Concept
Ways to Create a Warranty
Express warranties
Ways to Create a Warranty
Section 2-313(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code gives a seller three ways to create an express warranty, and each ends in a promise of conformity. An affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods warrants that the goods will conform to it; a description warrants that they will conform to the description; and a sample or model warrants that the whole of the goods will conform to it.1 A buyer who sues for breach must first prove that the seller made a warranty, and these three routes are how an express one is made.2 The first two routes work through words, one asserting something about the goods and the other naming what they are. The third works through an object, a specimen that shows the buyer what the rest will be like. Whichever route the seller used, the seller's performance is measured against what was said, described, or shown.
All three clauses share one condition: the affirmation, description, sample, or model must become part of the basis of the bargain.3 A communication that never entered the deal creates no warranty under any of them. Courts differ over what that phrase demands, a question taken up below. This subsection asks the narrower question whether what the seller communicated fits one of the routes at all.
The routes overlap, and courts often describe one statement under two of them. Descriptions are a particularly important subset of factual affirmations, and it is not uncommon for a court to label an express warranty both a description under clause (b) and an affirmation of fact under clause (a).4 The label rarely changes the outcome, since every route ends in the same promise.
When analyzing a problem, name the clause or clauses that fit the seller's statement and move on. The contest usually lies elsewhere: whether the statement was opinion or commendation, and whether it became part of the basis of the bargain. The three subsections below take the routes in order, beginning with affirmations and promises.
Affirmation or Promise
Clause (a) is the most common route to an express warranty. Any affirmation of fact or promise the seller makes to the buyer that relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain warrants that the goods will conform to it.5 In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., the court, applying Indiana's version of the section, divided the clause into three elements: an affirmation of fact or promise, a relation to the goods, and incorporation into the basis of the bargain. When all three are present, the goods must conform.6 This subsection takes up the first two elements and the direction of the statement, which runs from seller to buyer. The line between an affirmation and sales talk, and the basis-of-the-bargain element, come later; until a statement clears both, it is only a candidate for warranty.
The clause reaches two kinds of statement. An affirmation of fact describes what the goods are or can do, and a promise commits them to a level of performance over time. In Royal, the seller told the buyer that a copier's maintenance would cost about half a cent per copy and that service calls would be needed every 7,000 to 9,000 copies. The court found substantial evidence that the cost statement “was not an estimate but an assertion of a fact of performance capability,” and it held that the service-call statement likewise related to performance capability and could be the basis of an express warranty. Whether the seller made such an assertion is a question for the trier of fact.7
The difference between present fact and future performance matters more in fraud than in warranty. A fraud claim needs a false statement of present or pre-existing fact, and one court held that a seller's statements about how an untried logging system would perform were opinions or promises of future performance, not statements of present fact, especially since the buyer had been told that no such system had ever been attempted.8 Clause (a) has no such limit. It lists a “promise” beside an “affirmation of fact,” so a commitment about future performance falls within its words.9
Present-fact affirmations are the familiar cases. In Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., a buyer told the seller he wanted a hay baler newer than his own six-year-old machine, the seller said the used baler was two years old, and it was six. The age statement was an express warranty, even though age measures condition only indirectly. In Hauter v. Zogarts, the carton for a golf-training device declared the ball completely safe and said it would not hit the player, and the court held the makers breached an express warranty when the ball struck the user.
The second element ties the warranty to the thing sold, so courts look for statements about the particular goods. In a dispute over a tree stand, a court found that a retailer's statements related to all of its goods rather than to the stand, and it read them as saying, in effect, “We are a good company. We sell good products,” which is puffing. The court added that express warranties are most often found when a seller makes a specific statement about a specific product, as when a seller answered a buyer's concern about a truck's transmission by saying it had been “completely redone by Mack,” a statement that could be construed as an express warranty.10 The same requirement keeps collateral assertions out. A seller's forecast of the buyer's resale profits may sound factual, but it concerns the buyer's business and not the goods delivered, so the goods cannot fail to conform to it.
The seller need not announce a warranty. Section 2-313(2) makes clear that a seller need not use words such as “warrant” or “guarantee.”11 Many warranties are explicit representations. In Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., the seller stated that rustproof linings in its cans would prevent discoloration and adulteration of the buyer's solution, which was unquestionably an affirmation of fact relating to the goods.12 A casual spoken assurance can do the same work. In Wiseman v. Wolfe's Terre Haute Auto Auction, Inc., a seller's repeated statements that a truck was “road ready,” made after the buyer said he wanted no vehicle with mechanical problems, were treated as an express warranty.
Printed statements count as well. In Keith v. Buchanan, sales brochures described a sailboat as “a picture of sure-footed seaworthiness” and “a carefully well-equipped and very seaworthy vessel.” The court called the brochure statements specific and unequivocal in asserting that the vessel was seaworthy, and it noted that the seller's representative knew the buyer wanted a vessel for long-distance ocean cruises and that nothing in the negotiation suggested the boat was experimental.13
A promise printed in a purchase order can bind a maker as well. In Seely v. White Motor Co., the court held that a promise in the purchase order was an express warranty to the plaintiff, and because the warranty appeared there, no privity of contract was required.14 See also Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co. (manufacturer's written warranty on a vehicle).
Description of the Goods
Clause (b) covers any description of the goods that becomes part of the basis of the bargain, and it warrants that the goods will conform to the description.16 Goods trade under names. The name may be generic, as with “an automobile” or “mayonnaise,” or specific, down to a model year, a color, a wheel size, and a list of option packages.17 A description reads like a label and rarely sounds like a promise, yet it binds the seller. As Daughtrey v. Ashe puts it, quoting the Official Comment, the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what the seller has in essence agreed to sell, and a contract is normally a contract for the sale of something describable and described.18
Specific descriptions are the easiest to enforce because the delivered goods can be checked against them. In Daughtrey, a jeweler who knew and classified the diamonds in a bracelet as v.v.s. grade, one of the highest ratings, told the buyer only that they were “nice” and promised a refund if he was later dissatisfied.19 The jeweler also specifically described the stones as diamonds of “H color and v.v.s. quality.” That was not the mere opinion of value at issue in the North Carolina case the jewelers cited, where an assurance of a jewel's value was held to be opinion.20 It was a description, and a seller's description that is not mere opinion is a representation that defines the seller's obligation.21
Other descriptions fix a brand, a capacity, or a regulatory classification. In Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., a brochure defined “Midwestern Gilts” and “Meatline Boars,” and the seller breached by delivering something else. In Capital Equipment Enterprises, Inc. v. North Pier Terminal Co., a crane sold as a “30-ton McMyler Crane” in “very good condition” could lift no more than 10 tons. In Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Simon, the notation “Number 135, FAA, Flyable” on the buyer's check was read to warrant that the aircraft would qualify under the federal regulation named. A logbook description and certification of an airplane as “airworthy” has likewise been held to be an express warranty that the plane was flyable, because the airplane's certification records resemble a description provided by a blueprint.22
A description need not be made of words. Comment 5 to § 2-313 recognizes that blueprints may constitute express warranties,23 and technical specifications work the same way. A seller's specifications for a greenhouse created an express warranty that the structure as a unit would withstand a vertical load of 20 pounds per square foot, and specifications for a furnace in a seller's quotation could qualify as express warranties.24 Specifications, brochures, and samples sent before the sale can bind a seller too; the court in AFA Corp. v. Phoenix Closures, Inc. treated them as express warranties.
The hard cases are the one-word descriptions. A buyer who pays for an “air conditioner” and finds a fan with instructions to aim it at a block of ice has received something that falls short of its name. A court should treat a generic title as a description and ask what a reasonable buyer would understand the noun to convey: a person told that a carton holds an air conditioner expects a machine with a condenser and freon, whereas a person looking at a box of “Crunchberries” does not expect real fruit.25 A bare noun also overlaps with the implied warranty of merchantability, which clearly protects a buyer from utterly non-merchantable goods but is vague for goods short of that extreme.26 A specific description gives the buyer a firmer measure of conformity than that vague notion.
Art sales press the generic description hardest, because the artist's name is most of the value, and a dealer's attribution invites the reply that it is only opinion. In Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., the court held that an art dealer's representations that a work was a genuine Dali created an express warranty. The court noted that a dealer's representation of authenticity might ordinarily be considered mere opinion, but where the buyer is unsophisticated and justifiably relies on the representation, a warranty is indeed created.27 Some states have answered by statute. New York's 1966 law provides that an art merchant who sells a work to a nonmerchant buyer creates an express warranty if, in describing the work, the merchant identifies it with an author or authorship.28
A description warrants what it fairly says and no more. In Szajna v. General Motors Corp., the buyer cited two cases in which the misdescription of a product was held to breach an express warranty that the product would conform to its description, and the court distinguished them.29 The line, then, runs between delivering a different product from the one the description names, which breaches the description, and delivering a product that departs from some quality the description never mentioned, which does not. Davis v. Siloo Inc. draws the same line for a label: a label on a solvent cleaner that advised avoiding prolonged skin contact and mentioned possible dryness was held not to warrant that the product would not harm the skin.
Like the other two routes, a description warrants only if it becomes part of the basis of the bargain, and courts disagree about what that requires. Daughtrey held that the phrase imposes no reliance requirement; it makes a seller's description that is not mere opinion a representation that defines the seller's obligation.30 Other courts demand more. In a case about a tree stand, a buyer's vague familiarity with a retailer's catalogs and reliance on its reputation did not show that the catalog statements became part of the basis of the bargain.31 An answer on description therefore has two sides: a description, whether specific, generic, or made of specifications and drawings, binds the seller to what a reasonable buyer would take it to say, but a buyer who reads a name or label as a guarantee of everything it never mentions asks the description to say more than it does.
Sample or Model
Clause (c) supplies the third route: any sample or model that becomes part of the basis of the bargain warrants that the whole of the goods will conform to it.33 The other two routes work through words; this one works through an object, a specimen the seller puts before the buyer as a picture of what will arrive. The warranty reaches the whole of the goods because a buyer ordering a shipment cannot examine each unit, so the specimen is often the only thing the buyer can check. A seller who delivers goods that depart from the specimen has breached as surely as one who breaks a spoken promise.
The clause names two kinds of specimen, and Comment 6 to § 2-313 separates them by their relationship to the goods sold. A sample is actually drawn from the bulk of the goods that is the subject of the sale, such as a scoop of grain taken from the bin that will be shipped. A model is not drawn from the goods; it is something the seller offers for inspection, such as a prototype shown before any production run exists.34 The difference matters for proof, because a sample creates a stronger presumption than a model that it is a basis of the bargain.35
That presumption most distinguishes this route from the other two. The Code presumes that any sample or model is intended to become a basis of the bargain, so a seller who wants to avoid the warranty must rebut the presumption.36 Comment 6 adds that a sample drawn from an existing bulk must be regarded as describing the values of the goods contracted for unless it is accompanied by an unmistakable denial of that responsibility.37 A seller can avoid the warranty by telling the buyer clearly that the item is shown for illustrative purposes only and that the goods sold may be different.38 The burden falls on the seller because the seller controls what is held out and how it is presented. A buyer shown a specimen from the seller's stock naturally assumes the rest will match, and a seller unwilling to answer for that assumption can say so.
Printing Center of Texas, Inc. v. Supermind Publishing Co., Inc. shows the route working for a buyer. The written contract called for thirty-pound white newsprint, a witness testified that the seller had shown a sample of the newsprint to be used, and the delivered books had gray pages where the sample was white. The court treated that testimony as evidence of nonconformity, because any sample made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods will conform to it.39
The seller's best argument is that the item was only an illustration. In Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., a propane supplier first expected to furnish one brand of conversion unit, later changed its mind, and the dispute was whether the contract required that brand. The Seventh Circuit explained that a sample or description creates a duty of conforming tender only if the parties intended to contract with reference to it, so the question is whether the unit was the thing contracted for or was merely descriptive, illustrative, or suggestive. It was unlikely that the bakery cared about the brand: the bakery knew nothing about conversion units, the supplier was the expert on propane technology, and all the bakery would have cared about was that the supplier provide a unit that worked.40 The two cases differ on one fact. In Printing Center the sample was shown as the paper the buyer would receive, and the contract named that kind of paper; in Empire Gas the buyer cared only that a unit work, so a factfinder could treat the unit as illustrative and not as the thing contracted for.
Even when an item is a sample or model made part of the bargain, a court must still decide which of its characteristics the goods must share. A specimen shows many traits at once, such as color, size, grade, and texture, and it does not say whether a displayed trait is a minimum, an average, or merely typical. In Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. Ted Mirski Co., the seller warranted cherries as “twelve row larger” and sent a sizing card with a circular hole of fixed diameter. The buyer read the hole as the minimum size of every cherry, and the seller read it as the average size. Where a specimen is ambiguous, the parties' statements and the usage of the trade give it meaning, so a buyer should come to such a dispute with proof of both.