Concept
Election After Material Breach
Common-law breach: material and partial breach
Election After Material Breach
An uncured material breach hands the injured party a choice among three courses. It may declare the breach total, withhold its own performance, and seek full contract damages. It may instead treat the breach as partial, continue performing, and reserve its claim for damages. Or it may rescind the contract and sue in restitution, a remedy this section leaves to the study of restitution.1 The first course depends on discharge: the Restatement allows damages for total breach only if the breach discharges the injured party’s remaining duties to render the exchanged performance.2
Two questions sit inside that choice. Whether the breach is material is a legal judgment that a court makes after the fact, and the injured party’s own conclusion on the point “is fraught with peril.”3 Which course to follow once the breach is material belongs to the injured party. The next subsection takes up continuing the contract; the one after it takes up termination and the risk that comes with it.
Continuing the Contract
An injured party that continues the contract keeps the bargain and keeps its claim for damages. By electing to treat the breach as partial, it in essence waives the materiality of the breach; it must go on performing its own side, and damages become its remedy.4 A party makes this choice when the contract is part of a broader transaction, time is short, and no viable alternative exists.5 Because the choice binds, the question becomes how a party makes it.
An election may be made by express promise or by conduct.6 Conduct generally takes one of three forms, and two are easy to recognize: continuing to perform after the failure of condition, and accepting a defective performance.7 A party also shows that it has chosen to continue by accepting the performance of the breaching party.8
A building contract shows the effect. The contractor promises to finish by January 1, and the contract makes time of the essence, so a failure to finish by that date is both a failure of an express condition and a total breach. If the owner lets the contractor continue and the contractor finishes within a reasonable time from the election, the owner must pay the price and keeps a claim for damages for the late completion.9 The election does not give the contractor unlimited time. The contractor must still perform within a reasonable time, and the owner may set a reasonable date and make time of the essence.10 Nor does the election by itself waive damages, although the injured party’s language or conduct may show that it renounced them as well.11
For sales of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code adds two rules. A buyer who has accepted the goods must give notice of breach or be barred from any remedy, and notice is required even if the seller already knows of the breach; its purpose is to make the seller aware of potential litigation and of chances to cure, investigate, offer a settlement, and assert claims against suppliers. A renunciation of damages needs no consideration if the aggrieved party signs and delivers it.12 Whether that second rule codifies the common law is a question the treatise takes up later.
Acceptance of a defective performance usually constitutes an election. Suppose a buyer has agreed to buy a house that a developer will build on the developer’s land with a southeastern exposure, and the developer builds it facing northwest, so that the trade winds are blocked. If that defect defeats substantial performance and the buyer moves in, the buyer has elected by conduct and owes the price less damages against the developer for partial breach.13 An owner who manifests an intent to pay the contract price despite known defects makes the same election in words and is limited to an action for partial breach.14 Knowledge limits the election. If the owner was justifiably unaware of material defects, the owner may refuse to pay and claim damages despite an earlier election to pay.15
Once made, an election generally stays made. Under the majority view, an election cannot be withdrawn even if the other party has not relied on it, and many of the majority-view cases involve insurance policies. A small minority allows withdrawal if it would be fair.16 A party that elects to continue can never thereafter elect to terminate based on that breach, as Bigda v. Fischbach Corp. states.17 The rule keeps a party from taking the benefit of the breacher’s continued performance while holding a termination right in reserve.
The irrevocability rule does not always explain the results. In K & G Construction Co. v. Harris, the court said that by “permitting the subcontractor to proceed,” K & G “obviously, treated the breach by the subcontractor as a partial one.” The casebook then asks why K & G was not barred by its election from treating Harris’s breach as total.18 The question is worth asking whenever a party keeps the contract going after a breach and later tries to terminate over it.
Terminating and Its Risks
A party that terminates stakes its release on a conclusion a court will later review. Damages for total breach require that the breach discharge the injured party’s remaining duties,20 and when no repudiation accompanies the breach and no installment exception applies, the breach must so substantially impair the contract’s value to the injured party at the time of the breach that total-breach damages are just.21 A court that finds that standard unmet has found that the release never occurred.
That finding reverses the parties’ positions. When performance of a duty is due, any nonperformance is a breach,22 so a party that stopped performing without a release has itself breached. If it also told the other side that the contract was over, it added a repudiation, and a breach by nonperformance accompanied or followed by a repudiation gives rise to a claim for total breach, except where the installment-payment exception applies.23 The party that meant to leave the contract behind now faces the claim it expected to bring.
Walker & Co. v. Harrison shows the reversal. Harrison, who ran a neighborhood dry-cleaning establishment, bought a large outdoor advertising sign from Walker, a company that built and serviced signs and billboards. After two months, with no monthly payment made beyond the first, he telegraphed that Walker’s failure to maintain the sign as promised was a material breach, that he would pay no more, and that he considered the contract “Voided.” Walker sent a service crew a week later, but Harrison refused to resume payments, and Walker sued for the full amount still due on the purchase price, about $5,200.24 The Michigan Supreme Court listed the materiality criteria that now appear in Section 241 and quickly concluded that Walker’s failure to clean the sign, however irritating to Harrison, “was not of such materiality as to justify repudiation of the contract.” It held for Walker.25 Harrison’s better course was to keep paying and claim damages for the lapse; by repudiating, he became the party in breach.
Sackett v. Spindler shows how a terminating party can survive a misjudgment, though not reliably. Spindler treated Sackett’s breach as total and repudiated the contract. The court held the repudiation’s effect nullified, first because Sackett disregarded it and treated the contract as still in force, as shown by his attempt, through his attorney, to arrange another method of financing the balance due, and second because Spindler’s attorney retracted the repudiation in the same conversation, saying that Spindler was still willing to complete the sale if Sackett paid the balance in cash or its equivalent.26 Had Spindler “jumped the gun” in treating the breach as total, he would have stood in Harrison’s position. What saved him was Sackett’s conduct and his own retraction, and a terminating party cannot count on either.27
Imperfect performance alone does not justify discharge. In Health Related Services, Inc. v. Golden Plains Convalescent Center, Inc., a management company may have performed defectively in various ways, but the convalescent center failed to show a material breach that justified discharging it, and the center was liable for damages for total breach.28
A material breach is not always a total one. Under Section 242, totality depends on an uncured material breach, judged by the Section 241 factors plus two more: how far further delay is likely to prevent or hinder substitute arrangements, and how much importance the agreement attaches to performance without delay. The comments add that the reasonableness of the injured party’s conduct in communicating its grievances and seeking satisfaction also counts.29 Because totality depends on an uncured breach, a party that ends the contract while cure remains realistic invites the argument that the breach never became total. One court has gone further and stated that the common law requires notice of a material breach and an opportunity to cure before termination, and agreements often write that requirement in.30
Understandable reasons are not enough. In an illustration involving an owner, Lofty, and a builder, Standard, the owner’s reasons for acting as he did “may be understandable,” but they are “not legally justifiable” unless Lofty can show that Standard’s error amounts to such incompetence that it reasonably appears Standard would be incapable of properly completing performance in accordance with the contract.31
Courts do not always take both steps. Many decisions treat a material breach as letting the nonbreaching party cancel and sue for damages without applying the total-breach analysis. In Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, for example, the court said that under New York law a nonbreaching party may, after a material breach, terminate or continue the contract and sue for damages either way, and it held that an accountant who covertly worked for another firm had committed an egregious, material breach and was not entitled to retirement benefits from his employer.32 Such results may be explained by breaches so serious that the possibility of cure was remote or nonexistent.
Suspension offers a middle course. Under the Restatement analysis, if the circumstances make it appropriate for a builder to suspend performance by “declining to proceed,” and so give the owner a chance to cure, the builder is expected to do that before terminating and treating the breach as total. In Guerini the Court used the words “declining to proceed,” and the casebook asks how long a suspended builder must wait before terminating. A shortfall may also be too small to matter: in Stewart v. C & C Excavating & Construction Co., the Eighth Circuit found no material breach where the deficiency was “an insignificant portion of the total contract price” and “not a substantial portion of the gross progress payment earned for that pay period.”33 A party that stops performing over a shortfall that small risks becoming the breacher.
These cases explain why advice about termination is among the hardest a lawyer gives. The question usually arises in the middle of performance, when the client wants to justify self-help by suspending performance or by refusing to perform and terminating, either as a defendant explaining its nonperformance or as a plaintiff seeking damages for total breach, and such cases pose particularly thorny problems of counseling.34 The lawyer must predict whether a court will find the breach material and, if so, whether it justifies cancellation or only suspension. The second prediction turns on cure, on the client’s need for substitute arrangements, on whether the agreement called for timely performance, and on whether the client gave reasonable notice of its grievance.35
Termination stands on firmest ground when the breacher has itself closed off cure, as when nonperformance comes with a repudiation,36 and on weakest ground when the breach is small, remediable, or never explained to the other side.