Concept
The Written Demand
Adequate assurance of performance
The Written Demand
The grounds for insecurity studied above open the door; the demand is the step through it. Section 2-609(1) lets the insecure party “in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance” and, if commercially reasonable, suspend any performance for which it has not already received the agreed return, but only “until he receives such assurance.”1 The suspension right is thus framed as a waiting period, and a waiting period presupposes that assurance has been demanded.
The demand solves a problem that the rules of constructive conditions leave open. A party whose counterpart commits a total breach when performance is due may treat her own obligations as discharged. Suppose, however, that something happens before the date for performance that gives her serious doubts about the other party’s willingness or ability to perform.2 She has no breach to point to yet, and to act on doubt alone is to guess. Section 2-609 exists to “obviate the necessity of one party guessing whether or not the other intends to perform when he begins to receive signals that cause him concern.”3
The demand matters to both sides. For the sender it turns doubt into authority to suspend, and a party that halts its own performance without one risks becoming the repudiator, because repudiation occurs when a party makes clear by words or actions, before performance falls due, that it will breach when performance does fall due.4 For the recipient, a proper demand starts a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, in which to supply assurance, and failure to do so results in repudiation of the contract.5 Those consequences are fair only to a recipient who could tell what was being asked and what turned on the answer, so the disputes that reach courts concern form and content. The first is whether the demand must literally be written; the second is whether a communication, written or not, says enough to work as a demand.
The Writing Requirement
Courts have read the words “in writing” in two ways. The first follows the statute: a demand for assurances must be in writing to be effective. Decisions to that effect include National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Service, Inc. (5th Cir. 1975), Teeman v. Jurek (Minn. 1977), Bodine Sewer v. Eastern Illinois Precast (Ill. App.), and Automated Energy Systems, Inc. v. Fibers & Fabrics of Georgia, Inc. (Ga. App. 1982).6 In Atwood-Kellogg, Inc. v. Nickeson Farms the court added that, absent attenuating circumstances, the written demand is required before the demanding party may proceed with remedies for anticipatory breach.7 On this reading an oral demand supports neither a suspension nor a later charge that the other side’s silence was a repudiation.
A second line treats the writing as a means to an end. AMF, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. began when McDonald’s ordered 23 computerized cash registers from AMF and a prototype installed at a franchise performed poorly. McDonald’s personnel met with AMF and demanded that the order for all 23 units be held up pending resolution of the prototype’s problems; when AMF failed to resolve them, McDonald’s cancelled. The court rejected AMF’s argument that McDonald’s had made no written demand and held that McDonald’s had properly invoked the Code provision.8 In such cases a pattern of interaction demonstrated a clear understanding between the parties that suspension of the demanding party’s performance was the alternative if its concerns were not adequately addressed.9
The court that decided the grain-sale dispute discussed below found “more convincing authority” for the view that a demand may be written or oral, so long as it gives a “clear understanding” of the insecure party’s intent to suspend performance until it receives adequate assurances.10 That standard serves the section’s purpose: if the parties’ own interaction already told the recipient that an answer was needed, a writing would add only paper.
A commentator observes that this loosening is typical of § 2-609. Its phrases, “commercially reasonable,” “reasonable grounds for insecurity,” and “adequate assurances of due performance,” call for fact-specific interpretation, and courts have clouded even a term that looks unambiguous. Notwithstanding the explicit requirement of a writing, some courts treat the formality as superfluous where the other party clearly understands that the insecure party will halt performance unless assurances are forthcoming.11 The flexible line is best stated as an exception with conditions, not as a repeal of the statutory words.
Scott v. Crown shows where the flexible line stops. When one of the buyer’s trucks appeared at the seller’s farm to take another load of grain, the seller refused to deliver.12 The only communication he had made before suspending performance was an oral statement to the buyer’s driver. Having adopted the clear-understanding test, the court held that statement insufficient to justify the suspension under § 4-2-609.13 The buyer’s reply confirms the gap. Writing on March 23, 1983, in response to the seller’s refusal to load the wheat, the buyer insisted that he had not breached, that the seller had, and asked the seller to resume performance.14 That letter reads as a reaction to a refusal to perform, not as an answer to a demand that carried a stated consequence. In AMF, by contrast, McDonald’s personnel met with the supplier and demanded that the order be held up until the prototype’s problems were resolved. The two cases differ in what the recipient could have understood from what was said.
The seller’s suspension also exposed him to the charge that he, not the buyer, had breached, and the buyer’s letter made exactly that charge.15 A party in that position is not always without recourse. If it retracts a repudiation before the time for performance and attempts to reinstate the contract, the contract is reinstated unless the other party has changed position in reasonable reliance in the meantime.16
Because a court may follow either line, and because even a favorable court will ask what each side understood, the careful course is to put the demand in writing before suspending anything. The writing should say that the sender demands adequate assurance of due performance, identify the doubt, and state that performance will be withheld until assurance arrives. A party invoking § 2-609 is well advised to track its language closely and to say expressly that it is invoking the section, so that its intent is clear to the court.18 On an exam, a seller who telephoned and then stopped shipping presents the split: apply the jurisdiction’s rule if the facts give it, set out both lines if they do not, and test the oral exchange against the clear-understanding standard.
Content of a Proper Demand
The statute describes the demand by what it must achieve, not by its wording: the insecure party may demand “adequate assurance of due performance,” and until that assurance arrives it may suspend, if commercially reasonable, any performance for which it has not received the agreed return.20 Because the text prescribes no words, courts have had to decide which communications count. A demand starts the recipient’s time to answer and justifies the sender’s suspension, and an unanswered demand ends in repudiation, which is fair only to a recipient who could tell what was being asked.21
The permissive side of the line appears in Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group. The seller’s email of August 2 and its correspondence of September 21, 2006, never used the term “adequate assurance.” Reading them against the parties’ prior dealings, the court found that they clearly conveyed the seller’s reasons for insecurity, namely the buyers’ failure to pay substantial sums on invoices for the 2006 deliveries and the warehouse goods, and clearly indicated that the seller intended to suspend its own performance. The August 2 email acknowledged that the buyers had recently sent a check on an invoice and proposed a way to resolve their past-due invoices.22 The seller sought nothing more than the performance already due under the contracts, which was payment for and receipt of the warehouse goods and payment for the 2006 deliveries. Given the buyers’ undisputed failure to pay more than $2 million of the purchase price, the court could not say that the seller’s insecurity was unreasonable as a matter of law.23 Courts, it added, have generally eschewed formalistic requirements for the demand, preferring a case-specific approach that reads a party’s demands in the context of its course of dealings with the adverse party, as AMF illustrates.24
Real demands are rarely drafted by someone with the statute in mind. A letter in a decision that Rocheux cited told the other side that the process the letter began could end once the other side had provided adequate assurance of performance of its obligations. One commentator finds it hard to imagine that anyone without a legal education would throw around phrases like “adequate assurance of performance.” More often the language falls well short of paraphrasing the statute, and the litigator must argue whether words probably uttered without adequate assurance in mind can be said afterward to have been a demand for adequate assurance. The argument in Rocheux is typical.25
Courts also do not consider the alleged demand in isolation. Cases in which an ambiguous writing failed to qualify tend to be cases in which the court also found no reasonable grounds for insecurity, and cases in which a writing was construed as a demand tend to be cases in which the court found such grounds. The two conclusions may reinforce each other in the court’s mind.26 That pattern describes how courts behave, so an answer should still analyze the content of the demand as a separate question.
A demand may also go wrong by asking for the wrong thing. In the grain-sale dispute, counsel for the seller demanded assurances that the buyer would pay for grain shipped under one fully performed contract and one partly performed contract. The opinion sets that demand against the contracts’ payment terms: payment on the first was not due until April 13, 1983, and payment on the second was not due until thirty days after full performance.27 The statute authorizes a demand for assurance of “due performance,” and payment that is not yet due is not due performance. A seller who suspends on a demand that reaches past the contract’s terms therefore has no justified demand behind the suspension and risks being treated as the repudiating party.28 The Rocheux seller, by contrast, sought nothing beyond what the contracts already required. A demand must also be commercially reasonable, and a party feeling insecure should proceed cautiously in making one.29
A demand can fail by asking for too little. In one illustration, Sandy has seen a report that has made her doubt that Bill will perform, but her demand calls for little more than Bill gives her. He does not assure her that the report is wrong, probably because it is not, yet he reaffirms his commitment to perform. Sandy is right not to feel much reassured, but given her inept demand she will likely have difficulty arguing that his failure to provide a more substantive assurance is a repudiation.30 The risk runs both ways: a thin demand may leave the sender bound to a thin reply, while a suspension resting on a demand the sender had no right to make can make the sender the party who repudiates.31
The facts of C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Coalfield Services, Inc. test the same questions against conduct rather than a formal letter. Maddox called Coalfield and said that he would sign its proposal, but he never did. Coalfield’s crew began work the next day, March 20, and progress was slower than expected. On April 8, after Maddox had failed to reply to repeated requests to sign, Coalfield ordered its crew to stop work and faxed Maddox that it would not proceed unless he accepted the proposed contract and paid an invoice for $103,500, which was 45 percent of the contract price, the percentage of the job Coalfield claimed it had completed.32 Like the Rocheux correspondence, the fax tied the sender’s performance to a stated condition. Whether the repeated requests and the fax together amounted to a demand, and whether the invoice sought more than the parties’ arrangement made due, are the questions the steps below put to any such message.
None of these steps asks whether the communication recited § 2-609, which is why a missing citation to the statute rarely decides the issue. Step three can decide a case on its own, as counsel’s demand in the grain-sale dispute shows.