Concept
Meaning of Merchantable
Implied warranty of merchantability
Meaning of Merchantable
The implied warranty runs only from a seller who is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.1 A sawmill operator that sold a used power saw after replacing it with a new one was not such a merchant, so it owed no warranty of merchantability on the saw.2 Once a merchant is in the picture, § 2-314(2) says how good the goods must be. It answers with a floor rather than a definition: goods to be merchantable must be at least such as meet six standards.3
The six, by paragraph:
- (a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;4
- (b) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality within the description;5
- (c) be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;6
- (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;7
- (e) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and8
- (f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label, if any.9
Three features of the list govern how a court uses it. “At least” makes it a minimum: the official comment says the list “does not purport to exhaust the meaning of ‘merchantable’ nor to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the statute, but arising by usage of trade or through case law.”10 Each standard is also a test of its own. For fungible goods, meaning goods any unit of which can easily replace another,11 a breach of any one requirement is a breach of the warranty, and courts generally decide whether a requirement was met by applying a reasonableness standard.12 And the answer is factual: in Washington, “the question of whether a good is merchantable depends on the particular facts of the case.”13
Federal Signal Corp. v. Safety Factors, Inc. shows what goes wrong when a court looks past the list. The buyer’s light towers had a restrike problem, an oil leak, and other small faults. The trial judge found a breach of merchantability only for the restrike problem, reasoning that the other faults did not go to the essential purpose of towers that were still usable. The reviewing court called that the wrong test: the question is whether the goods are merchantable under the statute.14 A buyer need not show that the goods were useless or that a defect defeated the whole bargain.
Many courts compress the six standards into one sentence: merchantability means reasonable fitness for the general purposes for which an article is sold and used.15 Subsection (2) particularizes that shorthand, and the particulars matter, because goods that satisfy the shorthand can still fail a specific paragraph, such as the one on labels. The sections below take the standards in turn, beginning with how the trade itself regards the goods.
Passing Without Objection in the Trade
Paragraph (a) requires that merchantable goods “pass without objection in the trade under the contract description.”16 Its two parts do different work. “In the trade” supplies the yardstick: the question is how the relevant market would receive the goods, not whether this buyer is content. “Under the contract description” supplies the comparison class: a seller who promises a used car is measured against used cars, and a seller who promises a pedigreed dog against pedigreed dogs. The paragraph reads much like fitness for ordinary purposes, but it points more directly at trade usage, at similar goods, and at the conduct of sellers.17
Brand names carry the same implication. It would be wholly unreasonable, one court wrote, to say that the buyer of a car sold under a name like “Ford” or “Buick” has no implied warranty of merchantable quality even though the car delivered was so gravely defective in materials and construction that it could not be operated at all.18
Courts put the paragraph (a) question in two ways. In the first, goods fail if a significant segment of the buying public would object to buying them.19 In the second, goods are compared with their rivals, and a product that conforms to the quality of other brands in the market will normally be merchantable.20 The two formulations look at one question from opposite sides. The first asks whether buyers would turn the goods away; the second asks whether the product falls below what competitors sell.
Federal Signal names the evidence a court weighs: usage in the trade, the price actually paid compared with the standard price, the characteristics of similar goods made by others, and government standards and regulations.21 Each shows the trade’s position from a different side:
- Trade usage shows what merchants treat as acceptable under the description. The last section of this unit returns to it with a feed additive that was routine in one trade and unacceptable in another.
- Comparable goods show what the market already offers at that level of quality, as the next example shows.
- Price records what the parties dealt in. Comment 7 calls the price at which a merchant closes a contract “an excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation under the present section.”22
- Industry standards show what the trade requires. In Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., shoes that failed American footwear industry standards supported a claim for breach of the § 2-314 warranty.23
The comparison reading protects sellers as much as buyers. In Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, the seller warranted only that its terminal was of acceptable quality “when compared to that generally acceptable in the trade for goods of the kind.” Undisputed testimony showed that the WY-60 terminal conformed to the industry standard for terminals designed to operate with an IBM AT, so evidence that it was incompatible with the Multilink Advanced operating system did not support a finding of breach.24 A terminal that matched the trade’s own standard was not unmerchantable merely because it did not work with one buyer’s chosen software.
Goods fail when the trade itself would turn them away, and the contract description decides which trade is meant. In Thomas v. Ruddell Lease-Sales, Inc., a car that had been wrecked and rebuilt would not pass without objection even as a used car, although used cars are expected to show wear. Seed infected with the fungus known as black leg did not pass in Martin v. Joseph Harris Co. In Dempsey v. Rosenthal, the word “pedigreed” set the benchmark. A poodle the buyer assumed was suitable for breeding had an undescended testicle, a permanent genetic condition that can pass to its offspring, and the court allowed recovery because such a dog would not pass without objection in the trade.25
Delano Growers’ Co-op. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co. adds a limit. Fresno mold in sweet California wine made the wine unmerchantable because it would not pass without objection, and the court reasoned that even if all California sweet wine contained the mold, other wine merchants did not allow it to go unchecked.26 A defect the whole market shares therefore gives the seller no shelter when merchants in the trade would not leave it unchecked. The contrast with Step-Saver lies in the trade’s own posture: the terminal matched the industry standard, while the mold was a condition that merchants refused to tolerate.
The buyer’s proof must come in the same currency as the seller’s defense. In Federal Signal the buyer’s witnesses testified that they had never had as many problems with any other light tower, which gave the court substantial evidence that the towers fell far below the quality of other towers on the market.27 Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow shows a buyer with a real grievance and no such proof. The offshore sport fishing boat consistently reached only 17 miles per hour, apart from a brief stretch at about 24 after an engine modification, and a Bayliner representative later wrote that the performance representations made at the time of purchase were incorrect and that 23 to 25 miles per hour was the most the boat could achieve.28 The trial court entered judgment for the buyer on express warranty and on the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and awarded $135,000, the purchase price plus about $15,000 in expenses.29 Supreme Court of Virginia relied on Federal Signal and held that the buyer’s evidence did not address the standard of merchantability in the trade or whether his boat failed to meet it, so he had not proved that the boat would not “pass without objection in the trade.”30
Many courts treat paragraphs (a) and (c) as near synonyms, yet Bayliner kept them apart: the first concerns whether a significant segment of the buying public would object, and the second whether the goods are reasonably capable of performing their ordinary functions.31 A buyer who cannot prove a trade standard under paragraph (a) may still try to show under paragraph (c) that the goods could not do what such goods ordinarily do, which is the subject of the next section.
Step three is where most claims are won or lost. A buyer who arrives with testimony about personal disappointment, as in Bayliner, has no answer to a seller who arrives with industry specifications and competitor comparisons, as in Step-Saver.
Fitness for Ordinary Purposes
Paragraph (c) requires that merchantable goods be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”33 The phrase is the heart of the merchantability warranty.34 Federal Signal gave it a working definition: goods must be reasonably fit for their usual, intended purpose, meaning reasonably safe when put to their ordinary use and reasonably capable of performing their ordinary functions.35 The standard therefore has two halves, performance and safety, and goods that fail either half fall short. The international sales convention asks the same question. Its most thorough discussion is a 2002 arbitral award over a gas condensate that a buyer stopped accepting because of its high mercury content, which the buyer said made the goods unacceptable for processing or sale.36
The buyer must prove two things: the ordinary purposes of goods of that type, and that the goods delivered fell short of them. The first step comes first and rests on the plaintiff.37 In Koken v. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc., a fire-blanket case, the court began by asking whether the blanket was being used for its ordinary purposes, meaning the uses customarily made of the goods in question. It found that far from clear: nothing showed the blanket inappropriate for cutting operations or horizontal capture, but nothing showed it appropriate for them either.38
The test looks to customary use and not to the use this buyer made, and price explains why. A merchant is likely to know things the buyer does not, including how often the goods break down, what damage they are likely to suffer and inflict, and what repairs cost, and it prices the goods accordingly.39 A warranty covering whatever purpose a buyer might choose would raise the price for every buyer, and those who use the goods in the ordinary way would pay for protection they do not need.40 A buyer with an atypical use has other routes, namely the warranty for a particular purpose and express warranties.41
What counts as an ordinary purpose depends on the goods the contract describes, and price, trade usage, and the characteristics of similar goods help a court decide.42 Suppose a dealer sells a ten-year-old luxury sedan with 135,000 miles whose major components work but whose air conditioner does not. For a luxury sedan in general, ordinary use may include comfortable transportation. For an old, high-mileage car sold at a modest price, it may be basic transportation, which this car provides. The description and the price, not the make alone, set the baseline. Some goods have no ordinary purpose at all. In Binks Mfg. Co. v. National Presto Industries, Inc., an aluminum casting “system” designed and built at the buyer’s request for its electrical appliance factory had none, and because both parties were sophisticated businesses with equal skill and knowledge, no warranty of merchantability arose.43 In Alpert v. Thomas, by contrast, custom and usage of the trade established that an Arabian horse sold for breeding must be fertile.44
Fitness includes safety. McCabe v. L.K. Liggett Drug Co. began when the top of a coffee maker exploded and flew off while the plaintiff was using it at home according to the instructions.45 The violent bursting showed that accumulating pressure was not being released and, absent explanation, was itself evidence of a defective condition.46 A coffee maker “so imperfect in design that it could not be used without the likelihood of an explosion” could be found not reasonably fit for making coffee and therefore not merchantable.47 The exploding soda bottle makes the same point from the buyer’s side. A consumer who knew the bottle’s true character would not buy it, and the ordinary consumer expects a bottle that does not explode, so a defective bottle that bursts fails to perform one of its ordinary, expected functions.48
The cases yield a long list of ordinary expectations. Buyers may expect shoe heels to stay attached in normal use, ladders not to collapse, hair lotion not to burn the scalp, cookies to be free of maggots and foreign objects, and an SUV marketed for ordinary driving to be reasonably stable in normal highway use. Insulation that emits noxious fumes, a dryer or refrigerator that overheats and catches fire, and a flash cube, coffee maker, or stove that explodes are not merchantable.49 A pressure gauge that did not measure pressure building up in an expansion joint and a hay stacker that caught fire on the first day of use failed the same test.50
Vehicles show both halves at once. A merchantable vehicle requires more than the capability of getting from point A to point B; its safety, operability, and mileage range matter too, so gear-shift defects that cause rollaway accidents are not merchantable. An air conditioner has to cool air, and a piano has to make music.51 A car so gravely defective that it could not be operated at all is wholly useless for the ordinary purpose an automobile serves, whatever its brand.52 Hauter v. Zogarts applied the standard to a golf-training device, the Gizmo. A safety expert classed it as a major safety hazard, and the defendants admitted that a user who hits beneath the ball stands a substantial chance of seriously injuring himself. The court concluded that the Gizmo was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are normally used.53
Because the test is the statutory one, a court asks whether the goods as a whole were fit, and a buyer need not show that a single defect destroyed the bargain. In Federal Signal the trial judge limited the breach to the restrike problem. The reviewing court, considering all the problems together, found substantial evidence that the towers fell far below the quality of other light towers, including testimony from the buyer and its customers that these machines had so many problems that it was hard to use them for their ordinary purposes, and it held that the trial court erred in limiting the breach to the restrike problem.54 Usability in some minimal sense is not the measure, and a pile of failures can add up to goods that cannot do their ordinary job.
Bayliner shows the other side of the line. The buyer’s offshore fishing boat was too slow for his needs, but the Virginia court agreed with Bayliner that, although the boat did not meet the needs of this particular sport fisherman, there was no evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the boat generally was not merchantable as an offshore fishing boat.55 His need for speed said nothing about what offshore fishing boats customarily do. The court then turned to the separate warranty for a particular purpose, which applies when the seller has reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select suitable goods.56
The standard also leaves the seller’s care out of the analysis. The issue is not the degree of care exercised in design and manufacture but whether the goods meet the quality standards of § 2-314.57 The corollary is that the standard looks to the goods the seller actually delivered. In Flippo v. Mode O’Day Frock Shops of Hollywood, a buyer was injured by a poisonous spider concealed in a pair of stretch pants. The court found the warranty inapplicable: the pants were fit for the ordinary purpose of stretch pants, nothing showed that the seller controlled the spider or caused it to be in the pants, and the spider was not part of the manufactured article.58
Step three is where McCabe and Bayliner part ways. In McCabe the use was the most ordinary imaginable, making coffee as the instructions directed, and the failure lay in the appliance itself. In Bayliner the use was also ordinary, but the boat fell short only of what this buyer needed. A claimant who cannot connect the failure to the customary performance of the goods has proved a disappointment and not a breach. The outer limits of the standard, including the point that merchantable does not mean perfect, are taken up later in this chapter.
Fair Average Quality of Fungible Goods
Paragraph (b) sets a minimum that applies to one kind of goods only: for fungible goods, merchantable goods must be “of fair average quality within the description.”60 Fungible goods are those in which any given unit can easily be substituted for any other, such as a lot of lumber studs or a quantity of floor tile.61 Buyers of such goods usually buy by description, so the description becomes the yardstick, and the paragraph asks how the delivered lot compares with the average quality that goods within the description ordinarily run.
The word “average” does real work. A description names a grade, and a grade covers a range of quality. A test that asked only whether the goods fit the description would be satisfied by the poorest lot that still fell inside the range. “Fair average quality within the description” asks for goods that run at the typical level for the grade.
Courts applying the paragraph have mostly dealt with building materials. A buyer purchased linoleum floor tile that became discolored shortly after installation, and in Mindell v. Raleigh Rug Co. the court held that the tile was not of fair average quality and would not pass without objection in the trade.62 In Jetero Construction Co. v. South Memphis Lumber Co., warped and discolored lumber was unmerchantable because the seller did not send studs of fair average quality within the description or sample agreed upon. The court also held that the studs as delivered were not fit for the ordinary purpose of building construction and would not meet general construction standards.63
Two cautions keep the paragraph in its place. First, it speaks only of fungible goods, so a buyer of a single identifiable item has no interchangeable units against which to measure an average. Second, courts rarely rest a decision on this paragraph alone. The leading examples also rely on the failure of the goods to pass without objection in the trade or to be fit for ordinary purposes.64 On a fact pattern, pair paragraph (b) with paragraphs (a) and (c) whenever the facts support them.
Even Kind, Quality, and Quantity
Paragraph (d) requires that merchantable goods “run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved.”66 The paragraph makes two comparisons. The first, within each unit, asks whether a single carton, bag, or package holds contents of one kind and quality in the amount it should. The second, among all units involved, asks whether the cartons or pieces in the delivery match one another. A shipment in which some cartons are full and others short is uneven even if each carton is consistent within itself. Paragraph (b) measures a lot against the average its description implies; this paragraph asks whether the units match each other.
The expectation behind the rule is uniformity. The manufacturer and the buyer contemplate an exchange of a standard monetary value for a standard, uniform package of utility and safety. Consumers may know that producers sometimes make mistakes, but their actual expectation on buying a new product is that its important attributes, including safety, will match those of other similar units. A buyer who pays full price for a unit that looks like every other and receives one with a hidden flaw has been given a false expectation by the price and the appearance together.67
“Within the variations permitted by the agreement” keeps the paragraph from demanding identical units. The agreement supplies the yardstick: in commercial transactions the parties normally should be permitted to shape the nature of the deal,68 so a tolerance they set for size, weight, or color defines how much variation counts as even. Units inside the band are even, and units outside it are not. Where the agreement says nothing about tolerance, courts fall back on the reasonableness standard they apply to every paragraph of § 2-314(2).69
The evenness paragraph works independently of its neighbors. A lot can be uniform from unit to unit yet run below the average quality its grade implies, and a lot can match its grade on average while its units swing from one to the next. The first fails paragraph (b) and passes paragraph (d); the second does the reverse. Because a breach of any one requirement is a breach of the warranty,70 a seller cannot answer an uneven shipment by pointing to a respectable average. A single indivisible item has no other units to compare, so this paragraph usually has little to do there.
Contained, Packaged, and Labeled
Paragraph (e) requires that merchantable goods sold in packages or containers be “adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require.”72 Its three verbs name three ways goods can reach a buyer defective even though the product inside is exactly what the buyer ordered: a vessel that fails, packaging that exposes the buyer to the goods, and a label that withholds a warning. A buyer cannot see how firmly a cap sits or test a bottle’s strength, so the wrapper is part of what the seller delivers. A student who inspects only the contents has examined the wrong thing.
The cases track the three verbs. A glass can be the container. In Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., a customer’s wine glass shattered in his hand and caused permanent injuries, and the court held that the restaurant breached the warranty of merchantability, because wine cannot be consumed without a container and so carries an implied warranty that it will be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled.73 Serving food or drink for value is a sale, which is why the restaurant stood as a seller at all.74 A cap can be the defect: in Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., the court said that bleach that spills through a loose cap is not adequately contained or packaged.75 Gillispie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. holds a bottled drink’s container to the same standard: it must hold the drink when handled with ordinary care.76 Packaging, as distinct from the container, fails when it leaves dangerous parts exposed. In Pugh v. J.C. Whitney & Co., a buyer’s employee injured his hand on a sharp projection when he reached into a package of automobile parts, and the court held that packaging that left potentially dangerous parts uncovered and gave no warning of them breached the warranty.77
Labeling fails when a needed warning is missing. In Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., a deodorant maker breached the warranty by failing to warn on the label that the product was highly flammable.78 A buyer of asbestos-lined brakes likewise stated a claim where the labels did not adequately warn him of the specific risks of asbestos exposure.79 In each, the missing words were the defect, because the hazard was invisible to the buyer and only the label could disclose it before the harm occurred. Paragraph (e) therefore asks whether the labeling was adequate, which includes whether it supplied the warnings the goods needed. Whether what a label says is true is a different question, taken up in paragraph (f).
The closing phrase, “as the agreement may require,” makes the parties’ bargain part of the measure of adequacy. Packaging needs differ with the goods and the trade. A seller who ships in the form the agreement called for has not breached the paragraph merely because another form would have been more convenient, and a buyer who bargained for a particular container is entitled to it.
Applying the paragraph therefore means locating the failure in the container, the packaging, or the label rather than in the contents, asking what the agreement called for, and asking whether the failure appeared in ordinary handling or use. The glass, cap, and package cases come out for the buyer because each wrapper failed when ordinary people handled it. The quarry delivery comes out for the seller because the loose form was the form the agreement required.
Conformity to Label Statements
Paragraph (f) requires that merchantable goods “conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.”81 Paragraph (e) asks whether the wrapper and the warnings printed on it were adequate. Paragraph (f) asks whether what the label says is true of what is inside. A shopper who takes a product from a shelf bargains with no one, so the printed words are often the only representations the seller makes, and the seller chose every one of them.
The paragraph looks like an express warranty but differs from one: the buyer need not show reliance on the label’s statements or prove that they were the basis of the bargain.82 The difference follows from the source of the duty. Express warranties are basically contractual, while the implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law.83 A reliance requirement would also let a seller defend by proving that the buyer never read the carton, although the seller chose the words printed on every unit it sold. How express warranties arise, including affirmations of fact and descriptions of the goods under § 2-313, is taught separately.84
Hauter v. Zogarts supplies the leading example. The Gizmo’s carton stated “COMPLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT HIT PLAYER,” and the defendants admitted that a user who hits beneath the ball stands a substantial chance of seriously injuring himself. The court found that the device did not live up to the statement on the carton, and it found the Gizmo unmerchantable on a second ground as well, because it was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are normally used.85 Two paragraphs of § 2-314(2) reached the same product.
A description of what the goods are also counts as an affirmation of fact. In Farmers Union Co-op. Gin v. Smith, seed sold under a label describing it as a particular hybrid turned out to be mostly something else, and the court found a breach of both the express and the implied warranty of merchantability because the seed did not conform to the affirmations on its labels. The paragraph reaches only a “promise or affirmations of fact,” so a label that offers opinion or commendation gives the goods nothing to match.86 Express warranty law draws the line between puffing and warranty, and the paragraph’s language invites the same line here. What separates Hauter from a claim over a boast is that the carton made a specific assertion that could be checked against what the device did.
The seller who answers for a false label need not have written it. A retailer is subject to liability for breaching its own express warranties, but it is often said to bear no responsibility for a manufacturer’s express warranties. Yet under paragraph (f) a seller is liable for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability for selling a mislabeled product when the manufacturer’s statements on the container or label prove false.87 The implied warranty attaches to the retailer’s own sale as a merchant. Because paragraph (f) is part of the merchantability warranty, the opening conditions of § 2-314(1) still apply: the seller must be a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, and the warranty is subject to exclusion or modification.88
Step three decides most disputes, since a buyer who clears it faces a standard that demands neither reliance nor a bargained-for promise. Step five is where students most often err, because the habit formed in express warranty analysis is to ask whether the buyer saw the statement.
Other Attributes and Usage of Trade
The six paragraphs of § 2-314(2) do not close the subject. Subsection (3) provides that, unless excluded or modified under § 2-316, other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.90 Subsection (2) states what goods must at least be, and the official comment confirms that the list does not exhaust the meaning of merchantable or negate attributes that arise by usage of trade or through case law.91 Usage of trade is what merchants in a line of business regularly do, and course of dealing is how these two parties have dealt before. The statutory list is a floor, and the practices of the trade and of the parties can raise it.
A merchant seller is a fair target for trade-based terms. A merchant who deals in goods of the kind is likely to be a repeat player with substantial information about the goods that the buyer cannot readily obtain.92 A general statute cannot record what every trade takes for granted, so the Code leaves room for usage to supply it. And because subsection (3) yields to § 2-316, a merchant who does not want a trade-based term can exclude it by the means that section provides.
The standard illustration is the pedigreed animal. For a pedigreed dog or a blooded bull to be considered merchantable, trade usage may require that pedigree papers be produced.93 Because the term comes from the trade’s practice, the buyer need not point to anything the seller said. A buyer who receives a pedigreed dog without papers from a dealer whose trade supplies them has received less than the trade’s own baseline, even though the dog is healthy.
Usage of trade also shapes the listed standards themselves. In Kassab v. Central Soya, the seller sold cattle feed containing a growth-promoting hormone that was common in feed for cattle fattened for slaughter but could contribute to abortions in pregnant cows and sterility in bulls. The buyer’s cattle were used for breeding. To an outsider the feed looked fit for the ordinary purposes of cattle feed, since the additive was widespread. Trade usage showed otherwise: such hormones were normally excluded from feed for breeding cattle unless specifically ordered and disclosed on the label.94 Feed is goods, and warranties implied by the Code attach to its sale unless excluded.95 The same additive that passes in the market for slaughter feed fails in the market for breeding feed, and the trade’s own division of products draws the line.
Usage is one body of evidence among several. Courts also weigh the price actually paid compared with the standard price, the characteristics of similar goods made by others, and government standards and regulations.96 Because a practice is a fact about a market, the buyer who invokes it must prove it. A buyer who shows only disappointment has said nothing about the trade, while a buyer who shows what merchants in the line regularly supply has given the court its measure. The usual exam error is to treat the six paragraphs of § 2-314(2) as a closed list and stop when none fits. A second look at the trade’s practices, the price, and any applicable standards may show an attribute the list never mentioned.