Concept
Performance According to Contract
Obligations of the parties
Performance According to Contract
Section 2-301 measures both sides by one standard: the seller must transfer and deliver, and the buyer must accept and pay, "in accordance with the contract."1 That phrase gives a court no fixed list of acts that every seller and buyer must perform. It sends the court to the parties' own agreement and makes that agreement the yardstick for deciding whether performance has occurred. A shipment of the right goods to the wrong destination, or a payment of the right amount on the wrong day, may look like delivery and payment, but the statute asks whether the act matched the deal.
Sales contracts vary too widely for one schedule to fit them all. A grain merchant who buys by the truckload every week and a manufacturer who orders a custom-built machine need different arrangements for when the goods change hands, where, and when the money moves. Tying the duties to the agreement lets the same two pairs of verbs serve both, and it hands a court one question when a dispute arises: what did these parties agree to, and did the performance conform to it?
Two consequences follow, and the rest of this unit takes them in turn. Parties rarely address every detail, so what each side owes comes from the agreement together with the default terms Article 2 supplies where the agreement is silent. And an obligation is distinct from the remedy that follows when it goes unperformed: the obligation is what the contract requires a party to do, and the remedy is what the other side may pursue after a failure to do it.
Agreed Terms and Gap Fillers
The parties' agreement is the first place a court looks to learn what was owed. It can govern far more than the goods and the price. Time, place, and manner of delivery are open to agreement, so a contract may fix a delivery date, name the spot of handover, and prescribe how the handover occurs, and the parties may even set their own standard for a reasonable time of tender.2 Each choice becomes part of the yardstick under which § 2-301 asks whether the seller delivered or the buyer paid.3 When the agreement speaks to the point in dispute, a court has no reason to look past it.
A contract that is silent on a point still needs a rule for performing it. Article 2 supplies that rule through gap fillers: terms the law implies into a contract to supplement its express language when the parties plainly intended a deal but did not provide for the question now in dispute.4 Courts and legislatures do not draw these terms from the air. They base them on common expectations, commercial practice, and public policy, so each default is meant to reflect what the parties likely would have agreed had they discussed the issue.5 Several Article 2 defaults show the range. Section 2-305 supplies a reasonable price when the contract does not settle one. Sections 2-307, 2-308, and 2-309 call for delivery in a single lot at the seller's place of business within a reasonable time. Sections 2-312, 2-314, and 2-315 imply minimum warranties of title and quality.6 The defaults on when and where the buyer pays appear later in this chapter.
The agreement comes first and the gap filler second. A gap filler operates only where the agreement is silent, and an express term on the same subject displaces it. Many Article 2 defaults say so themselves with the words "unless otherwise agreed," as the rules on the concurrent exchange of goods and price do, and the parties may agree to make delivery and payment sequential instead.7 The logic follows from what a default is. It is the law's estimate of what the parties would probably have wanted, while an express term shows what they did want, and once the real answer is on the page the estimate has nothing left to do. The freedom to agree has an outer limit in unconscionability: a term whose outcome is so one-sided as to be unfair may go unenforced, and courts have applied the doctrine even between commercially sophisticated parties.8 Inside that limit, the agreement controls.
On an exam, a question about where or when delivery must occur starts with the contract, and the answer changes with what the contract says.
Displacement works term by term, not contract by contract. A contract that fixes the delivery date but says nothing about the place keeps the agreed date and borrows the Code's place, so one contract can draw on both sources at once. Only silence on the specific subject sends the analysis to a default.
The factual inquiry in step three precedes the default because a legally implied term is usually used only when no pertinent contextual evidence establishes the term as a matter of fact.9 The default is the last stop in the search for a missing term.
Two separate reasons support this structure: one explains why defaults exist, the other why they yield. Defaults exist because parties cannot practically negotiate every detail of a sale. If a silent contract left the missing term unresolved, a court applying § 2-301 would have no yardstick for judging whether delivery had occurred, and a neutral term that tracks what parties in such deals would likely have wanted gives the court that baseline.10 Defaults yield for a different reason. A statute must serve every sales contract at once, while the parties know their own trade, their own warehouse, and their own schedule, so a term they chose will usually fit better than a general estimate. That is why an express term wins even when a court finds the default more sensible.
Obligation Versus Remedy
Section 2-301 defines obligation and stops there: the seller's obligation is to transfer and deliver, the buyer's is to accept and pay, and each is owed in accordance with the contract.12 An obligation, then, is what the contract requires a party to do. A remedy is a different thing: the relief open to the other party when that performance is not rendered. The two are counterparts, and the Code lets them be shaped separately, since a seller may give a promise about the goods while limiting what the buyer can do if the promise fails.13
Keeping the concepts apart gives a court two questions in a fixed order. The first asks what the contract, read together with the Code's gap fillers, required of the party, and whether the party rendered it. The remedy question arises only if the first is answered against the performing party, because a remedy responds to a failure to perform and so presupposes one. If the questions were blended, any clause that touched on consequences could be read as a statement about the duty itself, and a seller could argue that a narrow remedy clause meant a narrow promise. The separation blocks that argument at the source.
The familiar "repair or replace" warranty shows the separation at work. The seller acknowledges liability for a wide range of defects, which is a promise about the goods, but limits what it must do about a defect to repairing or replacing the item, which is a limit on the buyer's recourse.14 The limit narrows what the buyer can claim, and it leaves the promise standing.
A student who sees a clause limiting recovery and concludes that the seller promised less has read a remedy term as though it defined the duty. The clause answers what relief is available, while § 2-301 still asks what the contract required the seller to transfer and deliver.15 On an exam stem, ask first whether the party did what the contract required, and second what the other party may do about it. The particular remedies belong to later material on breach, and this unit needs only the line between the two ideas.