Concept
Warranty and Products Liability
Implied warranty of merchantability
Warranty and Products Liability
Section 2-314(1) implies a warranty of merchantability in a contract for the sale of goods whenever the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, unless the parties exclude or modify it under § 2-316.1 The merchant limit has teeth. A used car lot owner is a merchant with regard to cars, but when the owner sells an old computer the business has used, the warranty does not attach, because the owner is not a merchant with respect to computers.2 The claim also generally requires a sale, although Article 2A now applies the implied warranty of merchantability to leased goods.3
Because the law supplies the warranty, an injured buyer need not point to anything the seller said. That feature made the warranty an early vehicle for injury claims against manufacturers, and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. shows it at work. Mrs. Henningsen, a member of the purchaser’s family rather than the purchaser, sued over a new automobile. The New Jersey court traced how courts had extended the implied warranty of merchantability to people outside the original sales agreement, found that extension absolutely necessary because manufacturers increasingly distanced themselves from sales act liability to consumers through a complex web of contracts, and called the limited protection the express warranty gave the plaintiff a “sad commentary” on the marketing practices of automobile manufacturers.4
Two questions grow from that decision and organize the rest of this part of the chapter. How does an unmerchantable product compare with a defective one in strict tort liability? And who besides the immediate buyer may sue on the warranty?
Merchantable Versus Defective
Section 2-314(2)(c) measures merchantability with one question: are the goods fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used?5 Strict liability in tort words its question differently and asks whether the product was in a “defective condition unreasonably dangerous.”6 Plaintiffs hurt by a product often plead both theories, and a court must then decide whether it faces two inquiries or one.
Most courts say one. They often recite the virtual or complete equivalence of the two standards and hold that the standards require the same types of proof,7 and most courts today treat unmerchantability as equivalent to the defect concept in both negligence and strict products liability in tort.8 Proof that a product is defective in strict liability therefore generally establishes that it is not merchantable, and the reverse holds too.9 The equivalence reaches warnings: Michael v. Wyeth, for example, involved an implied warranty claim for inadequate warning of an increased breast cancer risk from a hormone replacement drug.10
History explains the merger. Once Henningsen and Greenman stripped the implied warranty claim of its traditional contract defenses of privity, disclaimers, and notice, what remained was the doctrine of strict products liability in tort.11
Both standards also trace back to what an ordinary buyer may expect. An ordinary consumer expects a soda bottle that does not explode, and a bottle that explodes because of a manufacturing defect fails to perform one of its ordinary, expected functions: a malfunction.12 California’s design-defect law draws the connection openly. Its supreme court has held that a product may be defective in design if it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, a standard it described as somewhat analogous to the Code’s warranty of fitness and merchantability and as reflecting the warranty heritage of California product liability law.13 The same court added a second route: a design may be defective even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, when the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the design outweighs its benefits.14 That risk-benefit inquiry is where tort and warranty can part, as Denny shows below.
Iowa joined the equivalence in Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., a cigarette case. The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed its decisions and found that it had separated tort claims from warranty claims by the damages sought, not by the wrongful conduct alleged. It had confined cases involving only economic loss to warranty theories, but personal injury plaintiffs may seek recovery under tort and warranty theories that in essence allege the same wrongful acts. The court concluded that a seller’s warranty that goods are fit for their ordinary purposes gives rise to the same obligation tort law imposes on manufacturers to avoid personal injury.15 It added that the cigarettes’ being in the condition the manufacturer intended would not bar warranty recovery where the alleged defect lies in design or in inadequate instructions or warnings.16
The equivalence has a procedural consequence. If a product found not defective cannot also be unmerchantable, a jury that finds it so has contradicted itself, and some courts have held that conflicting verdicts on the two theories are irreconcilable and a basis for reversal. An extension cord found not defective, on this reasoning, can hardly also be found unmerchantable. And if the two claims are redundant, a court may properly refuse to instruct the jury on both doctrines.17 In such a jurisdiction the finding on defect usually decides the warranty count along with the tort count.
Denny v. Ford Motor Co. marks the main departure. Nancy Denny was hurt when she slammed on the brakes of her Ford Bronco II to avoid a deer and the vehicle rolled over. She sued Ford in federal court, attacking the vehicle’s relatively narrow track width, high center of gravity, and short wheel base, and Ford’s failure to warn of its tendency to roll over.18 Those features made the Bronco II less stable for the normal suburban highway driving for which Ford marketed it. Ford answered that the same features preserved the vehicle’s ability to cross the highly irregular terrain of off-road travel.19
The jury found the vehicle not defective but found that Ford had breached the implied warranty of merchantability, and after apportionment of damages it awarded $1.2 million.20 Ford moved for a new trial on the ground that the two findings were irreconcilable. The trial court rejected the motion, holding that the objection had been waived and that the verdict was not inconsistent in any event.21
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that claims of strict products liability and breach of implied warranty are not always coextensive.22 It rejected Ford’s contention that tort had completely subsumed warranty, because the negligence-like risk/benefit component of the defect element in a design case differentiates strict products liability from a claim for breach of the Code’s implied warranty.23 Ford’s proof about off-road capability bore on that risk/utility equation, which required the fact finder to decide whether the Bronco II’s value as an off-road vehicle outweighed the rollover risk when the vehicle served other driving tasks. On the jury’s findings the strict liability claim was not viable, yet Ford remained liable for breach of its implied promise that the Bronco II was “merchantable” or “fit” for its “ordinary purpose.” What made the case distinctive was that the ordinary purpose for which Ford marketed and sold the vehicle was not the utility against which the risk was weighed. Only unusual circumstances like these give practical significance to the ordinarily theoretical difference between the two defect concepts, and in most cases the difference has little or no effect.24
The dissent objected on doctrinal grounds. Implied warranty retains its contractual character in commercial transactions, it argued, but in personal injury litigation it is a tort and tort principles should govern, so a contract-based test of defectiveness can only destabilize well-settled tort law.25 Because most courts treat the two concepts as equivalent, Denny is best learned as the recognized exception. It applies when a product is sold for one ordinary purpose and defended by the utility of another, and it explains why the two defect questions can in theory come apart.
The two standards also separate at the edges of the personal injury case. Tort liability asks about a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous, while warranty asks only whether the goods are fit for their ordinary purposes.26 A new toaster that never heats bread is unfit for its ordinary purpose and so unmerchantable, though it threatens no one.27 Purely economic loss points the same way. Iowa confines cases involving only economic loss to warranty theories,28 and Indiana’s economic loss rule bars tort recovery where a product fails to perform as expected and the plaintiff suffers only economic damages.29 The equivalence most courts accept is therefore an equivalence for personal injury.
The Bronco II differed because Ford sold it to be driven on roads while defending its design by pointing to off-road utility. That gap between the marketed purpose and the weighed utility kept the warranty claim alive after a no-defect verdict, so the result in Denny depends on the proof as much as on the doctrine.
Steps three and five do the sorting. Students often treat Denny as a rule that a warranty claim survives a no-defect verdict. In most jurisdictions the finding on defect controls an injury case, and Denny matters only where the proof shows a marketed ordinary purpose that differs from the utility weighed in tort. The opposite mistake assumes that, because the theories converge in injury cases, a buyer whose toaster merely fails has no claim. Warranty reaches that loss.
Privity and Who May Sue
Section 2-314(1) implies the warranty “in a contract for their sale,” and the common law first read it as a right belonging to the parties to that contract.31 Under early common-law concepts of contractual liability, only the parties to a bargain could sue for its breach.32 Courts now describe the resulting gaps in two directions. Vertical privity runs along the distribution chain, so a consumer who buys a car from a dealership is remote from the manufacturer and lacks it. Horizontal privity concerns people who did not buy the product but were hurt while using it.33 A buyer who sues the immediate seller never meets the problem, which arises in suits against remote makers and in suits by users. The proposed 2003 amendments to Article 2 show the same default for express warranties, which they would have made clear are made to the immediate buyer.34
Courts began to break through the barrier because, as one put it, a noticeable disposition had appeared “to break through the narrow barrier of privity when dealing with sales of goods in order to give realistic recognition to a universally accepted fact.”35 The argument is sharpest for goods that endanger life or limb when defectively made. There, society’s interests can be protected only by eliminating privity between the maker and its dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer, so that the burden of loss falls on those positioned to control the danger or to distribute the losses equitably. Harper and James put the point this way: consumer protection calls for warranties “by the maker that do run with the goods,” reaching “all who are likely to be hurt by the use of the unfit commodity for a purpose ordinarily to be expected.”36
The extension came gradually. Food went first, with decisions such as Mazetti v. Armour & Co. and Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons. Not long after 1950 courts began extending the warranty to other products for intimate bodily use, such as hair dye and clothing, and then to all products.37
Henningsen settled the position for automobiles. On the horizontal question, the New Jersey court held that an implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser, to members of the purchaser’s family, and to others occupying or using the car with the purchaser’s consent, since such use falls within what the parties to the warranty anticipate.38 On the vertical question, it held that when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that the car is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of the ultimate purchaser, and the absence of agency between manufacturer and dealer is immaterial.39 The court did not fix the outer limits of the protection. For automobiles, it was enough to state the principle.40
The Code addresses the horizontal question in § 2-318, which sets out three alternatives for states to adopt on third-party beneficiaries of seller warranties.41 A footnote to the Code, quoted in Henningsen, adds that beyond that provision the section is neutral and “is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law” on whether the seller’s warranties to a buyer who resells extend to others in the distributive chain.42 Vertical privity is therefore left to the courts.
The alternatives differ in reach. Alternative A, the narrowest, covers a person in the family or household of the buyer, or a guest in the buyer’s home, who is injured in person. Alternative B reaches any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.43 A narrow version can leave a user without a claim. In Crews v. W.A. Brown & Son, Inc., a North Carolina court denied recovery to a teenager who worked at a church and was trapped in a walk-in freezer the church had bought, because a church has neither a family nor a household and is not a home, so she was no third-party beneficiary of the sale.44
Alternatives A and B speak to people injured in person, so a buyer whose only loss is the reduced value of a defective product raises a different question: may a consumer who bought from a dealer sue the manufacturer directly? Hyundai Motor America, Inc. v. Goodin answers yes in Indiana. Goodin bought her car from a dealership and so, remote from the manufacturer, lacked vertical privity with Hyundai.45 The Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana law does not require vertical privity between a consumer and a manufacturer for a claim on the manufacturer’s implied warranty of merchantability.46 The practical stakes explain the holding. Indiana’s economic loss rule bars tort recovery where a product fails to perform as expected and the plaintiff suffers only economic damages, and Goodin raised no negligence claim. She also argued that the warranty disclaimer in her Buyer’s Order barred her from suing her direct seller, AutoChoice, which could otherwise have sued Hyundai for reimbursement. That disclaimer, she said, precluded a chain of claims reaching the manufacturer, so that without abolition of the vertical privity requirement she would have no remedy and Hyundai’s implied warranty would be nonexistent in practical terms.47 The remedy is the benefit of the bargain, the difference between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had as warranted. In most cases any additional damages that abolishing privity might add under the UCC are available anyway under Indiana’s Products Liability Act, for personal injury or damage to other property.48
Other courts hold to privity. In Szajna v. General Motors Corp., the Illinois appellate court, in essence adopting the trial court’s conclusions of law, reasoned that although Szajna and General Motors were in privity under the express limited warranty, they were not in privity for the implied warranties, which that express warranty had disclaimed.49 Another court dismissed a case against a chair manufacturer because privity existed only between the buyer and the retailer.50 And when Hauter was decided, California appeared to require privity for implied merchantability actions, with a recognized exception for a member of the purchaser’s family, and it had not enacted § 2-318.51
The usual error is to announce that privity is dead because Henningsen abolished it. On new facts the answer depends on four things: whether the plaintiff is a family member or other user, whether the defendant is the immediate seller or a remote maker, whether the loss is personal injury or purely economic, and which state’s law governs.