Concept
As-Is Language
Exclusion or modification of warranties
As-Is Language
Subsection (3)(a) of §2-316 lets a seller exclude every implied warranty with a few plain words. Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, expressions like “as is” and “with all faults,” or other language that in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty, exclude all implied warranties.1
The formal route in subsection (2) asks for more. To exclude the warranty of merchantability, the language must mention merchantability and, in a writing, must be conspicuous; to exclude a warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be written and conspicuous.2 Sellers of new products usually take that route, even though subsection (2) is subordinate to subsection (3).3 Subsection (3)(a) is the lighter alternative. One phrase reaches both implied warranties, and on the text the seller need not mention merchantability or disclaim conspicuously.4
That lighter burden raises three recurring questions, which the subsections below take in order. Which words qualify? When may the circumstances of a particular sale override the phrase? And must the phrase be conspicuous, when subsection (2) demands conspicuousness and subsection (3)(a) is silent?
What Counts as As-Is Language
The clause has three working parts. Its subject is all implied warranties, so merchantability and fitness fall together. Its examples are two familiar expressions, “as is” and “with all faults.” Its standard covers whatever else a seller writes: other language qualifies when, in common understanding, it calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that no implied warranty comes with the goods.5
Because the clause requires no particular word, a seller who relies on it need not mention merchantability, which subsection (2) demands of a merchantability disclaimer.6 A sentence saying the goods are sold “as is” and “with all faults” therefore excludes both implied warranties without naming either.
One phrase can do the work of two named disclaimers because of what it tells the buyer. Section 2-316 aims to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer, and certain expressions carry the necessary warning on their own.7 Official Comment 7 explains that terms like “as is” “in ordinary commercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality of the goods involved.”8 Merchantability and fitness are two assurances about quality. A buyer who has taken the entire risk of quality has taken the risk that each would have covered.
In everyday usage, to sell goods “as is” is to sell them in their existing condition, and the phrase relieves the seller of liability for defects in that condition.9 The arrangement has a commercial logic. A buyer who pays a price reflecting what old furniture or a used car is worth in its present state has bought the thing with its flaws, and parties generally may decide between themselves who bears the risk of unknown problems.10
Schneider v. Miller shows the phrase answering a fitness claim. The buyer invoked the implied warranty that goods are fit for the purpose for which they are bought. The court replied that this warranty arises only “unless excluded or modified” under the state's counterpart to §2-316, and it relied on Comment 7's explanation that “as is” puts the entire risk of quality on the buyer.11
When a seller's words are not on the statute's list, the question is whether they do what the listed words do. The standard is objective. It asks how the language would be taken in common understanding, not what a particular buyer privately thought, and language fails it when it says too little about who bears the risk of defects.
The clause reaches only implied warranties, and two other kinds of promise lie outside it. The warranty of title is one. The methods in §2-316(3) do not apply to it, and it may be modified or excluded only by specific language or by circumstances giving the buyer reason to know that the seller does not claim title in himself or is selling only such right or title as he or a third person may have.12 A buyer who purchases goods from the trunk of a car parked in an alley has that reason to know; an “as is” notation on a receipt does not supply it. The seller's express promises are the other. A disclaimer is denied effect to the extent it is inconsistent with express-warranty language,13 and whether an oral promise such as “These goods are guaranteed for one year” ever reaches the trier of fact turns on the parol evidence rule, which can keep out a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement that contradicts a writing the parties intended as their final expression.14
When Circumstances Indicate Otherwise
The first words of §2-316(3)(a) make the as-is route conditional: the listed expressions exclude all implied warranties “unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.”16 That qualifier lets a court look past the words on the form to the transaction in which they were used. In the ordinary sale the phrase does its work. Where the facts show that the buyer would not have understood it to mean that no implied warranty came with the goods, a court may withhold that effect.
The qualifier follows from the purpose of the section. The required word and the conspicuous display in subsection (2) protect the buyer from surprise, and a short phrase can stand in for them only when the buyer is likely to hear it the way the seller means it.17 Several facts about the transaction bear on that likelihood.
Who the buyer is matters. Article 2 works most fairly between merchants, who are the actors most likely to be informed and able to bargain, while consumers generally know much less than sellers about a product's dangers and usually cannot bargain over its safety.18 A merchant seller also knows more about how its goods break down and what they cost to repair than the typical customer does,19 so a buyer who takes the goods as is gives up protection against risks the seller was better placed to assess. What is being sold matters as well. A buyer who pays a price reflecting the condition of old furniture or a used car has bought the item with its flaws,20 but the buyer of a new product has paid a price that assumes it works and may hear “as is” as something less than a surrender of every assurance.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. shows the circumstances working for the seller. The court held that the warranty item in a boiler contract failed subsection (2), because it nowhere mentioned “merchantability.”21 It then turned to subsection (3)(a), which permits exclusion when “the circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer's attention to the fact that no implied warranties are made.”22 The correspondence showed that the disclaimer came as no surprise to the buyer. The buyer had bargained with the seller over it for seven months, and it agreed to the language, which was written in simple language, only after the seller refused the buyer's condition that the seller be bound by the warranties implied under state law. The buyer made no factual showing to the contrary.23 On that record the disclaimer could not be called unbargained for or unexpected, and the court treated it as effective. The buyer had learned through negotiation what the formalities of subsection (2) exist to teach.
A buyer who wants the circumstances to cut the other way must put evidence in the record. In Perryman v. Peterbilt, Inc., the plaintiff filed no response or countervailing affidavits to the seller's motion, and the court sustained it.24
The buyer in Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp. made the argument the qualifier invites. The defendant contended that the “as is” clause was inoperative because it was not appropriate to a transaction involving new vehicles and because it was not in conspicuous language.25 The passage records a contention and not a holding, so it shows how the qualifier gets invoked and settles nothing about new goods.
The same phrase on a ten-year-old washer, sold to that homeowner at a deep discount and described on the form as used, sits comfortably with its surroundings. The price reflects the machine's condition, nothing in the sale suggests soundness was promised, and the phrase and the bargain agree.
The stakes can be high. A disclaimer drafted to satisfy §2-316 can bar a consumer's warranty claim even when a dangerous defect kills or seriously injures the consumer. In one case a buyer was severely injured when a steering defect sent his 14-month-old car off a bridge, and he recovered nothing in warranty because the contract disclaimed merchantability under §2-316(2) and his tort claims were time-barred.26 That result followed a subsection (2) disclaimer, but it shows what a valid exclusion can do, and it is why the buyer's understanding deserves scrutiny.
Each of these considerations is a fact courts weigh and not a rule that decides cases, so an answer should argue from the record. Sophistication, a history of negotiation, and used goods support the clause. A consumer buyer, a new product, and seller statements that cut against the phrase invite a finding that the circumstances indicate otherwise. Statutes outside Article 2 may limit the clause whatever the buyer understood. Some states have nonuniform versions of §2-316 that make disclaimers of merchantability ineffective in consumer transactions, and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act bars a warrantor who gives a “written warranty” from disclaiming implied warranties.27 Whether the phrase must itself be conspicuous is a separate question, taken up next.
Conspicuousness of As-Is Terms
Subsection (2) demands conspicuousness in so many words: a merchantability disclaimer in a writing must be conspicuous, and a fitness exclusion must be both written and conspicuous.30 Subsection (3)(a) says nothing about how as-is language must look on the page.31 On the text alone, then, a seller who relies on (3)(a) need not name merchantability and need not make the clause conspicuous.32 The open question is whether that lighter burden lets the seller bury the phrase in print no buyer would read.
A literal reading answers yes. The drafters wrote conspicuousness into subsection (2) and left it out of (3)(a), and the omission can be read as deliberate. In DeKalb Agresearch, Inc. v. Abbott, a federal district court in Alabama applied the statutory language literally and held that an “as is” disclaimer need not be conspicuous, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.33 The argument is that the listed expressions are short, familiar, and blunt, so the words themselves may do the attention-calling work that bold type and a heading do for a longer exclusion.
Most courts reject the literal reading. Section 2-316(3), unlike §2-316(2), has no conspicuousness requirement in its text, but most courts agree that one should be implied to carry out the section's purpose of avoiding surprise to buyers, and Lumber Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clarklift of Detroit, Inc. held that an “as is” disclaimer must be conspicuous to be effective.34 Two features of the section drive that result. The first is an anomaly. Because the formal route demands conspicuousness, a literal reading would make the informal route easier to hide than the formal one, and a seller whose buried exclusion fails subsection (2) could restate it as “as is” and escape the requirement. The second is the section's purpose of shielding buyers from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer, which a phrase no one sees cannot serve.35 Sellers gain the most from disclaimers that buyers do not see or understand, and a visibility requirement checks that incentive.36
Courts that hesitate to add words to the statute can reach a similar place through the clause's own opening qualifier. Because (3)(a) applies only “unless the circumstances indicate otherwise,” a court may treat a buried phrase as a circumstance that defeats the exclusion.37 The two routes test the clause differently. An implied conspicuousness requirement examines the clause itself, while the qualifier lets a court weigh what the buyer actually knew, which is how the boiler buyer who bargained over a clause for seven months could be held to it.38 The text offers support for visibility as well. Comment 6 describes the methods in subsection (3) as situations in which “the circumstances surrounding the transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer's attention” to the exclusion,39 and subsection (3)(a) itself covers language that “calls the buyer's attention” to the exclusion, so a phrase no one could find gives courts a textual argument that visibility is part of what qualifies.40
The page-72 sale is the situation the majority approach exists to catch. DeKalb and Lumber Mutual read the same statutory words and part ways over what the silence means. DeKalb's literal reading treats the silence as controlling. Lumber Mutual and the courts that follow it treat the silence as a gap that the section's purpose fills. Courts that require conspicuousness measure the clause by the conspicuousness test used for subsection (2).