Concept
Examination of the Goods
Exclusion or modification of warranties
Examination of the Goods
Where an as-is clause works through what the seller says, §2-316(3)(b) works through what the buyer does before the sale.1 The provision reads:
when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.2
Three working parts carry the rule. Two triggers set it off: a full examination, or a refusal to examine. A timing requirement fixes the moment, because the buyer must act before the contract is made. A limit on reach confines the loss to the defects an examination ought to have shown.
Subsection (2) opens with the words “Subject to subsection (3)” and demands that a merchantability disclaimer mention merchantability and be conspicuous, and that a fitness exclusion be in a conspicuous writing.3 Paragraph (b) demands no particular word and no conspicuous print. A seller whose written disclaimer failed those formalities may therefore still point to what the buyer examined.
The paragraph speaks only of implied warranties, and it speaks of them without qualification. It can strip the warranty of merchantability, which §2-314 implies in a sale by a merchant unless excluded or modified under §2-316,4 and the warranty of fitness alike, as to the covered defects. Section 2-314 includes no explicit requirement that the buyer rely on the merchantability warranty, yet §2-316(3)(b) removes that warranty as to defects an examination ought to have revealed.5 The warranty of title lies outside every §2-316(3) method; it may be modified or excluded only by specific language, by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know that the seller does not claim title in himself, or by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know that the seller is selling only such right or title as he or a third person may have.6
An exclusion under (b) is a disclaimer in the full sense. It keeps the warranty from arising as to the covered defects, so nothing remains for the seller to breach, whereas the remedy limits of §§2-718 and 2-719 assume a valid warranty that was breached and regulate only what the buyer may recover.7
A buyer’s own look can do this work because of why implied warranties exist. The warranty of merchantability, the most general of the Code’s warranties of quality, rests on the likelihood that a merchant dealing in goods of the kind holds information about them that the buyer lacks.8 A buyer who has examined the goods has closed that gap for whatever the examination shows, and a buyer who refused to look has chosen to rely on personal judgment instead of the seller’s. Neither can be surprised by the defects an examination would have shown, and surprise is what the disclaimer rules exist to prevent. The Official Comment to §2-316 permits exclusion of implied warranties by conspicuous language “or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise,”9 and Comment 8 names the buyer’s examination as one such circumstance: warranties “may be excluded or modified by the circumstances where the buyer examines the goods or a sample or model of them before entering into the contract.”10
The subsections below take up the paragraph’s questions in the order its text raises them: what counts as an examination before contracting, what counts as a refusal, and which defects the exclusion reaches. Paragraph (c), which lets course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade exclude or modify an implied warranty,11 follows in the next section.
Examination Before Contracting
The first trigger is an examination the buyer actually carries out, and three phrases in the text shape it. “Before entering into the contract” fixes the moment by which the look must be finished. “As fully as he desired” measures its depth by the buyer’s own wishes: a buyer who chose a quick glance is held to a quick glance, while a buyer who wanted more and was refused it has not, on the text, examined as fully as desired. “The goods or the sample or model” puts a look at a sample or model on a par with a look at the goods themselves.
A buyer who goes ahead with a flaw in view has presumably paid a price that reflects the goods as they are. That fits the general freedom of buyers and sellers to trade old furniture or a used car, flaws and all, for a price reflecting their shared view of its worth in that condition.12
The timing requirement has its own reason: the examination goes to what the seller took on when the contract was made. A look taken afterward says nothing about what the buyer understood when the price was set, and if it counted, a seller could withdraw a warranty the buyer had already paid for by pointing to a walk-around before delivery. Comment 8 draws the line in these words: “Examination” is “not synonymous with inspection before acceptance or at any other time after the contract has been made,” and it “goes rather to the nature of the responsibility assumed by the seller at the time of the making of the contract.”13
Keith v. Buchanan drew the same line. The evidence there showed that a boat was inspected after the contract of sale was made and before delivery and acceptance. The court called such an inspection irrelevant to any issue of express warranty and treated Comment 8 as instructive on the parallel point for implied warranties.14 Because the footnote concerned an express-warranty claim, the case illustrates the timing line more than it applies paragraph (b).
The fitness warranty is equally open to exclusion by examination. In Schneider v. Miller, a used-car buyer argued that the seller knew the car was for his sixteen-year-old stepson to drive as a motor vehicle, not for parts, which made the Ohio provision on which he relied, R.C. 1302.28, applicable.15 A showing of the seller’s knowledge of the buyer’s purpose goes only to whether a fitness warranty arose; §2-316(3)(b) addresses whether the buyer’s examination then took it away.
A diver who asks for a watch water-resistant to 100 meters, and who reads “30m” on the dial of the watch shown for examination, has looked at the very feature the warranty concerns. If the diver buys anyway, an implied warranty of fitness to 100 meters is probably excluded as to that defect. A watch with no depth marking would show the diver nothing, and the warranty would survive, because the exclusion follows what an examination should have revealed.
On an exam, the look usually sits somewhere on a timeline, and the answer turns on its date.
Step four is where a completed examination can still leave much of the warranty in place, and the last subsection takes it up. The next subsection first turns to the second trigger, the refusal to examine, which carries a requirement the first lacks: the seller’s demand.16
Refusal After Seller's Demand
The second trigger reaches a buyer who, before entering into the contract, “has refused to examine the goods,” and its consequence matches that of a full look: no implied warranty as to defects an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed.19 The text does not say who must have invited the buyer to look, and a quick reading could treat every buyer who passes up an available inspection as a refuser.
Comment 8 rejects that reading. It is not enough that the goods are available for inspection; the seller must in addition demand that the buyer examine them fully, and by that demand puts the buyer on notice of assuming the risk of the defects an examination ought to reveal. The proposed 2003 amendments would have written the demand into the text by requiring that the refusal come “after a demand by the seller,” and the treatise describes those words as clarifying the existing language.20
The demand matters because the two triggers rest on different footing. A buyer who looked has learned what a look shows. A buyer who refused has learned nothing, so something else must supply notice, and the seller’s demand does: it tells the buyer that the seller is not vouching for the goods’ condition and leaves the buyer to choose between looking and accepting the risk. Without a demand there is no choice to make. Goods are available for inspection in almost every sale, and treating availability as refusal would strip the implied warranties from every buyer who skipped the walk-through.
Even a refusal after demand narrows the warranty without erasing it. The exclusion reaches only the defects an examination ought to have revealed, a limit the next subsection measures. The refusal must also come before the contract is made, since the text says the buyer, “before entering into the contract,” has refused.21
Defects an Examination Reveals
Both triggers take away the same thing and no more: after either one, there is no implied warranty “with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.”23 Three features of that wording control. “Defects” confines the exclusion to particular flaws, so a buyer who looked over a machine does not lose the warranty on every part of it. “Ought to have revealed” sets an objective measure: the question is what a proper examination would have shown, not what the buyer happened to notice, and the refusal trigger proves the point, because a buyer who refused examined nothing and still bears the risk of whatever an examination would have exposed. “In the circumstances” ties that measure to the setting of the sale.
The limit follows from why an examination can exclude anything at all. Implied warranties attach because the seller usually knows more about the goods than the buyer does, so an examination can stand in for a disclaimer only to the extent that it closes that gap.24 Where no proper examination could have shown the flaw, the gap stays open and the premise of the exclusion fails.
Comment 8 supplies the yardstick: the particular buyer’s skill and the normal method of examining goods in the circumstances determine which defects the examination excludes. Two variables follow. The first is who looks. A professional buyer examining goods in the buyer’s own field is held to a higher standard than a consumer, because a buyer who knows what to look for closes more of the information gap by looking, while a consumer answers for the defects a layman might be expected to observe. Even a professional keeps the warranty against defects that a professional investigation would not reveal. The second variable is method. An examination made where chemical or other testing is not possible does not exclude defects that only such testing could find. A failure to notice an obvious defect never excuses a buyer.
Consider a used-car dealer who tells a buyer to go over a car carefully before signing. A buyer who declines, or who looks and misses tires worn through to the fabric, has no implied warranty as to the tires, because any look at them would have shown the condition. A frame that is dangerously defective in a way no ordinary examination would reveal comes out the other way: the warranty remains, because neither the look nor the refusal reached what an ordinary examination could not find. Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Williams-Hayward Protective Coatings, Inc. applied the same limit to a latent defect in paint that only chemical testing, not observation or examination, could have exposed, and the implied warranties were not excluded.
The scope question is the last step of any (3)(b) problem, and an answer that stops at whether the buyer examined or refused has not finished. A buyer who looked and saw nothing still has no warranty as to what a proper examination would have shown, and a buyer who refused to look still has a warranty as to what no proper examination would have found.