Concept
Does Article 2 Apply?
Identification of goods
Goods, Merchants, and Identification
Does Article 2 Apply?
Every Article 2 rule matters only if Article 2 governs the deal in front of you. A contract that is a sale of goods falls under the Article, and a contract that is not falls to the common law.1 The classification has consequences. An implied warranty may arise if the transaction is a sale of goods and may not if it is not; a signed writing may be required for a sale of goods and not otherwise; and the limitations period may differ.2 Scope therefore comes first, before any question about performance or remedies.
Section 2-102(1) supplies the test. Unless the context otherwise requires, and except as provided in subsection (3), Article 2 applies to transactions in goods; for a hybrid transaction, it applies to the extent provided in subsection (2).3 That one sentence raises three questions, which the sections below take in order: what kind of transaction brings Article 2 in, what the statute excludes even when goods are involved, and what happens when a single contract mixes goods with something else.
Transactions in Goods
Article 2 reaches a deal because of what changes hands, not because of who stands on either side of it. When a contract is a sale of goods, Article 2 applies irrespective of who the parties are; the nature of the transaction, not the attributes or occupation of the parties, is determinative.4 Although the Code is called commercial, a consumer who buys a car from a dealer, an airline that buys a jet from its manufacturer, and a neighbor who buys a bicycle at a yard sale have each made an Article 2 contract. Each deal passes title to a movable thing for a price.5 Merchant status still counts, but only in the particular sections that single out merchants and give special rules when one or both parties qualify.6
The statute's word is 'transaction,' not 'sale,' and the difference matters at the margins. A sale has two essential characteristics: title passes from seller to buyer, and the buyer pays a price that may be money or something else.7 'Transaction' is the broader word, and the text of § 2-102 invites a reading that stretches past sales, although most Article 2 sections, the warranty provisions among them, speak literally only of sales.8 In practice, the transactions Article 2 governs are sales of goods.9
Kaspers v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. tests that edge. A manufacturer gave a clinical-trial participant an implanted medical device, and when the participant sued on implied-warranty theories, the manufacturer argued that it had never sold the device. The court looked at the exchange itself: the participant gave consideration by taking part in the trial and received the device in return, which made the arrangement a transaction in goods. The absence of a money price did not take the deal outside Article 2.
Applying Article 2 does not switch the common law off. Under § 1-103(b), principles of law and equity supplement the Code unless a particular provision displaces them.10 The drafters did not try to write an exhaustive set of formation rules; Article 2 makes a limited number of changes against a common-law backdrop, and it does not redefine consideration.11 The Code also never defines an offer, so the common-law requirements of an offer continue to govern a sale of goods.12 When Article 2 speaks to a problem, then, its provision controls, and when it is silent, the common law supplies the answer.
What Article 2 Excludes
Section 2-102(1) makes the scope rule conditional, because Article 2 applies to transactions in goods 'except as provided in subsection (3).'14 Subsection (3) supplies two limits. Article 2 does not apply to a transaction that, though in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or a present sale, operates only to create a security interest; and it does not impair or repeal a statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers.15 The version of § 2-102 that predates the hybrid language states the same two limits.16 The remaining limits come from the definition of goods and from bodies of law that already cover the deal: leases, some international sales, and contracts for land or services.17
Each limit sends the deal to a body of law built for it. Because the question in every case is what the deal actually does, and because the parties' label does not answer it, the four checks below are best run in order before any Article 2 rule is applied.
The first check turns on function. A deal in the form of an unconditional contract to sell, or a present sale, still falls outside Article 2 when it operates only to create a security interest.18 A borrower who grants a bank a security interest in a painting the borrower already owns has bought and sold nothing, so Article 9 supplies the governing rules, including those on validity, perfection, and foreclosure, and Article 2 has no work to do.19 A buyer who purchases a car from a dealer, finances the price through the dealer, and signs a security agreement stands elsewhere, because that deal contains a genuine sale. Article 2 governs the sale, including warranties and remedies, while Article 9 governs the security aspect, including perfection and priority of the dealer's interest.20
Two phrasings are easy to blur. 'Article 2 does not apply' describes the painting loan, where nothing exists apart from the security. 'Article 2 applies to the sale and Article 9 applies too' describes the financed car, where the security interest secures the unpaid price of a real sale. The question that separates them is whether the parties made a real sale of goods apart from the security arrangement.
The second check follows from what a sale is. A sale passes title for a price, while a lease transfers the right to possess and use goods for a period in return for consideration; a sale, or the retention or creation of a security interest, is not a lease.21 Because the definition of goods is tied to a contract for sale, a true lease falls outside Article 2 and under Article 2A, whose provisions are in many respects modeled on Article 2.22
The difficulty arises with the false lease. The line between a lease and a secured sale matters in other contexts, bankruptcy for one, so the label cannot settle it.23 The statutory definition of 'lease' excludes a transaction that is labeled a lease but is in fact a disguised sale with a reserved security interest. The supposed lessor is treated as a seller and the lessee as a buyer, and the entire transaction is subject to Article 2 as well as Article 9.24
Section 1-203 supplies the test. It sets a bright line: a transaction that satisfies it is a secured sale, not a lease. A transaction that fails the bright line is not automatically a lease, however, because courts then look to the economic realities of the deal.25 A working rule of thumb asks whether the lessor can be expected to take the goods back at the end of the term. If so, the deal is a true lease. If the goods will probably never return, it is a sale disguised as a lease, and two common signs are an option to buy for a very small sum compared with the goods' real value and a term that runs past the goods' useful life.26
The standard illustration is a copy machine. Acme contracts with CopyCo for a machine it plans to use in its business, and the deal may be either a lease or a secured sale, depending on its terms.27 If the contract lets Acme buy the machine at the end of the term for a nominal sum, Acme will exercise the option, and the rent paid over the term has probably covered the machine's full value. CopyCo is then a seller and Acme a buyer, Article 2 governs the sale aspects, Article 9 governs the security aspects, and Article 2A drops out.28
Monthly payments of the same size can appear in a true lease and in a disguised sale, so the classification turns on who keeps the economic stake in the goods when the term ends.
The third check hands some international sales to a treaty. The CISG excludes certain sales from its own coverage, and the parties may opt out of it and provide that the UCC governs their contract.29 For an international sale, then, the first question is whether the Convention covers the deal; if it does, it governs unless the parties have opted out, and an express opt-out returns the sale to the UCC.
The fourth check gathers deals that involve no sale of a movable thing. Article 2 does not apply to sales of real property or to contracts for services, and common-law rules govern both.30 The definition of goods explains why. It requires a movable 'thing,' so a repudiated contract to build a desk falls within Article 2, while a repudiated contract to build a house does not, because no movable thing is involved.31 The same definition leaves out the money in which the price is paid, investment securities, and things in action, which a later section takes up.32 A contract that mixes goods with a service raises a separate problem, which the next section addresses.
The last item in subsection (3) does not remove the sale from Article 2 at all. Article 2 does not impair or repeal a statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers, or other specified classes of buyers.33 Article 2 still governs the sale, and the protective statute operates alongside it. Article 2 may govern the warranty terms while the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or another state consumer law governs the door-to-door aspects of the sale. State and federal legislation on farmers and agricultural products, statutes controlling the transfer of title to automobiles or aircraft, and local statutes on the sale of pets and domestic animals work the same way. When the two bodies of law conflict, the other statute typically controls.34 A consumer who buys a defective car from a dealer therefore has an Article 2 claim for the sale and may have further statutory claims, and a lawyer must look for both.35
An excluded contract is not left wholly without guidance from Article 2. Even when the transaction does not involve a sale of goods, a court may apply Article 2's rules by analogy to fill a gap in the common law.36 Courts have tended to do the same where Article 8 does not deal with a matter.37 Analogy is not application, however: the excluded contract remains governed by its own law, and Article 2 serves only as a source of reasoning.
Hybrid Transactions
Many contracts combine a sale of goods with something that is not one. Section 2-102(1) does not answer yes or no for them; it provides that, for a hybrid transaction, Article 2 applies to the extent provided in subsection (2).39 In plain terms, a hybrid transaction is one contract that mixes a sale of goods with services, installation, or another obligation that is not a sale of goods, such as the purchase and installation of a water heater.40 Subsection (2) is part of the 2022 amendments and appears last in this section. Most of the working doctrine to date comes from judicial decisions, and those decisions still govern wherever the amendments have not been enacted.
Hybrids are hard because the remedies available may turn on whether the product or the service caused the problem. Did the water heater leak because it was defective or because it was installed badly?41 The answer decides which body of law supplies the implied warranty, the writing requirement, and the limitations period.42
Most courts handle the question by asking what the contract as a whole is mainly for. In the leading case, Bonebrake v. Cox, the court held that Article 2 applied to a lump-sum contract for the sale and installation of used bowling equipment even though the contract involved substantial labor, and it framed the test in terms of the transaction's predominant factor.43 The reasoning was that the things sold were tangible items, normally in the flow of commerce and portable at the time of the contract, and that they are no less goods because service plays a role in their ultimate use; as one court put it, the Code contains no such exception.44 Treating the contract as a single unit means that one body of law governs all of it. A minor service component therefore cannot pull an ordinary sale out of Article 2.
Decisions applying the predominant-purpose test weigh four features of the contract.
Audio Visual Artistry v. Tanzer shows all four features pointing toward goods. The contract called the customer a purchaser and spoke of equipment, delivery, and goods. The installer made its living selling components that other companies manufactured, the customer wanted the equipment, and the equipment made up most of the price. Installation was incidental to a sale, so Article 2 governed.
Kaitz v. Landscape Creations, Inc. involved a similar mix, tangible things placed on a customer's property by a contractor, and came out the other way. The trees, plants, and shrubs were goods, but the project was extensive and ran for months, the work was labor-intensive (design, grading the soil, preparing and mulching plant beds), and the contractor was a full-service landscaping company rather than a nursery. The court found the predominant purpose to be service, so the contract fell outside Article 2. What separates the two decisions is what each customer bought: one bought equipment and paid for its installation, the other bought the transformation of a property, with plants as the raw material.
Specially manufactured goods count as goods,45 so the labor that goes into making the very thing the buyer ordered does not by itself pull a contract away from Article 2. If Acme contracts with Omega to manufacture a machine to Acme's specifications, the machine is a good. The production of goods involves services, and the mere fact that some service is involved in manufacturing does not mean that Article 2 does not apply.46 The 2022 comment draws the same line, attributing services in manufacturing, but not in designing, the goods to the sale-of-goods aspects of the transaction.47 The line is harder to draw when the contract buys the labor itself. A contract for an artist to paint a portrait of the family matriarch is probably a service contract, because the predominant nature of the deal is the artist's service even though a finished painting changes hands. Buying an already completed painting displayed at the artist's studio is a sale of goods.48
A minority of jurisdictions looked instead at the specific portion of the contract that caused the harm, a method called the gravamen-of-the-harm test.49 Applied to the water heater, a leak traced to a defective heater points to the sale of goods, while a leak traced to poor installation points to the service. The test answers a real concern, since remedies may turn on whether the product or the service caused the problem,50 but it has largely disappeared from recent case law. Courts in former gravamen jurisdictions now speak in terms of the predominant-purpose test, sometimes without acknowledging a shift in approach.51
The 2022 amendments move the hybrid question from case law into the statute. Rather than leaving hybrids to the common law, they add a definition of 'hybrid transaction' in § 2-106(5), new language in § 2-102 on when Article 2 applies, and a comment with a non-exclusive list of factors for deciding whether the sale-of-goods aspects predominate.52 The Code is the joint product of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and it takes effect through enactment by each state.53 A state's hybrid rule therefore depends on whether it has enacted the amendments, and elsewhere the case-law test continues to govern.
Subsection (2) sorts hybrids into two cases. If the sale-of-goods aspects predominate, Article 2 applies to the transaction, but it does not preclude application, in appropriate circumstances, of other law to aspects that do not relate to the sale of goods.54 If the sale-of-goods aspects do not predominate, only the provisions of Article 2 that relate primarily to the sale-of-goods aspects apply, and the provisions that relate primarily to the transaction as a whole do not.55
Neither branch is all-or-nothing. Under the predominant-purpose cases, a court treats the contract as a single unit, and one body of law governs all of it. The amended text lets Article 2 reach the goods part of a service-dominated deal and lets other law reach the non-goods part of a goods-dominated one, which meets the concern that drove the gravamen test. Predominance remains the entry point, though, so the question of which aspects predominate still decides which branch applies.