Concept
Reasonable Grounds for Insecurity
Adequate assurance of performance
Reasonable Grounds for Insecurity
Every contract for sale carries an obligation that neither party will impair the other's expectation of receiving due performance, and § 2-609(1) lets a party act when that expectation is threatened. It does not reach every party who feels uneasy. The right opens only "[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party," and it then allows the insecure party to demand adequate assurance in writing and, if commercially reasonable, to suspend any performance for which it has not already received the agreed return.1 A remedy with that force needs a filter. Without one, a party that regretted its bargain could send a letter, stop performing, and wait.
The filter solves a problem the older doctrine left open. Under the rules of constructive conditions, a party who commits a total breach when its performance is due lets the other treat its own obligations as discharged. Suppose, however, that something happens before the date set for performance and gives the second party serious doubts about the first party's willingness or ability to perform.2 Section 2-609 answers that doubt with a demand for assurance, and Restatement § 251 generalizes the idea to any obligee who "reasonably believes" that the obligor will commit a breach that would itself give a claim for total breach.3
Both formulations measure the doubt objectively. Subjective doubts or feelings of nervousness neither trigger the right to insist on assurances nor entitle the insecure party to alter the terms of the transaction, and the existence of grounds, like the adequacy of the later assurance, is governed by commercial standards.4 Between merchants, § 2-609(2) says so directly.5
Four questions organize the cases: when the grounds must arise, where they may come from, how a court tells a genuine ground from a pretext for escaping a bad bargain, and who decides whether the grounds were reasonable.
Change After Contracting
A reasonable ground is a reason, and the risk that every contract carries is not one. In By-Lo Oil Co. v. ParTech, Inc., a software customer argued that its vendor was due to perform in two years and that a failure would then be costly. The court answered that this "is generally the case in any contract" and that the mere fact that performance was to come due does not satisfy § 2-609.6 It quoted Cole v. Melvin for the reason: the drafters did not intend that a party could "go about demanding security for the performance of the other whenever he gets nervous about a contract," because "[s]ome reason for the demand for assurance must precede the demand."7
The same opinion shows what a reason looks like. ParTech's alleged failure to return calls, read together with the contract's provision for continuing support, without which the software "may not function as well or at all," "might have given rise to reasonable grounds for insecurity at some point before Y2K."8 The court pointed to Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon, Inc., where a seller's growing credit exposure to a buyer who would not return its calls about the situation constituted reasonable grounds.9 In both settings a risk the contract had already created met a development that made it real: silence from the other side.
By-Lo's own argument rested in essence on the approaching performance date. Unsatisfied with the responses it received, it sued a ParTech company in New York, won a default judgment, discovered that the defendant was not the ParTech it had contracted with, and in June 1998 bought a new system for over $175,000.10 The court nonetheless held that, as a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find that ParTech's assurance was inadequate or that By-Lo had reasonable grounds for insecurity.11
A baseline of facts already known to the demanding party gives the timing rule its sharpest edge. In Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., the court asked whether there had been "a change for the worse" in the buyer's financial condition after the contract was entered into.12 The buyer's inability or unwillingness to borrow from a particular lender did not prove a worsening. Its credit status, about which the seller's comptroller conceded that he had had complete information, was no different and no weaker than it had been at the contract date.13 The court surmised that the seller had simply changed its mind about extending credit and did not wish to go forward without additional security. On that view the demand lacked good faith and was a backdoor attempt to rewrite the original agreement.14
The clearest change is the other side's own admission of trouble. Suppose Seller tells Buyer, "We are experiencing problems with production and may be unable to deliver the goods, as agreed." Seller has not said it will not deliver, so the statement is no repudiation, but it gives Buyer grounds for insecurity, and Buyer should demand adequate assurance. A buyer that treats the statement as anticipatory repudiation and stops performing is the party in breach.15
Grounds Beyond the Contract
The change need not occur inside the contract being performed. Official Comment 3 provides that, "[u]nder commercial standards and in accord with commercial practice, a ground for insecurity need not arise from or be directly related to the contract in question," and it gives an example: "a buyer who falls behind in 'his account' with the seller, even though the items involved have to do with separate and legally distinct contracts, impairs the seller's expectation of due performance."17 The trial court relied on that comment in Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group, reading the seller's correspondence to show that its insecurity arose from the buyer's failure to pay for both the 2006 deliveries and the warehouse goods.18
Events outside the parties' dealings qualify too. The comment "certainly allows external events to trigger insecurity," and the obvious case is a seller who learns that its buyer has breached a contract with another seller and demands assurances on its own contract. The insolvency of a company affiliated with the obligor can also trigger grounds when that company had responsibilities under the contract.19 In Scott v. Crown, a grain seller faced a buyer who made no personal contact after the seller refused to load the wheat. The trial court found reasonable grounds because the seller had recently suffered a similar episode with another grain dealer, a pattern of unreturned calls ending in nonpayment for a grain delivery, and because an investigator told the seller that his office held active complaints from other farmers against the buyer. The appellate court held that this evidence supported the conclusion.20 A buyer who hears from a person outside the contract can also have reasonable grounds, as Clem Perrin Marine Towing, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co. illustrates.
Delegation supplies the most mechanical example. Section 2-210 treats delegation of performance and assignability as normal and permissible incidents of a contract for the sale of goods,21 yet the delegation is an ipso facto basis for insecurity and gives the other party a right to demand assurances.22 The other party bargained for performance by a particular obligor, and a stranger it never chose now stands to perform. The change in who will perform is itself the threat, so no showing that the delegate is unreliable is needed.
Comment 3 widens the places grounds may come from, but it does not relax the standard. A party's nervousness about the other side's ability to perform remains insufficient, and what counts as a ground is measured by commercial standards.23 Whether a market price swing alone can supply a ground is the hardest of the outside-the-contract questions, and the next subsection takes it up.
Pretext and Market Swings
The requirement of reasonable grounds also screens out the party that simply wants out. A justified demand lets the sender suspend its own performance,25 so a party whose bargain has turned unprofitable has every reason to discover insecurity. Market price changes that increase the cost of performance may lead a court to look askance at efforts to use a request for adequate assurances as a pretext for avoiding an unprofitable contract.26
The central warning is BAII Banking Corp. v. UPG, Inc., where the court concluded that the buyer had used § 2-609 "to avoid accepting the cargos" from the seller "at a time when these transactions had become unprofitable." The court was attentive to the risk that parties who wish to escape a contract may strategically employ § 2-609 to make an unfounded claim that their "expectation of receiving due performance" has been "impaired," and it concluded that the possibility of such abuse counsels caution in applying the section.27
A profit motive alone does not defeat a demand. In S & S, Inc. v. Meyer, the sellers of grain "did stand to profit if their contract with the buyer were terminated." But the buyer had filed a petition in bankruptcy, written checks against insufficient funds, and assigned contracts to a third party after losing its license to sell grain, and the court determined that these factors gave the sellers reasonable grounds for insecurity.28 What separates S & S from BAII is the substance behind the demand. In S & S it consisted of facts about the buyer's own finances and conduct, and in BAII the court found the buyer using the provision to escape unprofitable transactions. A seller can be both self-interested and right.
The good-faith limit reaches pretext even when no market swing is involved. In Pittsburgh-Des Moines, the seller had no new fact about the buyer's credit, and the court treated its demand for additional security as lacking good faith.29
Whether a price movement alone can supply reasonable grounds is an open question, and an exam answer should say so. Comment 3 is arguably broad enough to reach circumstances unrelated to any action or omission of the parties, such as severe market price fluctuations since contracting or statements by authorities that the contract is unenforceable. Yet "[i]t is unclear whether market price fluctuations, standing alone, are sufficient to provide reasonable grounds for insecurity."30 The comment's breadth supports coverage, and the pretext cases support skepticism, especially when the demanding party profits from escape. A price move accompanied by real facts about the other side's performance makes the stronger demand.
Fact Question or Law
The first three subsections described what counts as a reasonable ground, and the last question is who decides whether the facts of a given dispute meet the test. The statute's operative terms are standards: "reasonable grounds for insecurity," "adequate assurance of due performance," and a suspension that is "commercially reasonable."32 Between merchants, the reasonableness of the grounds and the adequacy of the assurance are measured against commercial standards.33 A standard applies to one particular set of dealings, so whoever applies it needs the evidence and the authority to weigh it.
Courts therefore treat these questions as questions of fact. The reasonableness of a party's insecurity, the propriety of its demand, and the adequacy of the assurance tendered present questions of fact for the jury,34 and any inquiry into whether a reasonable basis for insecurity exists is "necessarily fact-specific" and will normally be a question for the finder of fact.35 By-Lo said the same of reasonable grounds and adequate assurance under § 2-609(1) and (4).36
The default has an exception drawn from ordinary summary judgment practice. Where "reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, taking all inferences in favor of the non-moving party," a court may resolve these issues as a matter of law.37 The tilt toward the non-moving party keeps the exception narrow, because the court must give that party every reasonable inference before it concludes that no jury could disagree. In Rocheux International of N.J., Inc. v. U.S. Merchants Financial Group, the court set out these principles before it turned to the parties' cross-motions.38
By-Lo shows the exception at work. The court recognized the general rule and noted that the customer did not argue that district courts lack power to decide such questions as a matter of law, only that its case was not one of those. The court disagreed, holding that By-Lo lacked reasonable grounds for insecurity as a matter of law and that the district court was correct to rule as a matter of law that ParTech's assurance was adequate.39 It cited BAII as an example of the exceptions to the general rule.40 At the other pole, the trial court in Scott found reasonable grounds itself on a record of three concrete facts, and the appellate court held that the evidence supported its conclusion.41
The same allocation governs each step of the procedure. Rocheux lists the grounds, the demand, and the assurance together as fact questions, and By-Lo applied the exception to both the grounds and the assurance.42 On an exam, an answer that calls insecurity reasonable or unreasonable should add that the issue ordinarily goes to the trier of fact. It should then say whether the facts are so one-sided that only one conclusion is open.