Concept
Proving Breach
Implied warranty of merchantability
Proving Breach
Section 2-314(1) implies a warranty that goods shall be merchantable in a contract for their sale when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, unless the warranty is excluded or modified under § 2-316.1 Nobody has to say anything to create it. Like the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, it arises automatically in common factual situations unless it is unmistakably negated.2 The warranty needs no proof to arrive, but the buyer's claim needs proof to succeed. The buyer must show a sale by a merchant in goods of that kind, goods that fell below the statutory standard, a loss caused by the shortfall, and notice to the seller.
Merchant status is the first of those showings and the easiest to overlook. A used car lot owner is a merchant with regard to cars, but when she sells an old computer from her office the warranty does not attach, because she is not a merchant with respect to computers.3
The remaining showings are harder because the parties know unequal things. A merchant that deals in goods of a kind is a repeat player, and it holds information the buyer cannot readily obtain: how often such goods break down, what damage they suffer and inflict, and what they cost to repair.4 A merchant seller of cars knows the reliability of its automobiles better than any random customer. The buyer, by contrast, often has a single unit, and the failure may have wrecked it. Three problems of proof follow from that imbalance: the standard the buyer must prove and the evidence that proves it, the use of a malfunction as circumstantial proof, and the causal link between breach and loss, where the seller's care and the buyer's conduct come into play.
Burden and the Trade Standard
The two standards that decide most merchantability disputes say what the goods must be, and neither says who must prove it. Goods must pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, and they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.5 Courts place the burden on the buyer. To prove that a product is not merchantable, the complaining party must first establish the standard of merchantability in the trade, and the proof then turns on whether the goods fell below it.6 Each step needs its own evidence, since a shortfall can be measured only against a benchmark the buyer has already shown the court.
Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow shows a claim failing at the first step. The dispute concerned the speed capability of an offshore fishing boat. The owner had used the boat for offshore fishing, at least during his first few years with it, and its engines had run 850 hours; he said that many of those hours came during repair or modification attempts and that the boat was of little value to him.7 The record held no evidence of the standard of merchantability in the offshore fishing boat trade, and none that a significant portion of the boat-buying public would object to buying a boat with that speed capability.8 The owner's account therefore could not show that the boat would fail to pass without objection in the trade. The same gap defeated his ordinary-purposes theory, because his testimony did not support a conclusion that a boat with that speed is generally unacceptable as an offshore fishing boat.9
The evidence that would have filled the gap is evidence about a market. A Washington decision lists the considerations that bear on merchantability: usage in the trade, the price actually paid compared with the standard price, the characteristics of similar goods made by others, and government standards and regulations for such a good.10 Industry standards can be enough to support the claim; shoes that fail to meet American footwear industry standards have supported a claim for breach of the § 2-314 warranty.11 And where a significant segment of the buying public objects to buying a good, it does not pass without objection in the trade.12 Each of these describes the market. The Crow owner's evidence described one boat and one owner.
Federal Signal Corp. v. Safety Factors, Inc. adds two points about how the factfinder works with that evidence. Merchantability turns on the particular facts of the case.13 That does not excuse the buyer from putting evidence in the record, as the empty record in Bayliner shows. The factfinder also weighs the goods' problems together. The Washington court found substantial evidence that the warranty of merchantability was breached, yet held that the trial court erred in limiting the breach to the restrike problem, because all of the problems counted.14 The statutory list of merchantability attributes does not purport to exhaust the meaning of “merchantable,” and courts generally apply a reasonableness standard to its requirements.15
The ordinary-purposes standard puts a second question in front of the buyer: whether the use at issue was an ordinary one. A court examining a fire blanket used in cutting operations found it far from clear that the blanket was being used for its ordinary purposes, because the record held no evidence that a fire blanket was inappropriate for such use and none that it was appropriate.16 The appellants, Auburn and Inpro, had told the trial court they did not contend the wrong blanket was used for the application described, so the court turned to whether they had carried their burden of producing evidence sufficient to support a finding that the blanket was unfit for that purpose.17 The practical point for a buyer is that evidence of what goods of the type are ordinarily used for, and of why these goods were unsuited to those uses, belongs in the case. The burden of producing it falls on the party claiming unfitness.
The burden sits with the buyer because the standards track the market that the merchant prices for. A merchant knows how goods of its kind break down and what the damage and repair will cost, and it sets its price with that information in mind.18 A buyer's own disappointment describes the buyer. The same complaint could come from someone holding goods below the trade's level and from someone whose needs exceed what such goods are ordinarily meant to do, and only evidence about the market tells the two apart.
Merchantability is one element among several. The buyer must also show that the shortfall caused the loss, a point taken up in the third section below, and that the seller received notice. The Code's notice requirements govern implied warranty claims. In claims against Hyundai and Kia, the court held that the buyers' allegations that the sellers knew of the defect were enough to defeat a motion to dismiss on notice grounds.19 A buyer who can allege the seller's knowledge may survive the pleading stage. A buyer who has neither given notice nor alleged knowledge has a gap that proof of a defective product does not fill.
The Bayliner owner stalled at step four, where nothing in the record described the trade. Federal Signal shows step five, where the factfinder weighs every problem and does not stop at the first.
The usual exam error is to treat the buyer's complaint about the goods as proof that they were unmerchantable. A fact pattern that reports only that the buyer found the goods too slow, too weak, or otherwise disappointing has left out the market, and a good answer says that the buyer must still show the trade's standard and the shortfall from it. When the facts add that competing goods perform better, or that goods of the kind are built and priced to a standard these goods missed, the evidence needed to meet the burden is on the page.
Malfunction and Circumstantial Proof
Merchantable goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,21 and a buyer ordinarily proves a breach of that standard by showing how the goods failed. Sometimes that showing is unavailable. A product that burned or exploded may be destroyed or too damaged to examine, and the seller, not the buyer, knows how it was designed and made. Proof of the cause must then come from the circumstances.
Tort law has met the same difficulty. In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., a products case, the court observed that under the standard it was applying an injured plaintiff will frequently be able to demonstrate the defectiveness of a product by circumstantial evidence, even when the accident itself precludes identification of the specific defect at fault.22 The idea fits a warranty that asks about the condition of the goods and not about the seller's care.23
McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co. applies the idea to a merchantability claim. The plaintiff was using a coffee maker in her home, following the instructions in the circular that came with it, when its top part exploded and flew off; she claimed the appliance was not fit for the purposes for which it was sold and purchased.24 Where common knowledge and experience show that a process will uniformly or generally produce a certain result, the court reasoned, a jury of ordinary men may infer the cause from proof of the effect.25 The jury could find that the explosion came from the failure of the water to rise into the upper bowl, and from an examination of the notches in the filter that this failure was due to an inadequate outlet and the clogging effect of coffee grounds around the notches.26 The jury thus reasoned from an effect, an ordinary use ending in an explosion, to a cause located in the filter itself.
Courts have reached the same conclusion about other products that fail violently in ordinary use. Insulation that emits noxious fumes is not merchantable, nor is a clothes dryer or refrigerator that overheats and catches fire, nor a flash cube, coffee maker, or stove that explodes in the user's face.27 In each, a product used as such products are used did something that such products are not expected to do.
The inference rests on a premise, and the premise sets its limits. It works because common experience says that a product used as intended does not ordinarily fail in that way, so the failure points to the product. Where the record shows misuse or an outside cause, experience no longer points at the goods, and the buyer needs other evidence. The ordinary-purposes standard marks the same boundary, since it measures the goods against the uses for which such goods are ordinarily used,28 and the earlier discussion of foreseeable use versus misuse drew the same line.
The usual exam error runs in two directions: demanding that the buyer name the broken part, or treating any breakdown as proof of breach. A fact pattern that gives an ordinary use and leaves no other cause on the page invites the inference. One that mentions ignored instructions, an outside event, or abuse withdraws it. Even when the inference applies, the buyer must still show that the unmerchantable condition caused the loss, which the next section takes up.
Causation and the Seller's Care
Proof that the goods were unmerchantable does not complete the buyer's case. The loss must also follow from the breach, and the Code's consequential-damages provision speaks of injury to person or property “proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”30 Two questions bear on that link: what role the seller's care plays, and what happens when the buyer's own conduct comes between the defect and the injury.
The seller's care is no defense. The issue is not the degree of care exercised in designing and making the product but whether the goods meet the quality standards of § 2-314.31 The charge in Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co. was that the seller was liable for breach of implied warranties in the sale of one-day-old chickens.32 A charge of that kind asks about the chicks the buyer received and not about the degree of care the seller exercised.33 A careful merchant whose goods fall below the standards is liable; a careless merchant whose goods meet them is not.
The buyer's conduct after the sale is the second source of causation problems. The Code's commentary explains that where injury follows use of the goods without discovery of the defect, proximate cause turns on whether it was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as would have revealed it; if it was not reasonable, or if the buyer in fact discovered the defect before use, the injury would not proximately result from the breach.34 One commentary reads this as imposing the greatest burden on buyers: there is no proximate cause, and so no damages, if the buyer either unreasonably fails to inspect or uses the product after discovering a defect, whether the use was unreasonable or not.35
That rule differs from the examination exclusion in § 2-316(3)(b), under which no warranties arise with respect to defects a buyer does or should discover during a pre-sale examination.36 The exclusion prevents the warranty from arising. The causation rule leaves the warranty in place and asks who caused the loss. The Code is not crisp on the subject; the same commentary observes that none of these provisions treats the buyer's conduct in a manner that is “clear and to the point.”37
The rule makes sense because the warranty guards against defects the buyer cannot see. A buyer who knows of the defect can avoid the loss by setting the goods aside, and a rule that left the loss with the seller anyway would give the buyer no reason to stop.
The common error is to let step one bleed into step four by arguing that a careful seller is excused, or that a buyer's carelessness is irrelevant because warranty liability does not depend on fault. Step one asks about the goods, and step four asks about what the buyer did afterward.