Concept
Discharge by Obligee's Assent
Common-law breach: material and partial breach
Discharge by Obligee's Assent
An obligee can end the obligor's duty by agreeing to give up the right to performance, but the law does not honor every casual "forget it." Section 273 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that, except as §§ 274-77 state, an obligee's manifestation of assent to a discharge is not effective unless one of three conditions is met.1 The obligee is the party owed the duty, and a discharge extinguishes that duty. The conditions are alternatives, and any one suffices:
- The assent is made for consideration.2
- The assent is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration.3
- The assent has induced such action or forbearance as would make a promise enforceable.4
Discharge by assent differs from the most common way a duty ends. Full performance discharges a duty,5 and performance is the usual route, although many others exist.6 Assent needs neither performance nor breach: the party owed the performance gives up the right.
The Restatement demands more than the obligee's word because a discharge costs the obligee a right the law would otherwise enforce. A statement that the obligee will give up a right is a promise like any other, and the law enforces promises only when something stands behind them. If an offhand remark were enough, an obligor could cite it to defeat a claim the obligee never meant to surrender, and no obligee could know which casual words carry that price. Each condition supplies a recognized reason to hold the obligee to its word.7
The routes run in the order an analysis should take them: bargain first, then enforceability without a bargain, then reliance. Because the conditions are alternatives, the later routes matter only when the earlier ones fail.
Assent Supported by Consideration
Section 273(a) makes an obligee's assent to a discharge effective if it is made for consideration.8 Consideration here carries its ordinary meaning: a performance bargained for in exchange.9 A discharge is the obligee's promise to give up a right to performance, and a promise of that kind ordinarily binds only as one half of a bargain. Every problem therefore reduces to a concrete question: what did the obligee receive in return for letting the obligor go?
Mutual rescission is the easy case. When performance is still owed on both sides and the parties agree to cancel, each gives up the right to the other's performance in exchange for being freed from its own duty, so each party's assent is supported by consideration.10 Neither is giving anything away, because each surrender is the price of the other's. Suppose a warehouse lease has three months left to run, so the lessee still owes rent and the lessor still owes possession. If they agree to cancel, the lessee gives up its right to possession in exchange for release from the rent, and the lessor gives up the rent in exchange for release from the duty to provide possession. The rescission is effective so long as no third party's vested rights are affected.11
Rescission ends the contract's rights in both directions, which can surprise a party who has already done part of the work. X agreed to harvest 1,000 acres of Y's wheat at a stated price per acre, and after X had cut 50 acres the parties rescinded by agreement. Duties were still owed on both sides, X's to cut the remaining acres and Y's to pay for the work, so the rescission is supported by consideration. The parties said nothing about the 50 acres already cut, however, and under the prevailing common-law view the rescission raises no presumption or inference that X kept the right to the contract price. X may still recover the reasonable value of the benefit it conferred, but only in restitution.12 Parties who rescind a partly performed contract should therefore say what they are preserving.
A release is harder to support when one side has already fully performed and the other owes only money. The release then asks the obligee to give up a right while the obligor gives up nothing, and the common law has struggled with that problem at least since Foakes v. Beer was decided in 1884.13 Without a bargained exchange, the release is a bare promise to give up a right, and § 273(a) does not make it effective.
The lessee's payment does not rescue the release, because performing a legal duty owed to the promisor is not consideration when the duty is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute.14 To buy the release, the lessee must give the lessor something beyond what the lessor already holds a right to. Suppose the lessor had asked instead for a performance the lease did not require, such as repainting the interior. That bargained-for performance would be consideration, and the release would stand.15 A duty that is doubtful or honestly disputed falls outside the exclusion and is a different problem.
A release that fails this test is not necessarily ineffective, because § 273 offers two more routes, taken up next.
Assent Without Consideration
Section 273(b) makes an obligee's assent effective if it is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration.17 The first route asks what the obligee received in exchange.18 This one asks for no exchange and lists no grounds of its own. It sends the court to the rules, studied elsewhere, that make some promises binding without consideration, and it poses a single question: given how and in what circumstances the obligee assented, would a promise to give up this right bind under those rules?
The rule borrows those rules because consideration is only one ground on which the law enforces promises. If a promise to surrender a right would bind on another recognized ground, refusing effect to the release for want of consideration would make ending a duty harder than creating one. The borrowing also lets parties close out a claim in writing without inventing token payments to manufacture an exchange.
The usual example is a statute. The release of a debt without any bargained exchange has troubled the common law since at least 1884, and some states have responded by statute.19 A statute that makes a signed written release effective without consideration does what § 273(b) contemplates: a release in that form is made in circumstances in which a promise would be enforceable without consideration, so the assent discharges the duty. The writing requirement does the work consideration would otherwise do, because it marks the release as a deliberate act.
For sales of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code reaches a comparable result by its own rule: a renunciation of damages needs no consideration if it is "signed and delivered by the aggrieved party."20 Treat that provision as an analogy and not as part of § 273(b). It states its own formal requirements instead of borrowing other rules, and whether it merely codifies the common law is a separate question.
Because § 273(b) incorporates other rules, a fact pattern that says only that an obligee released a debt for nothing does not settle the question. A student who concludes that a release without consideration always fails has missed this route. A student who assumes some statute rescues every informal release has skipped the work of finding a rule that actually applies. Reliance by the obligor is a separate route, taken up next.
Assent Induced by Reliance
Section 273(c) supplies the third route: an obligee's assent to a discharge is effective if it has induced "such action or forbearance as would make a promise enforceable."22 The first two routes judge the assent when it is given, asking whether it was bargained for or made in circumstances that would bind a promise without a bargain.23 This route looks at what happened afterward, so a release that was gratuitous and informal when spoken can still end the duty if the obligor responded to it in the right way. Action is a change of position, such as spending money or taking on a commitment. Forbearance is holding back from a step the obligor would otherwise have taken, such as declining to raise funds or to press a claim.
The phrase "as would make a promise enforceable" sends the court to promissory estoppel, under which a promise that induces reliance may be enforced although nothing was bargained for. The inquiry asks whether the promise induced reliance, whether the other party in fact reasonably relied, and to what extent the circumstances require or justify enforcement of the promise or some lesser remedy.24 A release is a promise to give up a right, so an obligor who acts on one stands where the reliance cases stand. The elements studied in contract formation supply the test here, and this unit does not reteach them.
The law gives reliance this effect because of who spoke. The obligee alone chose to speak, and the obligor cannot look behind the words to learn whether the obligee will stand by them. An obligor who rearranges its affairs on the strength of a release would be worse off for having believed it if the obligee could then demand performance, because the money or effort would be gone and the duty would still be owing. Treating the duty as discharged once the obligor has acted leaves the risk of the statement with the person who made it, and it gives obligees a reason to say only what they will stand behind.
The rule has two parts. Induced asks about cause: the obligor must have acted or held back because of the assent, so a step already planned, or one the obligor would have taken anyway, does not count. The words "such as would make a promise enforceable" ask about quality: the reliance must satisfy the borrowed standard, including that it be reasonable. The quality requirement keeps the route narrow. If any reaction sufficed, every offhand remark would become a discharge, and obligors could manufacture reliance after the fact by pointing to whatever they happened to do.
The lessor's words here are the same passing remark that failed in the opening hypothetical. There the lessee did nothing in reliance, and the duty survived. The lessee's response is the missing ingredient, which shows where this route does its work: the words may be identical, and the aftermath decides whether they bind.
An exam stem that invokes this route must show a change of position that the assent caused and that a court would honor. The plainest failure is the absence of any response, and a close second is a response the assent did not cause.
Reliance can also fail on quality even when it is real and caused by the remark. An obligee who says only that she is considering a waiver has not manifested assent to a discharge, and an obligor who spends money on that hint has not reasonably relied on a release never given. A change of position that costs the obligor almost nothing also gives a court little reason to bind the obligee, since the borrowed standard asks how far the circumstances justify enforcement at all.25
Taken together, the three routes give a sequence for any stem in which an obligee releases an obligor.
A lessee who stopped paying rent on the strength of an idle remark would therefore be the party in breach.