Concept
Commercial Standards Between Merchants
Adequate assurance of performance
Commercial Standards Between Merchants
Section 2-609(2) answers two questions with one yardstick: "Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined according to commercial standards."1 The first question decides whether a party may demand assurance at all, because subsection (1) allows a written demand only when reasonable grounds for insecurity have arisen. The second tests the response, because the demanding party may suspend performance only until it receives adequate assurance.2 Both questions look outward, to what merchants in the trade would treat as a warning sign and would accept as a cure.
The Code defers to the trade because it generally relies on commercial parties within a trade to establish legal standards of conduct, and the Official Comment that follows each provision offers guidance on how its terms apply.3 The deference costs some precision, since the standard is inevitably vague. It is still clear that commercial standards govern both whether grounds for insecurity exist and whether the later assurance is adequate.4 The standard also screens out purely personal worry: subjective doubts or feelings of nervousness about whether the other party will perform neither trigger the right to insist on assurances nor entitle the insecure party to alter the terms of the transaction.5
Grounds for insecurity do not require anything close to a repudiation. The Official Comment materials make the point with a supplier's own words.
The dispute between By-Lo and ParTech states the inquiry as a question about a reasonable merchant. The court asked whether a reasonable merchant in By-Lo's position would "feel that his expectation of receiving full performance was threatened."7 Whether a party had reasonable grounds for insecurity and whether the other side gave adequate assurance are generally fact questions for the jury. The court nonetheless held, as a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could find ParTech's assurance on the continuing support provision inadequate, and none could find that By-Lo had reasonable grounds to ask for it.8 A court takes the question from the jury only when the record leaves no room for reasonable disagreement.
In Rocheux's dispute with its buyers, the record pointed the other way. The buyers had failed to pay more than $2 million of the purchase price for the 2006 deliveries and the warehouse goods, and the court read the seller's insecurity against that course of dealings. It could not say the insecurity was unreasonable as a matter of law.9 The same yardstick decided adequacy. The court, quoting New Jersey's version of the merchant provision, knew of no authority requiring an insecure party to accept an assurance of C.O.D. from a delinquent party more than $2 million in arrears when assurances were sought.10 A merchant sizing up a customer looks at the whole account, not one invoice, and the court did the same.
Payment history also carried the day in RAD Concepts, Inc. v. Wilks Precision Instrument Co., Inc. The buyer there sold multiple units to its own customers but paid only a small percentage of its revenues toward the seller's outstanding invoices, and the seller could not reach the buyer to learn when the balance would be paid. The court quoted Comment 3 of § 2-609 for the point that a buyer who falls behind in its account impairs the seller's expectation of payment. It then held that the seller had reasonable grounds for insecurity "because of [buyer's] payment history and avoidance of telephone calls," so the seller could demand assurances and suspend further performance until it received payment or acceptable assurances.11
The three cases mark out the standard. By-Lo shows a court deciding the issue as a matter of law because no reasonable jury could find reasonable grounds. Rocheux and RAD Concepts show the kind of record that supports a demand: millions in unpaid invoices, a thin trickle of payments, and a buyer who stops answering the telephone.
Subsection (2) opens with the words "between merchants," and those words confine the commercial-standards measure to dealings between merchants. Subsection (1) gives the right to demand assurance whenever reasonable grounds for insecurity arise "with respect to the performance of either party" and adds no merchant requirement.12 A consumer or other non-merchant who faces real grounds for insecurity is therefore not shut out of the procedure; the open question is only the yardstick. The materials here do not say how courts calibrate reasonableness in those transactions. An answer on such facts should apply the reasonableness requirement of subsection (1), note that subsection (2) speaks to merchants, and stop short of claiming either that the right disappears or that the commercial yardstick carries over automatically.