Concept
Good Faith and Materiality
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing
Good Faith and Materiality
Every contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.1 The preceding sections asked whether a party had broken that duty. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 puts good faith to a second use: clause (e) makes the extent to which a party’s failure to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing one of the circumstances that decide whether the failure is material.2
Materiality matters because it controls what the other side may do. A party confronted with its counterparty’s failure can keep performing and sue for the shortfall, or it can suspend its own performance. The law allows suspension only for a material failure, and discharge only when that failure becomes total.3 A rule that let any defect unlock those rights would let a party that regretted its bargain escape it over a trivial lapse. A rule that never let a party stop would force one who had been substantially deprived of what it bought to keep paying for performance it was not receiving. Materiality marks the line between the two. The first subsection below shows how courts weigh the circumstances; the second shows how motive shifts the weight of a breach without deciding it.
Weighing the Factors
Section 241 lists five circumstances that are significant in deciding whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material.4 Significant is the operative word. A court weighs the circumstances against one another,5 and good faith is only one of the five.
Courts tie materiality to suspension through conditions. Each party’s duty of performance is implicitly conditioned on the absence of an uncured material failure by the other party. That is a constructive condition, one the law supplies though the parties never wrote it.6 An uncured material breach is in effect the nonoccurrence of that condition, and the injured party may suspend its own performance until the breach is cured.7 A minor breach leaves the condition satisfied. The injured party keeps a claim for damages, which may be negligible, but it must keep performing and may set those damages off against what it still owes.8
Materiality is also the gateway to the harsher remedy. When an uncured material breach becomes total, the injured party’s remaining duties are discharged and it may sue at once for damages for total breach.9 Section 242 makes a breach total only if it is first material, and it adds two considerations: how far further delay would hinder the injured party’s substitute arrangements, and how much importance the agreement attaches to performance without delay.10
Before a court weighs anything, it may have to decide whether the broken term was an express condition at all. That question turns on the parties’ intent, and courts demand clear, unambiguous language before finding an express condition. In Solar Applications Engineering, Inc. v. T.A. Operating Corp. (Tex. 2010), a “lien-release affidavit” required before final payment to a builder was held to be only a promise, because an express condition will not be found when another reasonable interpretation exists. The builder could deliver a lien-free property by other means and still collect its final payment.11
The five circumstances can be put as questions about the breach:
- How much of the benefit the injured party reasonably expected will it lose?12
- How fully can damages compensate the injured party for the part of that benefit it will lose?13
- How much forfeiture will the failing party suffer if the injured party may terminate?14
- How likely is the failing party to cure, taking account of all the circumstances, including any reasonable assurances?15
- How closely does the failing party’s behavior comport with standards of good faith and fair dealing?16
The first two questions look to the injured party. The first is the heart of the inquiry: did the injured party receive substantially what it bargained for? Courts usually give it the most weight.17 They answer it by looking at the entire exchange the contract contemplates and asking whether the missing performance forms a significant part of the consideration bargained for.18 Suppose a developer delivers a house with cosmetic defects. The buyer can live in it and keeps nearly everything it expected, so the buyer must still close and pursue damages. Now put the defects in the roof, so that rain and snow reach the house. The buyer cannot live there, and unless the developer cures within a reasonable time, the buyer may refuse to buy.19
The second question asks whether damages can make good the shortfall. If they can, making the injured party keep performing costs it little, because it deducts its damages from what it still owes.20 If its loss is serious but cannot be adequately compensated, forcing it to perform leaves it carrying that loss, and the circumstance weighs toward materiality.21
Courts err when they let that second question decide the case. In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Basell U.S.A., the trial court found no material breach as a matter of law after looking almost exclusively at whether the railroad could be adequately compensated. The Third Circuit reversed, because the other circumstances, including whether the railroad was substantially deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected, could have supported a finding of material breach.22
The weighing can also favor the breaching party. In Boston LLC v. Juarez, a landlord sought to enforce a forfeiture clause against a tenant who had failed to procure renter’s insurance. The court held the breach too trivial to justify eviction, which would also have violated the statutory policy protecting tenants against arbitrary termination.23 Both courts asked how much the injured party lost and how much the breaching party stood to lose before allowing a drastic response.
The last three questions turn to the failing party. They are equitable considerations. They do not measure the injured party’s loss; they let a court weigh the hardship that termination would cause the failing party and the reasons for the failure.24 Forfeiture counts most when the failing party has already done most of what it promised, because termination would then cost it the most.25 Cure counts because a party likely to fix the problem leaves the injured party a remedy short of ending the contract, which is suspension until the repair arrives.26 Good faith, the fifth circumstance, belongs to this group. It says nothing about how much the injured party lost; it looks to the manner of the failure. A breach need not be deliberate or willful to be material, so an innocent failure is not saved by being unintended. Section 241 does let a court give some weight to whether the breach was willful or innocent, or a violation of standards of fair dealing.27
The lawyer has received nearly everything it bargained for. The lawyer or another attorney can do the missing research, and that work can be priced as damages. Denying all payment would impose a heavy forfeiture on the specialist. The specialist’s departure was voluntary, but accepting a government post probably violates no standard of good faith and fair dealing. Weighed together, the circumstances point to an immaterial breach, so the specialist recovers the price less the lawyer’s damages.
The circumstances do not all point one way. The failure was a knowing departure from duty, and a departing specialist leaves no future performance for cure to protect. The benefit delivered, the measurable damages, and the size of the forfeiture carry the result anyway, because the analysis weighs the circumstances and does not count them.28 Because good faith is one of five, even an adverse conclusion on it is not decisive.29
Good Faith as a Factor
Clause (e) asks how deliberate or unfair the failure to perform was. A deliberate or evasive deviation points toward materiality, and an honest, inadvertent, trivial one points away from it. Either answer moves weight on the scale without deciding the case, because a court balancing the equities may give some weight to whether the breach was willful or innocent, or a violation of standards of fair dealing.31
The clause replaced a harsher rule. In Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, the leading decision on substantial performance (the doctrine that lets a builder who has done nearly everything promised recover the price less damages for the shortfall), Cardozo limited the doctrine in two sentences. Change is not tolerated where it is “so dominant or pervasive as in any real or substantial measure to frustrate the purpose of the contract,” and “the willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression.”32 Courts generally read that second sentence to mean that a willful deviation from the contract’s terms always precludes a finding of substantial performance.33
The builder escaped the bar because the court found the breach unintentional.34 The pipe he installed came from the wrong manufacturers, but all manufacturers of wrought-iron pipe made a product of the same quality, so the owner’s damages were likely negligible.35
The dissenting judge saw the same pipe differently. He found the contractor’s failure intentional or the product of gross neglect, and he thought substantial performance of a contract of that kind “depends in no small degree upon the good faith of the contractor.” A contractor who had complied except for minor omissions due to inadvertence, he said, might recover the price less damages.36 The pipe in the walls was the same on either view. The disagreement concerned how it got there, which is the question clause (e) now puts to a court.
The Second Restatement kept the concern about deliberate deviation and changed how it counts. It adopts Professor Corbin’s view that a willful breach does not automatically bar recovery, but that the breacher’s motive is a factor in deciding whether performance was substantial.37 Section 241 avoids the word willful. Its question is whether the behavior of the party in default comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing, and even an adverse answer is not decisive. A court weighs it with the extent to which the owner will be deprived of a reasonably expected benefit and the extent to which the builder may suffer forfeiture.38
Two features of the problem explain the shape of the new rule. Corbin thought willfulness a vague concept, and a flat bar would let even a small intentional omission cost a builder the price of work otherwise done.39 A deliberate or evasive failure also tells a court something an honest slip does not. A party that erred honestly will often correct the error once it is pointed out, while a party that chose to deviate gives the court less reason to expect a cure and less claim to leniency. Clause (e) therefore works with its neighbors, informing the estimate of cure in (d) and the weight given the hardship of forfeiture in (c). Together the three focus on what will happen to the breaching party if the court finds a material breach and on the reasons for the breach.40
Willful conduct can make a breach material even when it costs the other side nothing. One court let a contractor treat a subcontractor’s willful disregard of safety procedures as a material breach although no injury resulted.41
Motive also reaches the remedy. In Roudis v. Hubbard, the defendant had apparently left out drains and insulation because he thought them unnecessary. Relying on Jacob & Youngs, the court awarded the cost of completion. It reasoned that even a contractor who has substantially performed may have damages measured by diminution in value only where the breach was unintentional and constituted substantial performance in good faith.42 In Jacob & Youngs, where the deviation was unintentional, the owner’s damages were likely negligible; in Roudis the intentional omission produced the cost of completion. Whether a breach is willful may thus affect the measure of damages as well as its materiality,43 and the remedies chapters address what an injured party may recover for an unjustified failure to perform.44
Outside construction, courts usually find motive in the history of the dealing. In B & B Equipment Co. v. Bowen, the company sought a declaration that it could terminate a contract under which Bowen was entitled to buy 100 shares of its stock.45 The court found his defective performance continued for years after protest and warning, called his continuing in it “at the very least negligent,” and did not require the company to wait longer in the vague hope of improvement.46 A repeated lapse after warning looks less like a slip. It counts against the failing party under clause (e) and undercuts any promise to cure.
Willful and bad faith are different findings, which is why the Second Restatement chose its words. Willful describes a knowing choice, and good faith asks whether the choice was honest and consistent with fair dealing.47 The specialist in the earlier example made a knowing choice, since the specialist could have declined the post and finished the brief. But accepting a position of that importance probably violates no standard of good faith and fair dealing, so clause (e) adds little weight toward materiality.
The first maker’s honest mistake, prompt disclosure, and repair make cure likely and point away from materiality. The second maker’s deliberate diversion points toward materiality and makes any promise of timely future shipments harder to credit, so a court weighing (d) and (e) together would give the buyer’s complaint more force. Even so, clause (e) carries less weight than the first circumstance, which asks whether the injured party received substantially what it was entitled to expect and is typically the most important of the five.48 A deliberate delay that costs the buyer little can remain immaterial, and an innocent failure that guts the performance can still be material, because a breach need not be deliberate or willful to be material.49
Good faith also has limits as a shield. A party that honestly but wrongly believes it owes nothing, and announces that it will not perform, has repudiated. In United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co., the court declined to “engraft a vague fault principle onto one branch of settled contract doctrine” and refused to make a good-faith reading of the contract a defense to anticipatory repudiation. A Montana decision likewise held irrelevant whether the refusal was a mistake or an intentional act.50 Honest motive can lighten a breach in the materiality weighing, but it does not turn a clear refusal to perform into something other than a repudiation.