Concept
Repudiation as Total Breach
Anticipatory repudiation
Repudiation as Total Breach
A repudiation does two things at once, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 253 states both. Under § 253(1), an obligor who repudiates a duty before committing a breach by non-performance, and before receiving all of the agreed exchange for it, faces a claim for damages for total breach on the strength of the repudiation alone.1 Under § 253(2), when performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's repudiation of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remaining duties to render performance.2 The first rule gives the injured party a claim now; the second frees it from its own side of the bargain. Hochster v. De La Tour shows both. The employer wrote on May 11 that he no longer wanted the courier's services, and from that day, three weeks before the tour was to begin on June 1, the courier could sue and could treat his own duties as discharged.3
The rule exists because waiting is costly. Before it took hold, a promisee told that the other side would not perform still had to hold itself available to tender its own performance, and it had no right to suspend any performance that fell due before the promisor's. During the nineteenth century courts came to see that arrangement as both unfair to the promisee and inefficient.4 A repudiation ends the waiting. Because the consequence is so drastic, the law reserves it for a clear repudiation: an unequivocal manifestation of intention not to perform, as the earlier sections explained.5
Two other routes lead to the same consequences. An obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor's failure to provide, within a reasonable time, adequate assurance of due performance, and a promisee who does so may, like the courier in Hochster, sue for damages and regard its duties as discharged.6 And for sales of goods, UCC § 2-610 provides that when a party repudiates a performance not yet due, the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may resort to any remedy for breach, even after telling the repudiating party that it would await performance and urging retraction.7 The Restatement speaks of total breach where the UCC speaks of substantial impairment, and a later section sets the two side by side. The four subsections below take § 253 apart: the immediate claim, discharge, the exception for a promisee who has fully performed, and the proof a plaintiff must still supply.
Immediate Claim for Damages
The claim exists from the moment of repudiation, and its name tells what it carries. A total breach is one serious enough to justify discharging the nonbreaching party, and it entitles the injured party to future damages that will reasonably flow from the breach as well as damages already accrued; a partial breach supports damages only for harm done to date.8 Section 253(1) sets two timing conditions. The repudiation must come before any breach by non-performance, and the repudiator must not yet have received all of the agreed exchange.9 The first condition marks the boundary with ordinary breach: a repudiation that occurs simultaneously with or after a breach by non-performance is a present repudiation, and the breach is treated like any other.10 The second condition is the fully performed exception, taken up below.
The rule comes from Hochster v. De La Tour, decided by the Queen's Bench in 1853. In April 1852 De La Tour engaged Hochster as a courier to travel with him on the Continent for three months from June 1, at £10 per month.11 On May 11 he wrote that he had changed his mind and did not want the courier's services. Hochster sued on May 22. Before June 1 he accepted a substitute job that would begin on July 4.12
De La Tour's counsel made two arguments. First, no breach could occur until June 1, which stated the traditional view accurately: a promise is ordinarily broken only when performance falls due.13 Second, by taking other employment Hochster had made himself unable to perform.14 The court rejected both, noting that De La Tour had renounced the agreement.15
The court reasoned from the promisee's position. Told that the engagement was off, Hochster could, “instead of remaining idle and laying out money in preparations which must be useless,” seek service under another employer, and what that service earned would go in mitigation of his damages.16 Mitigation, the principle that what the injured party earns elsewhere reduces its damages, thus entered the doctrine at the start. The court also found it strange that a defendant who had renounced the contract, “absolutely declaring that he will never act under it,” should be heard to complain that his assertion was believed and that he was left no chance to change his mind.17 Finally, the court reasoned that if a renunciation excuses a condition the other party would otherwise perform in the meantime, nothing requires that party to wait for the day before suing, since the only ground for dispensing with the condition is that the renunciation may be treated as a breach.18
De La Tour also argued that damages were too hard to calculate before June 1. The court answered that the difficulty was “equally strong against an action before the 1st of September, when the three months would expire,” because in either case a jury could look to all that had happened, or was likely to happen, to increase or mitigate the loss down to the day of trial.19 The answer persuades less when the contract is long-term and the repudiation and trial come months or years before performance would begin. When trial comes after performance would have ended, however, damages are rarely speculative, because the facts needed to fix them are usually available.20
The decision has critics. One commentator calls the premise that a present action is necessary to relieve the injured party of its obligations “the original fallacy in Hochster.”21 The criticism did not change the outcome. Anticipatory repudiation is now well established in the common law and under the UCC.22
Because the claim is for total breach, the repudiation must threaten a breach that would itself be total. Section 250(a) builds in that limit by counting as a repudiation only a statement indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give a claim for damages for total breach under § 243.23 Put in terms of material breach, a clear repudiation equals a material breach only if the threatened act or failure would be material if it occurred when performance was due.24 The limit follows from what total breach carries, discharge and future damages, which a minor breach does not.25 An announced minor deviation therefore supports no claim for total breach.
The claim arises at once, but its amount is not fixed that day. Suppose a disc jockey has a contract to play in a Las Vegas casino for 2019 and 2020. The casino goes out of business near the end of 2019 and repudiates its 2020 obligation. It concedes the breach but denies liability for damages from March 2020 forward, because a governor's shutdown order that month would have required it to close, and the contract's force majeure clause relieved both parties of damages liability if performance was “rendered impossible.”26 A court that considered similar facts in 2021, after the performance period would have ended, reasoned that a jury could find that the shutdown order triggered the clause, and it applied the Restatement rule that a party's duty to pay damages for a repudiation is discharged if it appears after the repudiation that the duty would have been discharged anyway.27 If the casino paid for 2019 and the clause would excuse it from March 2020, it owes no damages for 2020 beyond that date.28 The claim measures the value of the performance lost, and a performance that would have been excused anyway had no value to lose after the excusing date.
The first four steps decide whether the claim exists, and the fifth decides how large it is. Keeping those questions apart prevents the error of denying a claim when the only real dispute is the amount.
Discharge of Remaining Duties
Where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, one party's repudiation releases the other from its remaining duties to render performance.30 Three practical consequences follow. The promisee need not tender its own performance when the due date arrives.31 It may suspend performance and preparations, and it has a defense to going forward with the contract.32 And it may contract elsewhere for the same performance, as any party discharged by a total breach may.33
Discharge follows from the way an exchange of promises works. Lord Mansfield rejected the notion that a seller's promise to transfer his stock and business was independently enforceable, and he read the parties, even without express words, to have intended their promises to be conditional and mutually dependent, so that one side's failure to perform excused the other's.34 A repudiation announces that the repudiator will not render its own side. The law responds by excusing conditions that may have shielded the repudiator's duty and, as to the other party, by excusing its performance as well.35 The promisee is spared a pointless offer of performance toward a party that has said it will refuse.
Hochster v. De La Tour shows what discharge frees a promisee to do. The courier took a substitute job before the tour began, and the question was whether he could still recover although the new engagement meant he could no longer perform for De La Tour.36 The court let him recover. It held him free to seek other service instead of idling and spending on useless preparations, and it dismissed the employer's complaint that he had been given no chance to change his mind.37 Discharge is what makes that redeployment safe. Without it, a promisee who took other work would risk the very objection De La Tour raised, that it had made itself unable to perform.38 Discharge under § 253(2) and the immediate claim under § 253(1) are separate rules, even though Hochster joined them, and an answer should state each on its own.
Discharge depends on a genuine repudiation. An anticipatory repudiation is an unequivocal manifestation of intention not to perform, so a party who says it is encountering difficulties, is displeased with the bargain, or is uncertain whether performance will be rendered when due has not repudiated.39 A promisee who stops performing on such a statement cannot count on being discharged. Discharge can also be undone. A retraction nullifies the repudiation if notice of it reaches the injured party before that party materially changes its position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates that it considers the repudiation final.40 A promisee that has already redeployed may be past the point where a retraction can reach it, a matter the later section on retraction develops.
The discharge also has a boundary. Section 253(2) speaks of performances exchanged under an exchange of promises, and what it discharges are the other party's remaining duties to render performance in that exchange.41 Mutual dependence was the point of Mansfield's reading, so a promise that was never part of the exchange does not depend on the repudiated performance and loses nothing when that performance disappears.42
Discharge also presupposes remaining duties to discharge. A promisee that has rendered everything it promised and waits only for a repudiated payment to come due has no counter-performance left to excuse, and some courts for that reason deny it an immediate action, a limit taken up next.43 Even where discharge applies, the promisee is relieved of any need to tender but must still show, when it sues, that it would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the repudiation.44 The last subsection develops that proof.
The Fully Performed Exception
Section 253(1) limits the immediate claim in its last clause: the repudiation must come before the repudiator has received all of the agreed exchange for the duty repudiated.46 A promisee who has already given everything it promised, and waits only for money that is not yet due, has no counter-performance left to withhold. Almost every jurisdiction holds that no action lies for a present or anticipatory repudiation of a unilateral obligation to pay money at a future time or in future installments.47 The obligation may have been unilateral from the start, or it may have become so because one side completely performed a bilateral contract.48
A loan shows the rule at work. A lends B $12,000, and B promises to repay $1,000 a month beginning one month later. Before or at the time for the first payment, B repudiates. Under the general rule, A could claim the $12,000, plus interest, less an adjustment for early payment. The majority of courts refuse that action and let A sue for each installment only after it falls due, so A recovers $1,000 now and the rest as the installments mature.49
The mitigation reasoning behind the immediate claim explains why the exception takes this shape. A promisee told that the other side will not perform has choices to make: whether to stop preparing, whether to suspend its own performance, and where to find a substitute for the return it was promised.50 The courier in Hochster v. De La Tour faced those choices, and the law let him sue and take other work because waiting would have left him idle. A creditor who has already performed has none of them. It has no preparations to cancel and no substitute to arrange, because what it was to give has already been delivered, and courts that deny the early action reason that making such a promisee wait involves no economic inefficiency.51
The exception's pedigree is weaker than its logic. One commentator calls it an “indefensible exception” to the rule that an action lies for anticipatory breach, because it grew from a statement that was dictum: the plaintiff's action was for damages and not for the price, and the statement referred to the old writs of debt and indebitatus assumpsit.52 Courts apply the exception all the same, as in Diamond v. University of Southern California.
Two facts must coexist for the exception to apply. First, the promisee has completely performed. Second, the promisee is entitled to a fixed payment of money, at one time or in installments. The first fact is always required.53 The second confines the exception to promises of money. Suppose A transfers a farm to B in exchange for B's promise to support A for life, and B repudiates before the time for performance. A has completely performed, yet A may sue at once for total breach, because there is no fixed amount for each payment. The history fits, for the old writ of debt required a sum certain, and a promise of support supplies none.54
Some courts have stretched the exception to promises that involve no payment. The Restatement (Second) would allow that stretch for an anticipatory breach but not where a present breach comes with the repudiation, a distinction that appears to rest on the original fallacy in Hochster that a present action is necessary to relieve the injured party of its obligations.55 An answer should therefore say which version of the exception it applies.
Proving Readiness to Perform
Section 253 lifts two burdens from the promisee and leaves a third in place. The injured party need not tender its own performance, and it may stop preparing and take other work.57 It must still show, whenever it sues and even after the performance date has passed, that it would have been ready, willing, and able to perform but for the repudiation.58 Courts generally frame the showing as proof that the injured party would not have committed a material breach when its own performance came due.59 The bar is realistic. The plaintiff need not prove flawless readiness, only that nothing on its side would have amounted to a material breach.
The requirement follows from what damages replace. They compensate the promisee for the performance it would have received, and in an exchange of promises that performance was always conditioned on the promisee doing its own part. A promisee who could not have done its part lost nothing to the repudiation. The law does not, however, demand that the promisee sit idle and ready for a deal the other side has renounced, which is why tender is excused and why the promisee may redeploy itself.
The cause of any inability decides the matter. Inability that exists independently of the repudiation counts against the plaintiff, and a plaintiff who could not have performed an obligation arising shortly after the breach may recover only nominal or small damages.60 Inability that the repudiation itself produced does not count, because the repudiation excuses the promisee from fulfilling conditions to a performance that apparently will not be rendered.61 The same reasoning ties readiness to the doctrine of prevention: a promisee told that the other side will not perform would ordinarily be foolhardy to keep acquiring the property it needed to perform.62 Hochster fits the second pattern. The courier accepted a substitute job before the tour began, and the court rejected the objection that the job made him unable to perform and counted his new earnings in mitigation.63
Courts disagree about how far the inquiry reaches. In Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co., the court took the view that, even where the parties' promises were not concurrent, a plaintiff could recover only nominal or small damages from a repudiating defendant if it would have been impossible for the plaintiff to perform an obligation arising shortly after the breach.64 In American List Corp. v. U.S. News & World Report, the New York court refused to discount the total amount due under a contract to present value by the risk that the nonrepudiating party would be unable to perform in the future. It reasoned that such a rule would force that party to prove its future ability to perform, although the doctrine exists to relieve it of that very performance.65 An answer should state the general requirement and note that jurisdictions differ on how much of the plaintiff's future performance it covers.
A second limit comes from the repudiator's side. A later event that would have discharged the repudiator's duty anyway cuts off damages from that point, as the casino's force majeure shutdown did.66 The two limits ask different questions. Readiness looks at the plaintiff's own capacity to perform, and the discharge rule asks whether the repudiator would have owed performance at all.
Step three decides most contested cases. The same practical fact, that the plaintiff is no longer free to perform, is fatal when it began before the repudiation and harmless when the repudiation set it in motion.