Concept
Express Warranty Versus Magnuson-Moss
Express warranties
Express Warranty Versus Magnuson-Moss
A written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not simply a § 2-313 express warranty committed to paper. The drafter of the federal definition plainly knew § 2-313, yet the definition is not coextensive with it, so a seller can make a warranty under one regime without making one under the other.1
The Code supplies three routes to an express warranty. An affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods warrants that the goods will conform to it; a description of the goods warrants that they will conform to the description; and a sample or model warrants that the whole of the goods will conform to it. Each route works only if the affirmation, description, or specimen becomes part of the basis of the bargain.2 The seller need not say “warrant” or “guarantee” or intend to make a warranty, but a statement of the goods’ value, or the seller’s opinion or commendation of them, creates none.3 In some states the buyer must also prove reliance, although that requirement appears at odds with the drafters’ intent as expressed in the Official Comment to § 2-313.4
A buyer suing on a Code express warranty generally must allege a contract containing an express warranty about a material fact, that the warranty was part of the basis of the bargain, and that the seller breached it.5 A bare description can carry that burden. One court applying § 2-313 found that a seller who described stones as diamonds of “H color and v.v.s. quality” had done more than give an opinion of their value, and it added that a seller with superior knowledge who does not qualify a statement as opinion will have it treated as fact.6 A grade description of that kind says what the goods are. It says nothing about how they will perform over time, a silence that does not trouble § 2-313 but matters under the federal definition.
The federal Act regulates written consumer product warranties. Certain of them must fully and conspicuously disclose their terms and conditions, including whether the warranty is “full” or “limited.”7 A full warranty adds further duties: the warrantor must remedy a defect in a consumer product within a reasonable time and without charge; the warrantor may not limit the duration of implied warranties; any exclusion or limitation of consequential damages must appear conspicuously on the face of the warranty; and, after a reasonable number of attempts to remedy defects, the consumer may elect a refund or replacement.8
Disclosure matters because a warranty works as a signal of quality. If sellers answer for their statements, a warranty is costly: the seller must price in the repairs and replacements that breakdowns require, and that cost runs higher for low-quality goods than for high-quality ones. Sellers of low-quality goods therefore cannot afford to mimic the warranties of high-quality goods, and buyers can compare quality by the signals implicit in the warranties they are offered.9
The federal definition lives in section 101(6). Subsection (A) requires an affirmation or promise that the product is “defect-free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time,” and subsection (B) includes promises to repair.10 The phrase “over a specified period of time” does most of the narrowing, because a promise about quality or performance must also say how long it lasts. In Skelton v. General Motors Corp., the court observed that if General Motors had represented that the transmission would “perform like a THM 350 transmission for the life of the transmission,” there was little question the statement would be a warranty under section 101(6).11 That hypothetical promise names a performance standard and measures it by time.
A seller who calls a used car “top-notch” shows how the two tests part. The seller has arguably made an affirmation of fact under § 2-313, though the opinion-and-commendation exclusion in subsection (2) threatens the claim. It takes greater imagination to read the statement as an assertion that the car is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, so the statement is a candidate under the Code and a poor candidate under the Act.15
A household dryer’s energy-efficiency label makes the same point where the statement is plainly in writing. The rating is a checkable fact about the goods, so once it becomes part of the basis of the bargain it is an express warranty under § 2-313(1)(a).16 It promises neither freedom from defects nor any level of performance over a specified period, so it is not a written warranty under section 101(6)(A).17
Samples and models stay on the Code side alone. A paint dealer who brushes out a sample from the lot to be sold warrants that the whole of the paint will conform to it,18 yet the sample is no writing that promises defect-free performance over any period. Oral assurances stand in the same position, because the Act regulates written warranties, and sales of goods that are not consumer products fall outside it although § 2-313 contains no consumer limit.19
Section 101(6)(B) runs the other way. It counts promises to repair as warranties, but a promise to repair may not be a § 2-313 warranty if it is not an affirmation of fact or a promise with respect to the product.20 That provision is the one exception to the rule that the federal definition sits inside the Code’s.
The relationship is therefore one-directional. Anything that qualifies under section 101(6)(A) would appear also to be an express warranty under § 2-313, but a statement can satisfy the Code and fall short of the federal definition.21 A sound analysis decides first whether the Code creates a warranty, and it asks whether the Act adds anything only when the facts involve a written statement about a consumer product that promises freedom from defects or performance over time, or a promise to repair.