to delete the obligation itself. Agreed terms of any kind meet one further limit: courts have refused to enforce terms they found substantively unconscionable, and they have applied the doctrine to contracts between commercially sophisticated parties.5
Students who have learned that an express term displaces a gap filler often carry that rule over to good faith and conclude that a waiver clause works. It does not. A default yields to an express term on the same subject; this obligation yields to nothing, because § 1-302(b) puts it beyond the parties' agreement.6 On an exam, a stem that reproduces boilerplate waiving good faith asks whether the clause works, and the answer is no. A stem that reproduces a stated hour or date asks a different question, and there the agreed standard governs.
The CISG also speaks to good faith, in Article 7(1), and Article 60(a) measures the buyer's obligation to take delivery by what could reasonably be expected of the buyer.7 The international regime thus ties performance to reasonable expectations too, while the UCC treats the duty as a constant that the parties can calibrate but never switch off.
Cooperation and Options
Section 2-301 measures each party's duty by the contract, and many contracts leave a particular open when signed: which colors the buyer wants, which carrier moves the goods.9 The Code does not treat the gap as fatal. A contract that leaves particulars of performance to be specified by one of the parties is not invalid for that reason, but the specifications must be made in good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness. § 2-311(1).10 The rule keeps contracts workable, since the parties need not settle every color and every carrier before either can commit. The good faith and commercial reasonableness limits answer the risk the rule creates: the party holding the choice could use it to deliver or demand a performance worse than the other side bargained for. Those limits are the good faith obligation from the preceding subsection, applied to a single decision.
When the parties do not say who holds a choice, the Code assigns it. Unless otherwise agreed, specifications relating to the assortment of the goods are made at the buyer's option, and specifications or arrangements relating to shipment are made at the seller's option.11 Assortment determines what the buyer will receive and use, and shipment determines how the seller moves goods it still controls. In a contract for 600 pens, the buyer may therefore elect to take 100 blue pens and 500 green ones, and the seller may elect to ship by a trucking company of its own choosing.12 A buyer who objects to that carrier, when the contract says nothing about carriers, has no complaint, because the seller exercised an option the Code gave it. A stem in which the seller picks the colors reverses the default, and it should prompt the question whether the contract assigned that choice to the seller. The words “unless otherwise agreed” leave the parties free to reallocate either option.
Holding an option is not holding a free hand. A seller who picks the carrier must still choose in good faith and within commercial reasonableness, so a carrier that could not protect perishable goods would defeat the performance the buyer expected, and the option would not cover the choice. The buyer's assortment choice is subject to the same standards.
Performance often cannot go forward until the option holder acts, which leaves the other party unable to carry out a duty it has not been told how to perform. Section 2-311(3) responds to that problem. When one party's exercise of an option or cooperation is necessary to, or materially affects, the other party's performance, and it is not seasonably forthcoming, the other party is excused from any resulting delay in its own performance, in addition to all its other remedies. That party may also proceed to perform in any reasonable manner. Alternatively, after the time for a material part of its own performance has passed, it may treat the failure to specify or to cooperate as a failure to deliver the goods, if the party who failed to act is the seller, or as a failure to accept the goods, if it is the buyer.13 The rule has several triggers and two possible responses, so run it in order.
The standard illustration is the pen contract in which the buyer holds the choice of styles and colors. If the buyer refuses to choose, the choice is not seasonably forthcoming and the seller is excused from the resulting delay. Once the time for a material part of the seller's own performance has passed, the seller may treat the refusal as a failure to accept.14 The same silence can be examined at two different moments, and the answer depends on which moment is in question.
The two parts of the rule have separate reasons. The excuse from delay prevents a trap: without it, a supplier waiting on the district's choice would be late under its own delivery term because of an omission it did not commit. The timing requirement works in the other direction. Until the date for a material part of the aggrieved party's own performance arrives, the missing choice has not yet cost it the performance it bargained for. The Code lets it adapt reasonably and reserves the harsher characterization for the point at which the delay has actually prevented performance. The words “in addition to all other remedies” show that the excuse supplements remedies the Code provides elsewhere, such as the right to demand adequate assurance of performance, taken up in the following sections.15
The rule runs both ways. If the seller fails to make a shipping arrangement that the buyer needs, the buyer may, after the time for a material part of its own performance has passed, treat the failure as a failure to deliver.16 The CISG has a parallel in Article 65, which addresses a buyer's failure to make specifications.17 Treating a missing specification as a failure of performance is therefore a feature of sales law generally, and the UCC adds the timing limit described above.