Concept
Restatement Versus UCC
Anticipatory repudiation
Restatement Versus UCC
Two bodies of law govern anticipatory repudiation, and they agree on more than they dispute. Both treat repudiation as a breach in advance of performance: before the time for performance, a party makes clear by words or actions that it will breach when performance falls due.1 Restatement § 250 supplies the common-law definition. It reaches a statement that the obligor will commit a breach that would itself support a claim for total breach, and it reaches a voluntary affirmative act that leaves the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without such a breach.2 For a sale of goods, UCC § 2-610 attaches its own responses to a repudiation of a performance not yet due when the loss will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other party.3 The regimes part ways in the machinery around that core: the demand for assurance, the time to answer it, the aggrieved party's options, and the cutoffs for retraction. Because those rules differ, classify the contract before anything else.
What both regimes share
Both regimes answer the same practical question. A party who learns of an anticipatory repudiation, or who has reasonable grounds for insecurity about the other side's ability to perform, must decide whether to wait until the time specified for performance or to act at once.4 Restatement § 251 had no counterpart in the first Restatement. It generalizes UCC § 2-609, which was itself a legislative innovation, and the two rules therefore rest on the same idea.5 Each lets a party with reasonable grounds for insecurity demand adequate assurance of due performance. Each lets that party suspend any performance for which it has not already received the agreed return, the Code if commercially reasonable and the Restatement if reasonable.6
Each regime also frees a repudiated party from waiting for the due date. The Code allows resort to any remedy for breach, and the Restatement lets the repudiation alone support a claim for total breach.7 And each lets the repudiator take the statement back until the injured party commits itself by materially changing position or by indicating that it considers the repudiation final.8 On these points the choice of regime seldom changes the answer.
The demand for assurance: form
The Code's text requires the demand to be in writing, and courts generally follow that text, treating an oral demand as ineffective.9 Courts have not always held to the formality, however, and some accept a demand that is unequivocal even though it is not written.10 The Restatement's text contains no writing requirement at all: the obligee 'may demand adequate assurance of due performance' and says nothing about how.11
A grain-sale decision shows how form and timing interact. The seller there refused to load the grain and spoke with the buyer's driver on March 22, 1983, and the court found that this amounted to an oral demand. The written demand did not come until counsel's letter of April 6, some two weeks after the seller had suspended performance. The opinion identifies serious problems with the timing, form, and content of the demand.12 Whatever else went wrong, the sequence was backwards: the seller suspended first and demanded later.
Form is not the only test. Whether the grounds for insecurity were reasonable and whether the assurance given was adequate are generally fact questions left to the jury, but a court decides them as a matter of law when no reasonable jury could find otherwise.13
The response: time and the effect of silence
After a justified demand, the Code treats a failure to give adequate assurance within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days as a repudiation.14 The Restatement says that the obligee may treat as a repudiation a failure to provide adequate assurance within a reasonable time, and it states no maximum.15 Two differences follow. Thirty days is a ceiling in the Code, so a shorter period may be reasonable but longer silence is a repudiation, whereas the Restatement leaves the length entirely to the circumstances. And under the Code silence is itself the repudiation, while under the Restatement the obligee chooses whether to treat it as one.
The Restatement also channels the insecure party more firmly. It replaces the first Restatement's approach, so the insecure party may no longer, for example, change position and must proceed by demanding assurance, unless the other side's prospective unwillingness can already be characterized as a repudiation. The Code is silent on whether the demand is mandatory, and it has been suggested that the demand is merely authorized. If so, the insecure party may still resort to responses that the Second Restatement forecloses, such as changing position.16
After repudiation: the aggrieved party's options
Once a repudiation exists, the Code lists the aggrieved party's responses. It may await performance for a commercially reasonable time. It may resort to any remedy for breach even after telling the repudiator that it would wait and urging retraction. And in either case it may suspend its own performance or, if it is a seller, identify goods to the contract or salvage unfinished goods under § 2-704.17 At common law the same freedom comes from the claim for total breach under § 253: the repudiation alone supports the claim, and in an exchange of promises it discharges the other party's remaining duties.18 The thresholds also read differently. The Code asks whether the loss of the performance will substantially impair the contract's value, while the Restatement asks whether the threatened breach would itself support a claim for total breach.19 An answer should use the term of the regime that governs.
Neither regime lets the aggrieved party wait indefinitely. The Code confines waiting to a commercially reasonable time. In a grain-sale case, the court reasoned that the seller's unequivocal repudiation ended that period when the seller first gave notice of non-performance, so the buyer recovered damages for non-delivery measured by the grain's market value on the date of repudiation. The court may have been influenced by the fact that the buyer had waited in a rising market.20 The mitigation principle sets a comparable limit. A victim may decline to accept a repudiation and give the repudiator a chance to recant, but must do so reasonably. When Cliff unequivocally repudiated the day before Dinah's performance and Dinah could have suspended, her decision to perform anyway was unreasonable, and she was confined to the damages she had before she increased them.21
One common-law wrinkle deserves a flag. Some decisions deny an immediate right of action when the innocent party has already fully performed and is simply waiting for payment to fall due, because there is nothing left to mitigate and so no inefficiency in making the victim wait.22 The text of § 253(1) is written for a repudiation that comes before the repudiator has received all of the agreed exchange, which fits that limit.23
Retraction
The Restatement nullifies a repudiating statement if notice of the retraction reaches the injured party before it materially changes position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates that it considers the repudiation final.24 The Code adds a calendar limit and one more cutoff: the repudiating party can retract until its next performance is due, unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled, materially changed position, or otherwise indicated finality.25
The Code also fixes the method and the effect of retraction. Any method will do if it clearly indicates that the repudiating party intends to perform, but the retraction must include any assurance justifiably demanded under § 2-609.26 A retraction reinstates the repudiating party's rights under the contract, with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party for any delay the repudiation caused.27 That is a change from the general common-law view that an anticipatory breach withdrawn in time produces no breach at all.28
Working the problem
Because the regime decides which formalities, time limits, and cutoffs apply, work a problem by classifying the contract first and then moving through the repudiation sequence in order.
Step one carries the most risk, since a wrong classification sends every later step down the wrong path. The writing requirement and the thirty-day ceiling appear only in the Code, and the Restatement's open-ended reasonable time and its optional treatment of silence appear only outside it. Where a problem leaves the classification unclear, state both rules and say which facts would move the answer.