Concept
Good Faith and Discharge
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing
Good Faith and Discharge
When a contract provides that a named event will end a party’s duty, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 230 decides what the event accomplishes. Section 230(1) states the baseline: the duty is discharged if the event occurs.1 Section 230(2)(a) states the first exception: the duty is not discharged if the occurrence of the event is the result of a breach by the obligor of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.2 The obligor is the party whose duty the event would end, and discharge means that the duty has been brought to a legal end, so that nothing further is owed under the promise.
The exception follows from what an event clause does. The clause allocates a risk: the parties agreed that if the event occurs, one side is excused, and each priced the deal with that allocation in view. That allocation assumes the event arrives from outside the obligor’s bad faith. An obligor who could trigger the event by wrongful conduct would hold the power to cancel its own promise, and the law withholds that power because every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.3 No party should profit from an event of its own making.
Good faith has already entered the law of failure to perform once. Section 241(e) lists the extent to which a failing party’s behavior comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing among the circumstances bearing on materiality.4 Here the same duty answers a different question: whether a party’s own duty has ended at all. The first subsection below states the baseline rule, and the next two take up the exceptions.
Terminating Events
Under § 230(1), when the terms of a contract provide that the occurrence of an event will terminate an obligor’s duty of immediate performance or its duty to pay damages for breach, that duty is discharged if the event occurs, except as § 230(2) provides.5 A clause may therefore end either duty: the duty to perform when performance falls due, or the duty to answer in damages for a breach. Discharge follows from the event itself. A court applying the rule does not weigh how badly the event hurt either party; it asks whether the contract made this event the end of this duty, and whether the event happened.
The parties made that choice themselves. A clause that ends a duty on a named event allocates the risk of the event to one side, so each party can price the bargain with the allocation in view. Materiality works differently: there a court weighs the seriousness of a failure the contract never classified. Here the parties classified the event in advance, so the court has an allocation to enforce and no seriousness to weigh.
Shopping-center leases supply a familiar example. A smaller tenant depends on the customers an anchor store draws, so a lease may let the tenant leave when the anchor does. In Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., a drugstore’s lease let it terminate if the anchor supermarket ceased operating; the supermarket closed, and the tenant was allowed to terminate. The event occurred as the lease described it, which is all the rule requires.
Older cases and the Restatement name this idea differently, and both vocabularies appear in the decisions. An event that must occur before a duty arises works in the opposite direction: until it occurs, the duty does not arise, and once it cannot occur, the obligor is discharged.6 Under the Second Restatement’s structure, an event that terminates a duty, traditionally a “condition subsequent,” is treated separately in § 230 simply as an “event.” The drafters thought the difference “one of substance and not merely of the form in which the provision is stated.”7 Courts that generally follow the Second Restatement nevertheless often keep the traditional condition precedent and condition subsequent labels.8 The label matters less than the function: if the contract provides that an event ends a duty, § 230(1) applies, whatever the court calls the event.
Courts enforce a clearly stated express condition strictly, an approach characteristic of classical contract law that remains alive today.9 The same literalism governs an event that ends a duty. The clause discharges the duty only when the named event occurs, so a near miss does not count. In Sun Valley, Ltd. v. Galyan’s Trading Co., a lease required a particular Sears anchor store, and a Sears outlet store did not satisfy the requirement. Strictness has a reason: the clause exists to give both sides a line they can see in advance, and a close-enough standard would make a court decide in every dispute how near a miss was near enough.
Strict enforcement is tolerable because courts insist first that the contract speak clearly. Restatement (Second) § 227 prefers an interpretation that a term or event is not an express condition, in order to reduce the risk of forfeiture.10 Whether a term is an express condition depends on the parties’ intent, but a finding of one requires clear, unambiguous language, and none will be found if another reasonable interpretation exists.11 In Solar Applications Engineering, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp., a Texas decision, a construction contract required a lien-release affidavit before final payment to the builder. The court held the requirement was only a promise, not an express condition, because the contractor could deliver a lien-free property by other means and still claim final payment.12
An express condition also differs from a promise in what it asks of the parties. In an option contract, the buyer’s delivery of notice by a stated date is an express condition to the seller’s duty to sell the land. The buyer has no commitment to ensure that the notice is given: the condition gives it discretion to send the notice if it wishes to exercise the option, and imposes no obligation to do so if it lets the option lapse.13 An event that ends a duty shares that feature. No one has promised that it will not occur, so the event clause itself gives the other side no claim when it does. If the event came about through the obligor’s own wrongful conduct, the remedy must come from another source, the duty of good faith, which the next subsection takes up.
Event Caused by Bad Faith
Section 230(2)(a) turns the inquiry from whether the event happened to who brought it about: the obligor’s duty is not discharged if the occurrence of the event is the result of a breach by the obligor of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.15 The duty whose breach triggers the exception is the one § 205 attaches to every contract in its performance and its enforcement.16 Earlier sections of this chapter described what that duty requires; the exception applies those requirements to the way an event came about.
The prevention principle supplies the model. Every contract includes an implied condition that one party will not prevent performance by the other, a corollary of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in performance.17 The Supreme Court stated the principle in United States v. Peck: “the conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other from performing his part is an excuse for nonperformance.”18 The government there had caused all of the contracted hay to be cut by other parties, and the seller was relieved from his contract.19 Section 230(2)(a) carries the same idea into the law of discharge. An event that results from the obligor’s own breach of good faith is disregarded, and the duty remains. A party may rely on a named event only if it did not write the event.
In Maness v. Collins, Maness had been a production manager for SKM. The trial court found that Josh Smith’s actions effectively prevented him from functioning in that job. It credited testimony from Maness and former SKM employees that Smith fomented dissent against him, undercut his authority, and sought to get rid of him, and it did not credit Smith’s denial.20 The appellate court affirmed. SKM and the new owners were without cause to terminate his employment, and Maness could recover under the contract.21 Having prevented Maness from functioning as production manager, the employer could not treat the result as cause. The logic parallels § 230(2)(a): the ground the party invoked was one its own conduct had produced.
The same reasoning reaches events that depend on someone’s judgment. One court respected a building inspector’s finding that the plaintiff’s building was not free from “defects of a substantial nature,” although the trial court had found the defects, though expensive to remedy, not substantial, because the contract left that question to the honest judgment of the defendant’s expert.22 The protection attaches to honest judgment. A determination the obligor itself dictates is not one.
Two things must be shown before the exception operates: a breach by the obligor of its duty of good faith, and a causal connection between that breach and the event. The text supplies the second requirement, since the event must be the result of the breach. General misconduct by the obligor that never touched the event leaves the discharge in place, and an obligor that merely benefits from an event it did not cause remains free to rely on it.
A neighboring rule shows the same idea from the other direction. A condition is an event that must occur before a duty becomes due, so when it fails to occur the promisor ordinarily owes nothing. If the promisor hindered or prevented the event, the nonoccurrence is excused. Consider a buyer whose duty to buy a house depends on obtaining a mortgage. The buyer does not promise to obtain the mortgage, so the condition is not promissory, but the buyer does promise, expressly or impliedly, to make reasonable efforts to get it.23 A buyer who makes a good-faith effort and is denied has suffered a failed condition and need not buy.24 A buyer who does not try, or makes only a token attempt, has hindered or prevented the condition. The seller may then claim that the condition is excused, so that the buyer’s promise to purchase becomes enforceable as if the condition had not existed.25 A buyer who knowingly withholds the documents the lender needs stands at best on the token-attempt side of that line. The two buyers differ in one fact: whether the buyer’s own conduct produced the missing approval. Section 230(2)(a) runs on the same logic. There a party is held to a promise although the condition failed; here a party is held to a duty although the event occurred; in each, the party who caused the result cannot profit from it.
Prevention reaches only conduct that breaches the duty of good faith, and that explains the cases in which the argument fails. A buyer who makes adequate efforts but is denied has hindered nothing. Courts have also declined to excuse conditions where the conduct complained of was something the contract allowed or where the required effort was in fact made. See Rastek Construction & Development Corp. v. General Land Commercial Real Estate Co. (sale agreement gave the seller the right to refuse to proceed); Indiana State Highway Commission v. Curtis (good faith required only that a governmental approval be considered in good faith, not that it be secured). As earlier sections of this chapter explained, express terms prevail, and good faith polices how a party exercises its rights without forbidding what the contract authorizes. An obligor acting within a right the contract expressly gives it has not breached the duty, and § 230(2)(a) then has nothing to work on.
Other Exceptions to Discharge
Section 230(2) is a lead-in that clauses (a) and (b) complete: the obligor’s duty is not discharged if the occurrence of the event meets either.28 Clause (a), covered above, reaches an event that is the result of the obligor’s breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.29 Clause (b) and subsection (3) add two more exceptions with different triggers. Bad faith is therefore one of three independent routes by which a clearly stated event can leave a duty in place, and a student who stops after finding no bad faith has checked only one of them.
Clause (b) is best learned in the Restatement’s words. The duty is not discharged if the occurrence of the event “could not have been prevented because of impracticability and continuance of the duty does not subject the obligor to a materially increased burden.”30 The text joins two requirements with “and,” so both must be addressed. Its trigger differs from clause (a)’s: clause (a) looks to a breach by the obligor, while clause (b) speaks of prevention, impracticability, and burden and mentions no breach. This chapter does not develop clause (b) beyond its text, so state it as written and keep it apart from the other two exceptions.
Subsection (3) works on a different principle altogether: the obligor’s own assurance. The obligor’s duty is not discharged if, before the event occurs, the obligor promises to perform the duty even if the event occurs and does not revoke the promise before the obligee, the party to whom the performance is owed, materially changes position in reliance on it.31 Two pieces of text carry the rule. The promise must come before the event, and it must reach the event itself, since the obligor has to promise to perform even if the event occurs. The revocation window is then measured against the obligee’s reliance, so the obligor may take the promise back at any time until the obligee materially changes position because of it. The text names no other requirement. It asks only for the promise, the absence of revocation, and the reliance, and it never asks how the event came about or why the obligor gave the assurance. An obligor that did no wrong therefore remains bound once the window closes.
The line falls where harm begins. Until the obligee acts on the assurance, the assurance has cost the obligee nothing, and letting the obligor withdraw it leaves the parties where the contract put them: the event ends the duty, as they agreed. After the obligee has materially changed position, withdrawal would leave the obligee worse off than if the promise had never been made. The word “materially” keeps a trivial adjustment from closing the window.
The two distributors received the same promise, so the promise cannot explain the different results. The difference lies in when the withdrawal arrived relative to the distributor’s reliance, the variable the text makes decisive. Reading subsection (3) as a bad-faith rule misdirects the analysis, because the provision asks about the promise, the revocation, and the reliance, and never about motive: a supplier that gave the assurance innocently is as bound as one that gave it strategically. Reading it as a rule that any early assurance is final ignores the revocation window, which keeps the obligor free to retreat until the obligee has committed something to the assurance.