Concept
The Implied Duty
Obligation of good faith and fair dealing
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The Implied Duty
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 attaches to every agreement a term that no one had to write down: every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.1 Two businesses can bargain over price, delivery date, and remedies for late payment and never say aloud that neither will sabotage the other's ability to collect what was promised. Section 205 supplies that understanding anyway.
Because the law writes the term in, a court that applies it enforces an obligation imposed from outside the bargain, not a clause the parties drafted, and the parties cannot draft it away. The need is plain. No drafter can foresee every occasion on which one party will hold discretion, control the timing of an event, or act in a way the written words do not forbid. Without a background duty of honest and fair dealing, that party could comply with the letter of the agreement and drain it of the value the other side paid for. The duty closes that gap, yet it stays tied to the exchange the parties actually made. It can protect that exchange; it cannot rewrite it into a better one.
Two questions organize what follows. Source and Scope asks where the duty comes from and how far it reaches. Protecting the Fruits of the Contract asks which interest the duty guards, and the answer is the benefits each party reasonably expects to receive from the other's performance. Those two ideas, a term supplied by law and aimed at the value of the bargain, frame the rest of the chapter, which develops what good faith means and how courts apply it.
Source and Scope
Section 205 states the duty in one sentence, and each phrase of the sentence fixes part of its reach.2 “Every contract” makes the duty universal: the authorities are unanimous that once a contract has been concluded, its terms are deemed to include an obligation of good faith binding on both parties.3 “Each party” makes it reciprocal. The Uniform Commercial Code reaches the same result for sales contracts in § 1-304, and its official comment adds a limit: the section supports no independent cause of action for unfairness. Failing to perform or enforce a specific contract duty in good faith is itself a breach of that contract, or it makes a remedial right unavailable under the circumstances.4
The closing words name the two stages at which the duty operates. Performance is the carrying out of what the contract requires. Enforcement is the assertion of rights under it, and it reaches past the courtroom: good faith governs how a party asserts and litigates claims and defenses, and it condemns conjuring up a pretended dispute and making harassing demands even when the conduct is perhaps not technically beyond the bounds of the contract.5 Two stages are needed because a contract can lose its value in two ways. A party can perform in a way that drains the bargain, or it can use its rights, such as withholding payment or threatening to stop work, for a purpose the contract never gave it. The second danger grows once the other side has come to depend on the performance.
Demands to modify a contract show enforcement-stage good faith at work. Under UCC § 2-209(1), a modification of a sales contract needs no consideration to be binding. The official comment adds that the modification must still meet the test of good faith, and that extorting a modification without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty.6 With consideration no longer checking coercive demands, good faith does the checking. Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. shows how. A threat to breach unless the other side agrees to a modification raises an inference of bad faith, which the threatening party can rebut by showing that it honestly believed it had a legal defense to performance. In Roth Steel the legal justification surfaced only as an afterthought in litigation, not when the modification was sought, so the inference stood. That was not the “honesty in fact” the UCC's good-faith obligation requires.7
The same request looks different when the supplier's input costs have jumped because of a market shift. A shift that makes performance a losing proposition can supply a legitimate commercial reason for asking for more, even though it falls short of the unforeseen difficulty that would excuse performance.8 The duty also binds the party who gives in. Some courts hold that a party agreeing to an assertedly coerced modification must make plain that it acts under protest, because a secret intention never to pay the higher price deceives the other side about whether the modification will be resisted. Others have held that a failure to protest formally did not bar a later objection.9
Because the law supplies the duty, a contract's silence cannot defeat it, and Seidenberg illustrates the point. The plaintiffs there sued on a set of written agreements. The trial court dismissed on the view that they were not claiming breach of the implied covenant at all but were trying to prove and enforce an oral agreement made beyond the four corners of the writings, in violation of the parol evidence rule.10 The appellate court reversed, holding that the assessment of the claim's validity was both erroneous and premature.11 The parol evidence rule bars oral promises offered to alter or vary an integrated writing. A claim under the implied covenant needs no such promise, because the covenant belongs to every contract by operation of law, and a court judging good-faith performance must in any event look to the parties' expectations and the contract's purposes, which takes evidence outside the document.12 The limit appears when the offered evidence would contradict an express term. Then the parol evidence rule may apply and the covenant cannot override the term, a point developed later in this chapter.
The duty is mandatory for the same reason. Under UCC § 1-302(b) the parties cannot disclaim the obligation of good faith, though they may set standards for measuring its performance if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.13 A clause that purports to remove the covenant altogether is void, because good faith does more than carry out the parties' intentions: it requires each party to exercise its rights and fulfill its duties in a manner that meets basic societal standards.14 In Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, the Court held a claim under an airline's frequent flyer program agreement preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. A state's covenant rules escape preemption only if state law lets the airline contract around them, and an airline governed by such a state's law may specify that its agreement does not incorporate the covenant.15 The test shows what a mandatory covenant is: a rule the state imposes, not an undertaking the parties chose.
The duty attaches to a contract, so it does not itself govern bargaining before one exists. Comment c to § 205 says the section does not apply to formation, and bad faith in negotiations is redressed, if at all, through the rules on fraud, duress, undue influence, and promissory estoppel.16 At the negotiation stage the common law imposes mainly negative duties, such as the duty not to misrepresent facts.17 Parties under no compulsion to negotiate owe each other no obligation to keep talking or to talk in good faith, and each may press its own interest and walk away. Only when the parties are under a contractual compulsion to negotiate does the covenant attach, as it does in every contract.18 Protection begins once the parties commit and start to rely on each other's performance.
Other pre-contract risks fall to other doctrines. Mistake law, for example, can treat a party who goes ahead in conscious ignorance of the relevant facts as having assumed the risk, as when an estate's representatives sold two paintings for $60 without an appraisal and the paintings later proved worth more than $1 million.19
Protecting the Fruits of the Contract
Section 205 obliges each party to deal in good faith, but it does not say which interest of the other party the obligation shields.21 Courts answered with a formulation from Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., a New York decision: in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.22 That answers the question left open above. A party may not destroy or injure the other's fruits, and the rest of this section explains what those are and how a party takes them back.
The word fruits sounds abstract until a real bargain gives it content. A salesperson's fruit is the commission earned on sales the salesperson produced; a filmmaker's is the chance to have her projects considered and made. In each case the fruit is compensation or opportunity the bargain led that party to expect. The measure is reasonable expectation, judged against the background practices and customs in which the agreement arose.23 The Restatement commentary says the same in its own terms: good-faith performance emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.24
The duty protects the right to receive those fruits, not literal compliance with the written terms, because one party usually controls part of the performance: the timing of a decision, the use of a discretionary power, the flow of information. Control gives that party the means to take back value surrendered at signing while pointing to the contract's words. No drafter can list every such device, so the law looks to effect and asks whether the other side's right to the fruits was destroyed or injured. That focus also shows what the duty adds. A party who fails to meet the contract's terms is liable for breach without any help from good faith, so the duty does its distinctive work where the actor stays within the literal terms and still defeats what those terms were meant to deliver.25
Fortune v. National Cash Register shows a fruit taken back through a right the contract plainly gave. A sales representative worked under a written agreement that made his employment at will. The agreement entitled him to a substantial bonus commission only if he remained in the employer's service. The day after the employer received a $5 million order that he had procured, it gave him notice of termination. The jury found the dismissal was in bad faith, and the court held that he had a contractual claim under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that every contract carries.26 The power to terminate was real. What the covenant reached was the use of that power to avoid paying the commission his work had earned, because the commission was the fruit his labor had bought.
In Locke v. Warner Bros. the fruit was opportunity. A studio agreed to pay Sondra Locke a total of $1.5 million in return for the right to consider before other studios any movies she was developing, and the right to use her as director if it decided to make one of them. It had 30 days to approve or reject each submission.27 Her evidence suggested that the studio never intended to consider any submission seriously. Unbeknownst to her, Eastwood had agreed to reimburse the studio for the cost of her contract if she failed to get projects produced and developed, and early in the second year of the three-year contract the studio charged $975,000 to an Eastwood film, Unforgiven.28 A power to approve or reject is a power to judge proposals. It is not a power to decide in advance to reject them all. If her evidence was true, the studio kept the exclusivity it had bought while ensuring that nothing she brought would be made.
The commentary to § 205 adds that subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in performance even though the actor believes the conduct to be justified.29 The typical evader has an explanation ready: the contract allowed it, the other side no longer deserved the benefit, business conditions had changed. If sincere belief in justification ended the inquiry, the duty would restrain only parties who knew they were cheating, and the party best at rationalizing would be the least constrained. Because the duty aims at the effect on the other side's fruits, the actor's own view of the matter cannot excuse an evasion of the bargain's spirit. How this reach fits with the requirement of bad faith or ill motive is taken up under Improper Motive.
The same commentary recognizes that bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and its catalogue includes lack of diligence, slacking off, and failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.30 Control over performance includes control over what a party leaves undone, so a party whose cooperation the other side needs can defeat the bargain by sitting still. In Seidenberg, the plaintiffs alleged that Summit failed to allow for a close working relationship between the entities, failed to create an effective cross-selling structure to generate leads, failed to introduce the brokerage firms to its vendors, and failed to develop existing relationships, the “low hanging fruit” that could easily have become clients.31 The appellate court did not decide that those allegations were true. It held only that dismissal at the pleading stage was erroneous and premature.32 In similar circumstances involving a landlord and tenant, Judge Posner found a good-faith obligation to cooperate, which he called “halfway between a fiduciary duty . . . and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud.” He grounded it not in fairness or justice but in what the parties would have intended had they foreseen the problem: good-faith performance “is a stab at approximating the terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have given rise to their dispute.” The parties would have agreed to cooperate, he concluded, and would not have allowed the landlord to lull the tenant into losing her right to renew the lease.33
The duty has a limit that keeps it tied to the bargain. Contract law does not demand altruism, and the covenant imposes no general duty of kindness in performance.34 A party vested with a clear right is not obliged to exercise it to its own detriment in order to benefit the other side, and outside the insurance setting the duty stops well short of fiduciary loyalty.35
The picture changes if the bakery uses a power the contract gave it over performance, such as the authority to inspect and reject deliveries, to reject sacks it knows conform in order to escape the minimum. That is control over performance used to take back what was promised, and the duty applies. The mill's disadvantage in the first scene is the ordinary cost of the other side's pursuing its own interest in matters the contract left open.
Taken together, the cases show two faces of one idea. A party undermines the spirit of a contract either by realizing gains that, in making the contract, it implicitly agreed to surrender, or by unfairly denying the other side the fruits it reasonably expected to receive.36 The first face is an attempt to recapture opportunities the contract was understood to foreclose.37 In Fortune the employer sought to reclaim the money its own commission plan had promised, and in Locke the studio, on her evidence, took back the serious consideration its payments had bought. That pattern yields a working test.