Concept
Merchant Status
Identification of goods
Merchant Status
Merchant status is a statutory category, so every question about it starts with the text of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code is the joint product of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which approved a draft in 1952; Pennsylvania enacted it in 1953.1
Article 2 first asks what the parties are trading. It applies to transactions in goods,2 and it reaches a desk bought off a showroom floor and a desk the seller has yet to build alike, because future goods remain subject to Article 2 if they will be movable when identified to the contract.3 It also looks past labels. A transaction called a lease that is in fact a disguised sale with a reserved security interest is a sale: the “lessor” is a seller, the “lessee” is a buyer, and Article 2 applies alongside Article 9.4
Merchant status asks a different question, about the parties, and it matters only after scope is settled. Once a transaction is inside Article 2, the status of one party or of both decides a handful of further questions. An implied warranty of merchantability arises if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind, and that is not the only time Article 2 applies a special rule for merchants.5 The written-confirmation exception to the statute of frauds operates in a sale of goods between merchants.6 Even good faith has a merchant definition in § 2-103(1)(b), which a jurisdiction deletes when it adopts the general definition in § 1-201(b)(20).7
Each provision sets its own requirement, so a party can be a merchant for one section and not for another. Section 2-104 supplies the vocabulary those sections draw on: “merchant” and “between merchants,” which sort parties by knowledge and skill,8 and “financing agency,” which sorts a party by its function in the payment chain.9 The sections below take the three terms in that order.
The Merchant Definition
Section 2-104(1) offers three routes to merchant status. A person is a merchant who
- deals in goods of the kind involved;
- otherwise, by occupation, holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction; or
- is charged with that knowledge or skill because he employs an agent, broker, or other intermediary who by occupation holds himself out as having it.10
The drafters placed the criteria in the alternative by joining them with or, so a person who satisfies any one of them is a merchant.11
The first route requires no expertise. A person who regularly sells inventory deals in goods, so the definition catches distributors, wholesalers, and retail dealers even when they know nothing about the particular product.12 People who “deal” in goods sell their inventory to consumers and other buyers, and a seller outside that pattern does not qualify. A thriving Wall Street lawyer who sells an old piano to Alice does not deal in pianos, so Alice receives no warranty of merchantability.13
The second route reaches people who may never sell the goods at all. The skill it requires can lie in the goods themselves, as with electricians, plumbers, carpenters, and boat builders,14 or in the practices of the transaction. Either experience or special knowledge is enough, and practically any person in business has one or the other so long as the person acts in a business capacity. The exception is a provision that asks for a “merchant with respect to goods of that kind,” such as § 2-314(1).15 A bank shows the route at work. It does not buy computers to resell them, so it does not deal in computers. But a bank that regularly buys computers for its operations could be a merchant for those purchases, because it has knowledge or skill relating to computers or to transactions for acquiring office equipment.16
The route has a floor. The official comment aims the definition at professionals in the field, as distinct from a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer, so an ordinary consumer who buys for personal use or sells a personal item in a casual sale is not a merchant.17 A business that buys goods for its own use, and not for resale, sits in between. It can be a merchant if the argument can be made that it has expertise relating to the goods or to transactions of that type, which turns on what the business has shown. The bank qualifies because it regularly buys computers; a business that merely consumes a product has shown less, and a court can ask whether it has any expertise at all.18 The commentary illustrates the question with Vanguard Energy Services, LLC v. Shihadeh.
The third route lends skill to a party that lacks it. Knowledge or skill may be attributed to a person who employs an agent, broker, or other intermediary who by occupation holds himself out as having it,19 so a principal who hands a transaction to an expert carries the expertise it hired.
Farmers test how far the definition stretches. A farmer who sells a crop fits neither the dealer nor the craftsperson of the standard examples, so courts ask a factual question. They consider how long the farmer has marketed products on the farm, how much business skill the farmer has shown in dealing with others, how well the farmer knows how farm markets operate, and how much experience the farmer has with the customs and practices unique to marketing the product sold.22 The farmer-as-merchant problem is the subject of Nelson v. Union Equity Co-operative Exchange.
Step three is where most disputes arise, because it asks how much a party must know, and the answer depends on the provision in play. The next section takes up how one party can be a merchant for one provision and not for another.
Practices Versus Goods Merchants
The word merchant does not name one fixed class for the whole Article. Comment 2 explains that professional status “may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be sufficient is indicated by the nature of the provisions.”24 Each provision therefore draws on the definition in its own way, and the working question in a problem is “a merchant for which rule?”
Provisions aimed at ordinary commercial dealing sit at the wide end. They presume familiarity with how business is done, not with a particular product, and practically any person acting in a business capacity has that familiarity.25 The comments observe that even banks and universities could conceivably be merchants under the written-confirmation exception: a university whose purchasing office orally agrees to buy copy paper from a local store would likely be a merchant if the store sent a confirmation meeting the requirements.26 The same reading governs § 2-207(2). Even a person that does not trade in the goods can be a merchant there if it is a “professional” user of them, as opposed to a “casual or inexperienced seller or buyer.”27
The firm-offer rule in § 2-205 tests the edge. A casebook asks whether a manufacturer that does not deal in goods of the kind can be bound to a firm offer when it buys or sells a piece of factory equipment. The answer depends on whether the manufacturer holds itself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices involved, and on which practices count.28
The implied warranty of merchantability sits at the narrow end. It is implied in a contract for sale “if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind.”29 That phrase takes the warranty out of the broad business-practices reading, because the rule that practically any person in business qualifies does not extend to provisions that ask for a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.30 The warranty descends from the nineteenth-century move in American law away from caveat emptor toward caveat venditor, which required a seller to answer for latent defects in goods sold, on the theory that fair dealing implied a guarantee that the product would conform to the description under which it was sold.31 The Code extends that guarantee to a seller who is a merchant with respect to the goods sold.
The dealing route carries the warranty even to a dealer with no expertise. A dealer that sells prepackaged goods containing a defect over which it has no control may be surprised to learn that it gave an implied warranty of merchantability, but that is the law.32 An isolated sale lies on the other side of the line. A person who places an ad in the local paper to sell a 2018 Honda Accord is not a merchant, and the neighbor who buys the car cannot sue for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.33
Entrustment is narrower still. Section 2-403 requires a “merchant that deals in goods of that kind,” which restricts the § 2-104 definition. The definition turns on a person’s skill or knowledge; § 2-403 concerns a narrower class based on appearances. A buyer who purchases from an apparent dealer expects to get good title, and that expectation facilitates exchange, because a buyer cannot ascertain a seller’s title without slowing commerce. One expects good title when buying a shiny new car from a General Motors dealer.34
Step two does the real work. The kind of knowledge a provision presumes explains why its class is wide or narrow, and it lets a student defend a result on facts that no case has decided.
Between Merchants
A transaction is “between merchants” when both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants.36 The definition creates no new class of persons. It applies the merchant test of § 2-104(1) to each side of the same deal,37 so one party’s status cannot carry a rule that needs both.
Article 2’s merchant rules fall into two groups, and the wording of each rule shows which group it joins. The warranty of merchantability looks only to the seller, who must be a merchant with respect to goods of the kind, so the buyer may be a consumer without changing the result.38 A rule that applies only “between merchants” requires both parties to qualify, and if either does not, the rule is unavailable.39
The written-confirmation exception is the central example. In a sale of goods between merchants, a writing sufficient to make the contract enforceable against the person who created it can be enforced against the other party if that party receives a copy and fails to object in writing within ten days.40 Because the rule takes away a recipient’s defense for staying silent, the Code insists that the recipient, as well as the sender, be a merchant. The exception also addresses only the writing requirement. Article 2 forms contracts liberally, in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including by conduct, and it does not require a court to find the exact moment of formation,41 so a contract can exist before any writing does.
The filter is less demanding than the phrase suggests. For provisions aimed at ordinary business conduct, practically any person acting in a business capacity qualifies as a merchant,42 and the comments observe that even a bank or a university could conceivably qualify.43 The requirement therefore screens out chiefly consumers and other parties who are not acting in a business capacity, and an exam problem that wants the exception to fail will usually supply exactly such a party.
The exception works as intended in a commentary illustration involving Spacely and Astro. Astro receives Spacely’s memo and fails to object in writing within ten days. No one at Astro signed the memo, yet it satisfies the Statute of Frauds against Astro.44
A confirmation can also fail between two merchants, which shows that status is one gate among several. In Lindell v. Belville, a merchant argued that his bank’s wire instructions, which accompanied a money wire to another merchant, satisfied the exception, and the court rejected the argument because the recipient had “no reason to know of the contents of this internal bank document.”45 Two merchants and a writing still lose if the recipient was never in a position to read what the writing said.
Satisfying the statute of frauds also does not prove that a contract was made. Astro’s failure to respond takes away its defense of the Statute of Frauds, but the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally before the written confirmation is unaffected.46 Astro could still deny on the merits that the telephone call produced an agreement, and the confirmation would then be evidence for Spacely to weigh against that denial.
The same status question governs § 2-207(2), which requires that the transaction be “between merchants.” Both parties must be merchants, and if either is not, that ends the matter: the proposed terms do not become part of the contract, even if none of the other exclusions applies.47
Financing Agencies
Alongside the merchant definitions, § 2-104(2) names a third role that later provisions refer to by name: the financing agency. The Code defines it as a bank, finance company, or other person who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or documents of title, or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer intervenes in the ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the contract for sale.49 A document of title, such as a bill of lading, stands for goods in transit or in storage, so a lender who advances against one is lending against the goods themselves. For now, you need only recognize the role when it appears, because the provisions that use the term belong to later remedies discussions.
The definition has two entrances. The first is the advance: a person who regularly lends against goods or against the documents that represent them qualifies. The second is intervention in payment, and the statute gives examples of it: purchasing or paying the seller’s draft, making advances against the draft, or merely taking it for collection, whether or not documents of title accompany it.50 A draft is an order, typically drawn by the seller on the buyer, to pay a stated sum. The word merely matters, because it brings in even the least involved participant, a bank that forwards the draft for collection and advances nothing of its own.
The definition closes by including a bank or other person who similarly intervenes between persons in the position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods, and it cross-refers to § 2-707.51 That reference marks where Article 2’s remedies provisions pick the role up again.
The Code names this role separately because a financier’s place is neither the seller’s nor the buyer’s, and it does not depend on knowing anything about the goods. A bank that advances against a shipment of steel need not deal in steel or hold itself out as skilled in steel practices, and those are the tests for a merchant under § 2-104(1).52 The financing agency is defined by what it does. Payment itself runs on ordinary-course practice: tender of payment is sufficient by any means or in any manner consistent with the ordinary course of business, unless the seller demands legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably necessary to procure it.53 The financing agency is a party placed in that ordinary course, by lending against the goods or documents or by stepping into the payment between seller and buyer.
The fact pattern that signals the role is a third party, neither seller nor buyer, who handles money or documents for a particular sale: a bank honoring a draft, a finance company advancing against shipped goods, or a collecting bank. A common mistake is to treat any lender to a party as a financing agency, when the lender must be connected to the goods, the documents, or the payment under the contract for sale.