Concept
Outside Limits on Disclaimers
Exclusion or modification of warranties
Outside Limits on Disclaimers
Section 2-316 gives a seller a checklist for each kind of warranty, and the preceding sections worked through it route by route. To exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, the language must mention merchantability and, if written, be conspicuous; to exclude the implied warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be a conspicuous writing.1 Subsection (3) adds three general routes: expressions such as “as is” or “with all faults,” the buyer’s examination of the goods or refusal to examine them, and course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade.2 Express warranties follow a separate rule: the seller’s promise and its limiting words are read together wherever reasonable, and the limit yields when the two cannot be reconciled.3 (The warranty of title lies outside §2-316 altogether; it can be excluded only by specific language or by circumstances that give the buyer reason to know the seller does not claim title or sells only such right as it or a third person may have.4) Absent specific language or circumstances excluding them, the Code reads implied warranties into a sale of goods, so a seller that satisfies the route fitting the warranty at issue has, as far as §2-316 is concerned, kept that warranty from arising.5 Does satisfying §2-316 end the analysis?
It does not, because each test in §2-316 asks a narrow question about notice. A required word, conspicuous print, an expression like “as is,” a completed inspection, and an established course of dealing all help show that the buyer could learn a warranty was missing. None asks whether the term is fair in the setting where the seller imposed it, whether a legislature has barred sellers of a particular kind of goods from using it, or when the clause entered the transaction. Each gap is real. A clause in bold capitals above the signature line passes every typographical test even when the buyer had no power to bargain over it. A seller can satisfy the section in every particular and still sell to a consumer in a state whose statute forbids the disclaimer. A clause printed on a card inside the shipping carton can be perfectly conspicuous and still have arrived after the bargain was made. Visibility is the protection the Code chose against surprise; the doctrines below address the risks that visibility leaves untouched.
Three outside limits follow, each aimed at one of those gaps. Unconscionability lets a court refuse to enforce a term that is oppressive or unfairly one-sided, and the next subsection asks whether it reaches a disclaimer that complies with §2-316, directly or through the Code’s remedy rules. Consumer statutes, state and federal, restrict what a seller may disclaim in a consumer sale. Timing requires a disclaimer to be part of the agreement made during the bargaining, so a disclaimer first delivered after the sale meets the objection that it was never part of the bargain. In working a problem, treat the conclusion that a clause satisfies §2-316 as the midpoint, and run all three checks before calling the warranty disclaimed.
Unconscionability and Disclaimers
A seller that follows §2-316(2) has done what that section asks: the language mentions merchantability where it must, and a written disclaimer is conspicuous.6 Article 2 still carries a second, general check. Under §2-302(1), a court that finds a contract or any clause of it unconscionable when made may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the rest without the offending clause, or limit the clause so as to avoid an unconscionable result. Courts divide over whether that power reaches a disclaimer that already satisfies §2-316, because they read §2-316 differently: some treat it as the only test a disclaimer must pass, and others treat it as the first of two.7
The two doctrines overlap without coinciding. Section 2-316 aims to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer, and each of its routes works to make sure the buyer sees what is being surrendered.8 Article 2 never defines unconscionability, but Comment 1 to §2-302 describes the target as one-sided clauses, states the goal as preventing oppression and unfair surprise, and disclaims any intent to disturb allocations of risk that merely reflect superior bargaining power. Surprise therefore appears in both tests, while oppression appears only in the second. The difference matters because a buyer can see a clause in bold capitals above the signature line and still have no power to bargain over it; consumers of new products know little about a product’s dangers and have minimal say over its terms.9
The preemption view holds that §2-316 is self-contained, so a disclaimer is tested only against that section.10 Its proponents make three arguments. The first is textual silence: §2-316 authorizes disclaimers in detail and never mentions unconscionability, although nine other sections of Article 2 cross-refer to §2-302.11 The second turns on a neighboring provision. Section 2-719(3) expressly conditions limits on consequential damages on their conscionability, while Comment 3 to §2-719 says the seller “in all cases is free to disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section 2–316.”12 The third argument is subtler. If the principal purpose of §2-316 is to protect buyers from surprise, and that purpose overlaps §2-302’s concern with oppression and unfair surprise, then §2-316 already contains whatever policing of disclaimers the Code needs.13
The two-hoop view requires a disclaimer to clear both §2-316 and §2-302, and its proponents answer each argument in turn.14 Section 2-302 reaches “any clause of the contract,” and nothing in it exempts a clause that another section regulates in detail; likewise, nothing in §2-316 declares conforming disclaimers immune from general policing.15 Comment 1 to §2-302 illustrates the section with ten decided cases, and seven involve disclaimers denied full effect, which is hard to square with a drafters’ intent to leave disclaimers alone.16 Above all, §2-316 guards against surprise but does nothing about one-sided oppression. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. shows the point: a new Plymouth lost steering ten days after purchase, with 469 miles on the odometer, and smashed into a brick wall with the buyer’s wife at the wheel, and the New Jersey court refused to enforce the warranty disclaimer on public-policy grounds.17 Procedural unfairness, a defect in how the term was presented, is hard to find where §2-316 has been satisfied. Substantive unfairness, a term that is itself lopsided, is easy to imagine whenever a powerful seller imposes a one-sided or oppressive disclaimer on a buyer.18
The courts are as divided as the commentators. Some decisions clearly favor preemption; others suggest that §2-302 may invalidate a disclaimer that complies with §2-316.19 A Virginia court sided with preemption when it declined to follow Henningsen and upheld a new-car disclaimer. Any overriding public policy, it reasoned, would have been known to the legislature when it adopted the Code, and the legislature had still specified in §2-316 how an implied warranty may be excluded.20 On the other side, the Third Circuit in Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co. upheld the implied-warranty claim of a buyer of day-old chicks and suggested that even a clause specifically disclaiming the risk might not shield a seller whose goods proved worthless.21 In Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, a New York court held that a disclaimer of merchantability was not sufficiently conspicuous to a buyer who could not read English and was therefore ineffective under §2-316. The Fifth Circuit, in Koch Supplies, Inc. v. Farm Fresh Meats, Inc., noted in dicta how helpful it would be to have evidence, such as the buyer’s initialing a warranty exclusion clause, that the buyer understood he was paying $57,000 for a smokehouse that was not required to be operable.22 None of these decisions strikes down a disclaimer that strictly conforms to §2-316. A survey of the cases found that clauses struck as unconscionable “disclaimers” were generally remedy limitations in disguise, governed by §2-719(3) and not §2-316, and it found no case holding a strictly conforming disclaimer actually unconscionable, although several decisions suggest one may be.23 The debate has so far produced more statements about what a court could do than decisions doing it.
Buyers who doubt that §2-302 will carry the day have a second route that sidesteps the debate over §2-316. Section 2-719(3) provides that consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable, that limiting consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, and that limiting damages where the loss is commercial is not.24 Some plaintiffs therefore ask courts to nullify §2-316 disclaimers under this remedy provision instead of §2-302.25 The route works because of what an effective disclaimer does to an injured buyer. By preventing the warranty from arising, the disclaimer leaves no breach and therefore no consequential damages at all, including the damages for injury to the person that the statute singles out.26 A buyer who attacks that result under §2-719(3) borrows the statute’s presumption. The buyer shows the two facts the text names, a personal injury and consumer goods, and the seller must then rebut the presumption, whereas under §2-302 the buyer would have to build a showing of oppression from the ground up. The line the statute draws tracks the Code’s assumption that merchants can inform themselves and bargain effectively, which an injured consumer usually cannot do.27
In Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, a buyer was killed when a defective axle caused a new truck to turn over. The manufacturer’s warranty disclaimed the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness and offered only repair or replacement, and the court held that letting the disclaimer bar damages for the wrongful death would be unconscionable under §2-719(3).28 The decision rests on the remedy provision and leaves open what §2-302 alone could have done, so it illustrates the §2-719(3) route without resolving the preemption debate. It carries weight because the loss was a death, the kind of injury to the person that the statute presumes unconscionable to limit.
A problem on this topic is best worked in a fixed order.
Two opposite errors are common. One treats compliance with §2-316 as the end of every problem, and the other assumes that any harsh disclaimer is automatically struck. The accurate answer presents the split, identifies which facts feed a §2-719(3) presumption, and then applies whichever view the jurisdiction follows.
Consumer Statutes
A seller that names merchantability in a conspicuous writing satisfies what §2-316(2) requires for that warranty.30 When the buyer is a consumer, though, legislatures have added rules that apply on top of the Code and operate whether or not the seller met §2-316. Two of them restrict what a seller may disclaim: state anti-disclaimer statutes, which either amend §2-316 or sit in separate consumer laws, and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. A third body of law, the state consumer-protection acts, targets deception and ignores the content of the warranty altogether. A form that passes every test in §2-316 can therefore be unenforceable in a particular consumer sale, which makes the identity of the buyer and the presence of a written warranty the first facts to look for.
These overlays answer a gap between what §2-316 tests and what consumers experience. The safe harbor for merchantability turns on a single legal word, and that word tells the average consumer almost nothing about what is being given up; the safe harbor virtually ensures that almost all consumers, after a serious product accident, will be amazed to discover that they “consensually” bargained away their most important rights.31 One reported decision shows the problem. A buyer was severely injured when a steering defect in his 14-month-old car sent it off a bridge and onto the street below. His 12-month, 12,000-mile express warranty had expired, and the sales contract disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability in accordance with §2-316(2). A one-year statute of limitations barred his tort claims, and the properly drawn disclaimer barred his warranty claim.32 Legislatures answered in two ways: some states prohibited disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer sales outright, and Congress in 1976 enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which sharply limited a seller’s ability to disclaim implied warranties in most significant consumer sales.33
State anti-disclaimer statutes take several forms. At least fifteen states and the District of Columbia restrict disclaimers or remedy limitations in consumer sales, and most do so by amending their versions of §2-316, §2-719, or both, while a few, including California and Kansas, place the restriction in broader consumer statutes.34 Connecticut shows the strongest form. Its added subsection makes unenforceable any language, oral or written, by which a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods attempts to exclude or modify the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or the consumer’s remedies for their breach.35 Other states are narrower. Alabama provides that nothing in subsection (2), subsection (3)(a), or the succeeding section limits or excludes the seller’s liability for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods.36 New Hampshire nullifies a disclaimer of implied warranties in personal, family, and household goods unless the seller gives the buyer, before or at the time of sale, a clear, simple, concise, and conspicuous writing, signed by the buyer, stating that the goods are sold “as is” or “with all faults,” that the entire risk as to quality and performance rests with the buyer, and that the buyer bears the entire cost of repair if the goods are defective.37
Because the statutes differ in coverage, the text of the controlling statute decides the problem, and an answer should say which kind of statute the facts supply before applying it.
The federal Act restricts disclaimers through a different trigger. It does not require a seller to give any warranty, but it imposes obligations on a supplier who chooses to give a written warranty, or a service contract, on a consumer product above a small price threshold.38 The Act does not generally supplant the Code provisions on warranties, but it applies to consumer buyers and to consumer products, which it defines as tangible personal property.39 Under its §108, no supplier may disclaim or modify any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to a consumer product if the supplier makes a written warranty to the consumer, or if the supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer that applies to the product at the time of sale or within 90 days afterward. The restriction applies even though state law authorizes the disclaimer under §2-316.40 The structure of the rule explains its purpose. A seller remains free to give no written warranty and rely on §2-316, but a seller who offers a written warranty, which usually helps to sell the product, cannot use the same document to strip away the baseline protection the law supplies. Without that bar, a form could advertise a warranty on its front and withdraw the implied warranties in a sentence saying the seller makes no other warranties, leaving the buyer with only what the seller chose to write down.
Whether the Act applies depends on its own definition of a written warranty, which is narrower than the Code’s definition of an express warranty. The Act covers a written affirmation of fact or written promise, made in connection with the sale of a consumer product, that relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms that the product is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, and it also covers a written undertaking to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action if the product fails to meet stated specifications. Two differences matter. The warranty must be in writing, so a seller who pulls a sample from stock and shows it makes an express warranty of conformity to the sample under §2-313 but has made no written warranty under the Act. The affirmation must also be tied to a specified period of time, so the energy-efficiency label on a dryer is an express warranty under the Code yet is not a written warranty under the Act, because it promises no level of performance over a stated period. Sellers of the sample and of the labeled dryer keep the ordinary §2-316 analysis, while a seller who adds a one-year repair-or-replace promise to the same dryer has given a written warranty and triggers the federal restriction.
Once a written warranty exists, its label decides how much of the implied warranties survives. The Act requires the warrantor to designate the warranty as either a “full (statement of duration) warranty” or a “limited warranty,” and it requires the warranty’s terms to be disclosed fully, conspicuously, and clearly before purchase.41 A full warranty must meet federal minimum standards, among them an effective procedure for timely repair or replacement or a refund. Those standards also forbid the warrantor to limit the duration of any implied warranty, and that prohibition holds even when the written warranty itself runs for a limited term; they further forbid excluding or limiting consequential damages unless the exclusion is conspicuous and on the face of the written warranty.42 A limited warranty, the label a supplier uses when it does not meet those standards, cannot exclude the implied warranties completely, because a complete exclusion is void.43 What a limited warranty may do is limit the duration of the implied warranties to the term of the written warranty, but only if the limit is reasonable, conscionable, set forth in clear and unmistakable language, and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty; a limit that fails any one of those requirements is void. Tying the implied warranty’s length to the written one gives the buyer at least as much implied coverage as the seller was willing to promise in writing, and the four conditions keep a seller from writing a limit so short that it becomes a disguised exclusion. A one-month limited warranty on a refrigerator shows the concern: refrigerators are expected to last far longer, so limiting both express and implied warranties to thirty days may be viewed as an effort to make the consumer believe the warranty is worth more than it is, and the limit would be ineffective under both federal and state law.44
The bar on complete exclusion shows up in a simple refrigerator sale. The seller gives a “limited warranty” against defects in materials and workmanship, promising repair or replacement of defects reported within one year, and adds a conspicuous sentence saying the seller makes no other warranties, express or implied. The buyer relied on the seller to recommend a refrigerator that would meet the buyer’s particular requirements and later finds that it does not, so the buyer sues for breach of the implied warranty of fitness. Even if the added sentence would satisfy §2-316(2), the seller’s written warranty precludes an otherwise effective disclaimer, and the fitness claim goes forward.45
The Act changes what a disclaimer can do, but it does not enlarge the warranty that state law supplies. Two buyers of similar SUVs hold identical limited three-year, 36,000-mile warranties that limit all implied warranties to the same term, and each is injured four years after purchase. The first buyer’s original fan belt breaks, his engine overheats and stalls, and a truck hits his vehicle from behind. He probably has no claim: the express warranty has expired, a fan belt might not fairly be expected to last four years, and the implied warranty of merchantability had probably run out under state law before the accident, so the federal Act never comes into play. The second buyer’s steering, which no mechanic had touched, locks, and her vehicle leaves the highway and strikes a tree. She keeps her claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, because steering should last far longer than three or four years, and an attempt to cut that warranty to three years is unreasonable and unconscionable and therefore void. Her recovery comes from state warranty law, since the Act creates no new remedy for injured plaintiffs in ordinary products liability litigation.46
A last body of law stands apart from warranty doctrine. State consumer-protection acts prohibit unfair or deceptive acts and practices, and a disclaimer that is valid under §2-316 does not defeat a claim under them. In Morris v. Mack’s Used Cars, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that disclaimers permitted by the state’s version of §2-316 may limit or modify the liability the Code would otherwise impose, but that they do not defeat separate causes of action under the state Consumer Protection Act.47 The court reasoned from the text of both statutes: the Code lets principles of law and equity, including fraud and misrepresentation, supplement its provisions, and the Act declares its remedies cumulative of all others and forbids contracts to limit or waive its own provisions. Letting a seller avoid liability for deceptive practices by disclaiming contractual warranties, the court added, would contravene the Act’s broad remedial purpose, and it pointed to Paty v. Herb Adcox Chevrolet Co., where a seller’s failure to tell a buyer that a vehicle had been in an accident and repaired violated the Act.48 The two claims ask different questions. A warranty claim asks what the seller promised, and a disclaimer removes promises the law would otherwise supply, while a deceptive-practices claim asks what the seller did, and a disclaimer of promises says nothing about whether the seller deceived the buyer. The holding is one state’s reading of its own statute, and consumer-protection acts vary in coverage and remedies, so an answer should treat the claim as a separate theory pleaded alongside the warranty claim and not as a way of reviving a disclaimed warranty.
A disclaimer that survives these checks must still have been part of the agreement when the sale was made, a timing limit taken up next.
Disclaimers After the Sale
Section 2-316(2) tells a seller how a disclaimer of implied warranties must be worded and displayed: the language must mention merchantability to exclude that warranty and, if written, be conspicuous, and a fitness exclusion must be a conspicuous writing.52 Those instructions assume the disclaimer is part of the sale it qualifies, and sellers do not always meet that assumption. They place disclaimers in owners’ manuals, on postcards and invoices, inside product packaging, and in other materials the buyer cannot reach until after the purchase. Courts generally nullify these post-sale disclaimers, and the two reasons they give both turn on when the bargain was made.53
The first reason concerns conspicuousness. A term is conspicuous only if a reasonable person against whom it operates ought to have noticed it, and a clause sealed in a carton the buyer has not yet opened cannot have been noticed when the parties contracted, however large its type. The second reason is more basic: the clause is not part of the contract the parties made. A contract fixes its terms when the parties agree, so a term that first appears afterward is in substance a proposal to change a deal already struck. To validate it, the seller generally must satisfy the modification rules of §2-209, which call for the seller’s good faith, the buyer’s agreement, and possibly the buyer’s signature.54 Those conditions explain the result. A buyer who has already paid and carried the goods home has lost the leverage to bargain, and a seller that withheld the clause until then will rarely show that the buyer agreed to it. In a typical consumer sale the seller cannot satisfy all three conditions, so a post-sale disclaimer normally has no effect on the warranty claim of a consumer injured by a defective product.
The same timing limit governs express warranties. A disclaimer of an express warranty is ineffective if it does not become part of the basis of the bargain, so one printed in a writing that reaches the buyer only after the sale has no effect.55 A seller who conditions an express warranty on the return of a registration card, through a writing inside the product’s packaging, has not made that condition part of the original agreement. Neither has a seller who limits express warranties by a form placed in the glove compartment of a new car delivered after the sales contract was executed.56 The connection to subsection (1) is direct. That subsection reads the seller’s promise and its limiting words together, and it can do so only when both belong to the bargain, so a disclaimer outside the bargain never reaches the comparison and the promise stands.57
The software license cases show the circumstances in which terms that surface after the buyer has paid can nonetheless bind. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the license terms came with the boxed software and were also displayed on the screen when the program ran, and the program would not proceed until the user indicated acceptance. The Seventh Circuit enforced the license. It reasoned that §2-204(1) lets a contract for the sale of goods be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, that a vendor as master of the offer may propose that using the software after a chance to read the license counts as acceptance, and that a buyer who disliked the terms could return the package.58 The court distinguished a consumer who opens a package and finds an insert demanding an extra $10,000, because any buyer can prevent formation of a contract by sending the package back.59
What separates that case from the glove-compartment form is whether the buyer could still say no when the terms appeared. In ProCD the seller arranged the transaction so that the buyer’s commitment came after the terms were visible, and the buyer’s use of the program after seeing them was the acceptance. In the car sale the commitment came first, and the paper that followed was an attempt to rewrite a deal already made. The software case therefore teaches when later-revealed terms can become part of a contract still in formation. It involved a license restricting use of the product and not a warranty disclaimer, and the same opinion observes that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must still be conspicuous under §2-316(2).60 It leaves the general rule intact for the consumer who has paid, taken the goods, and has no chance to undo the purchase.