Concept
Total Breach and Discharge
Common-law breach: material and partial breach
Total Breach and Discharge
A breach is total when it is serious enough to justify discharging the nonbreaching party from her own duties under the contract.1 Material breach marks the threshold: it is a breach significant enough to let the aggrieved party elect to treat the breach as total rather than partial, which excuses that party from further performance and affords it the right to sue for damages.2 Whether a breach is material is not the aggrieved party's call, but whether to treat a material breach as total is.3 Section 243 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states when a breach by nonperformance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach.4
The label carries two consequences. The nonbreaching party is released: it may refuse to perform and may even contract with others, as the seller in Sackett v. Spindler did when he sold his stock to another purchaser.5 It may also collect damages for breach of the entire contract rather than for the defective part alone, including future damages that will reasonably flow from the breach, while a partial breach yields damages only for the harm that has resulted to date.6
Because those consequences are drastic, a party that treats a breach as total without being entitled to do so takes a serious risk: its own act becomes a total breach that discharges the other side. Sackett v. Spindler, discussed at the end of this section, shows how that happens.7
Section 243 contains four rules, and the subsections below take them in order. Subsection (1) sets the general requirement: a breach supports total-breach damages only if it discharges the injured party's remaining duties.8 Subsection (2) adds the case of a breach accompanied or followed by a repudiation.9 Subsection (3) removes from that case contracts whose only remaining duties are the breaching party's payments of money in unrelated installments.10 Subsection (4) supplies a residual test for everything else, asking whether the breach so substantially impairs the contract's value to the injured party that it is just to allow damages on all of its remaining rights to performance.11
The Discharge Requirement
Section 243(1) ties the claim for total breach to what the breach does to the injured party's own duties. For performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, a breach by nonperformance supports damages for total breach only if it discharges the injured party's remaining duties to render the exchanged performance, other than a duty to render an agreed equivalent under Section 240.12 The agreed-equivalent carve-out lies outside this chapter. What matters here is the gate the rule builds: a claim for total-breach damages must pass through the injured party's release from its own remaining duties.
Release and total-breach damages travel together because of how those damages are measured. They aim to put the injured party where full performance by both sides would have left it, so they equal the value of the performance the breacher promised, less the cost of the performance the injured party promised in return.13 The first term pays for performance the injured party will not receive, and the second subtracts a cost it will not have to bear. Both assume the contract is over for the injured party. An injured party who stayed bound could still demand the performance, so an award for its value would pay for the same performance twice, and the deduction would subtract a cost the party would still have to incur. Discharge and total-breach damages therefore come together or not at all.
In the first version the breach is partial. It is not material, so it does not discharge Arnold: he must keep paying at the end of each month, and he may recover only for the harm already done, the value of the five minutes he lost.14 Damages for future harm would have nothing to replace, because the remaining sessions are still owed to him in kind.
The second version changes the analysis. Four missed sessions without a word is a breach that looks material and shows no sign of cure, so Arnold has a choice. He may treat the breach as partial, keep performing, and reserve his claim for damages, or he may withhold his own performance and seek damages for breach of the entire contract.15 The first path stays inside the contract and collects only for what has been missed; the second leaves the contract and collects for all of it. The next section takes up how Arnold should choose. For now, the point is that the second path is open to him only because the uncured breach discharges his own duties. If the trainer resumes and Arnold keeps attending and paying, Arnold has stayed bound, and he cannot also collect the cost of a replacement trainer, since he would then be paid twice for the same sessions.
The Restatement therefore treats materiality and totality as separate, linked questions. Section 242 makes the totality of a breach depend on an uncured material breach judged by the Section 241 factors, plus two further considerations: how far delay is likely to prevent or hinder substitute arrangements, and how much importance the agreement attaches to performance without delay.16 Comment b adds that the reasonableness of the injured party's conduct in communicating its grievances and seeking satisfaction is a factor to consider.17 A breach can thus be material and still fall short of total. The common error is to move from a finding of materiality straight to damages for the whole contract without asking whether the injured party has actually been discharged.
Breach Plus Repudiation
Section 243(2) names a second situation in which a breach by nonperformance supports damages for total breach: apart from the installment exception, a breach accompanied or followed by a repudiation does.19 The rule needs two events, and each does separate work. The breach is a failure to render a performance that is due, and any such failure counts, however small.20 The repudiation is a refusal to perform that the other side can read in the party's words or conduct. It is either a statement by the obligor that it will commit a breach that would itself support damages for total breach, or a voluntary affirmative act that leaves it unable or apparently unable to perform without such a breach.21
A refusal changes the analysis because a breach standing alone leaves open whether the breacher will repair it, and a repudiation answers that question in advance. A party that has announced it will not perform will not use a cure period, and waiting costs the injured party something: Section 242 treats the extent to which delay is likely to hinder substitute arrangements as a consideration,22 and Sackett v. Spindler holds that an injured party need not endure uncertainty about performance or wait on the breacher's convenience.23
The warehouse lease shows the two events working together. The lessee paid its security deposit on July 15, and when the first month's rent came due on July 31 it refused to pay and told the lessor it no longer intended to lease the warehouse. That refusal and statement were a material breach, and they gave the lessor the right to terminate the lease, withhold its own performance, and claim damages.24 The lessor had no reason to wait for cure, since the lessee's own words had closed it off.
A repudiation does not depend on an earlier breach. Had the lessee told the lessor on July 2 that it no longer intended to lease the premises, it would have repudiated before performance was due from either side.25 This subsection concerns the combination, in which a due performance has already gone unrendered.
Because a repudiation carries this much force, the Restatement tests it objectively. The party's language must be positive enough to be reasonably read as meaning that the party will not or cannot perform.26 A mere expression of doubt about willingness or ability falls short, although it may give the other side reasonable grounds to expect a serious breach and may ripen into a repudiation. The line protects against hasty exits: if a hesitant remark counted as a refusal, an injured party looking for a way out could seize on a passing worry, and one who terminated on a mistaken reading would risk becoming the party in breach.
A demand for new terms falls on the other side of the line. Language that, fairly read, states an intention not to perform except on conditions beyond the contract is itself a repudiation.27 The courier in Hochster v. De La Tour had agreed in April 1852 to serve the defendant on a continental tour for three months from June 1 at £10 a month.28 If that defendant had written that he would not take the trip unless the courier accepted a material pay cut, the letter would have been a repudiation. One court likewise found a repudiation in a concrete subcontractor's letter telling the general contractor that the subcontractor would shut down unless the general accepted its terms within hours.29
Doubt, though it is not a repudiation, is not useless. A party with reasonable grounds for insecurity about performance may ask for adequate assurance of due performance, and if none comes it may treat the situation as a repudiation.30 What counts as reasonable grounds and adequate assurance is as unclear as materiality itself, though at least one court has held that a distributor's poor history of punctual payments and bounced checks was enough to supply reasonable grounds.
The first lessor must therefore rely on the residual rule of Section 243(4), which asks whether the breach so substantially impairs the value of the contract that total-breach damages are just.31 A lessor that terminated on the strength of a hesitant letter would have to satisfy that test, and if it failed it would risk being the party in breach. The safer course is to ask for assurance.
Installment Payment Exception
Section 243(3) carves one class of contracts out of the repudiation rule. Where the only remaining duties of performance at the time of the breach are the breaching party's and are for the payment of money in installments not related to one another, a breach as to less than the whole does not give rise to a claim for damages for total breach, whether or not a repudiation accompanies or follows it.33 Subsection (2) opens by deferring to this exception, so a debtor who misses a payment and announces that it will make no more has still not exposed itself to damages for total breach.34 The exception withholds one claim, damages for total breach, and says nothing that excuses the missed payment itself.
The exception applies only when every one of its limits is met, so it is best run as a short screen before any total-breach analysis begins:
The first limit does most of the work, and the reason shows in what total breach normally accomplishes. Under Section 243(1), total-breach damages depend on discharging the injured party's remaining duties.35 A creditor that has already delivered the goods or advanced the funds has no remaining duties to be discharged from, no performance to withhold, and no substitute arrangement to make, so a missed installment costs it only the delay in being paid. The exception also leaves the debtor the schedule it bargained for, since a buyer who misses one of twenty-four payments does not owe the whole balance as damages for total breach.
The first limit fails in the warehouse lease. Rent is money payable in installments, but the lessor still holds performance of its own, which it may withhold, so the remaining duties are not all the breaching party's.36 A lessee that refuses to pay and announces that it no longer intends to lease is therefore a repudiating party under subsection (2), and the lessor may treat its breach as total.37 The usual mistake is to apply the exception to any contract in which money is owed, when it depends on the injured party having finished its own side of the bargain. A debtor within the exception also cannot be reached through the residual test of Section 243(4), because that test governs only cases other than those stated in the preceding subsections.38
Substantial Impairment Test
Section 243(4) governs every breach by nonperformance that the earlier subsections leave untouched. In any such case the breach supports a claim for total breach only if it so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow damages based on all of its remaining rights to performance.40 The preceding subsections cover two defined cases, a breach joined by a repudiation and the installment exception, so the residual test is the ordinary route for ordinary breaches: a payment that never arrives, a stage of work done badly, a delivery that comes late. The warehouse lessor holding a missed month's rent and a hesitant letter, but no refusal, sits here, and it must satisfy this test before it may terminate and re-let the premises.
Each phrase of the test does separate work. The yardstick is the value of the contract, not of one performance within it, which matches the remedy: damages on all the remaining rights to performance are justified only when the breach has damaged the bargain as a whole. That value is measured from the injured party's side, by what the contract was meant to deliver to it, which is the question the first materiality circumstance asks.41 The phrase at the time of the breach fixes the moment of judgment, because the injured party must decide whether to stop performing on the facts it has in hand. The closing words, just in the circumstances, send the court to the same considerations that decide materiality, so that fairness to both sides is weighed rather than assumed.
That weighing draws on the earlier sections of this chapter. Section 241 asks to what extent the injured party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably expected,42 to what extent the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture,43 and how likely that party is to cure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances.44 A breach need not be deliberate to be material, but courts may give some weight to whether it was willful or innocent or violated standards of fair dealing, and the stage of performance at which it occurs also affects its significance.45 Section 242 adds the effects of delay on substitute arrangements and the importance the agreement attaches to prompt performance, with the reasonableness of the injured party's communication as a further consideration.46 Cure enters the analysis as a forecast built from what the breacher has said and done by the time of the breach, and the delay considerations tell the court how long the injured party must wait on that forecast. The test is where materiality, cure, and timing merge into one judgment about whether it is just to end the contract.
Because the test asks for one judgment built from several smaller ones, it is best run in order, with the threshold questions answered before the weighing begins:
Sackett v. Spindler applies the test to a breach that was not a repudiation. The buyer, Sackett, had not tendered the balance due on Spindler's stock. He never repudiated and frequently expressed willingness to perform, yet the court held that the evidence warranted the inference that he did not intend to perform: it was unlikely that he would tender the balance, or that he would do so other than at his own convenience.47 Since Sackett never repudiated, subsection (2) would not apply, and the question was whether the breach was serious enough to be total. The opinion sets out the first Restatement's six factors for that question: the extent to which the injured party obtains the substantial benefit he could reasonably anticipate; the extent to which he may be adequately compensated in damages; the extent of the breaching party's part performance or preparations; the hardship on that party in terminating the contract; its willful, negligent, or innocent behavior; and the uncertainty that it will perform the rest of the contract.48
Uncertainty about performance carried the result. Spindler was not required to endure the uncertainty or to await Sackett's convenience, so he was justified in treating the nonperformance as a total breach, and the letter his attorney wrote to Sackett's attorney on October 5 was not an unlawful repudiation, did not breach the contract, and did not discharge Sackett's duty to perform or to respond in damages.49 Spindler was free to sell his stock to another purchaser,50 and in July 1962 he repurchased the stock he had sold the previous November and sold the full 6,316 shares for $22,000, which netted $20,680 after brokerage.51
The same opinion shows what rode on the judgment. If Sackett's breach had not been total, so that Spindler was not entitled to consider himself discharged, Spindler's action would have been an unlawful repudiation and itself a total breach sufficient to discharge Sackett from any further duty to perform.52 A party who misjudges the impairment can trade places with the breacher.
The usual error is to move from a finding that a breach is material to a finding that it is total. Materiality gives the injured party an election, while totality under Section 243(4) requires that the contract's value be so substantially impaired that discharge is just.